AMERICAN OPINION

# AMERICA'S RETREAT FROM VICTORY

*by*

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy

REPRINT SERIES

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It is our purpose, in issuing these reprints, to recapture for those who care some of the true history of the past twenty years.

Talleyrand said that speech was used by man to conceal his thoughts. Today that wily realist would add that "history" has become the means of falsifying the record of past events.

We hope that the rescue in this series of a few of the honest books of the period, which have been smothered by the Liberal Establishment, will cause some thin rays of truth to pierce through the fog of distortion and falsehood that now envelops America. For when man's past crimes are presented as virtuous accomplishments, he has little chance to avoid the repetition of either the crimes or their cruel results.

REPRINT SERIES

# America's Retreat From Victory

*by*

SENATOR JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY

August 24, 1961

Dear Reader:

Here is the record of George Catlett Marshall. It provides the key to an understanding of an extremely tragic and disastrous period in American history.

The contribution of Marshall himself to this tragedy was tremendous. More sad and significant, however, was the number of other men in high places who were willing to support Marshall, defend him, and help to carry out the plans and policies dreamed up for him and associated with his name.

Saddest of all was the cooperation of so large a part of the press, in making a hero of Marshall and scoundrels of his critics. For it was in connection with McCarthy's charges against Owen Lattimore and George Marshall, and Whittaker Chambers' charges against Alger Hiss, that the American press first clearly revealed the depths to which so much of it had fallen. Instead of carefully considering fully documented charges of extreme importance to the security of our country, the press as a whole — despite many honorable exceptions — brushed the accusations under the rug as quickly as possible, and devoted its full attention to villifying the accusers.

We have always felt — and have said before — that the name of George Marshall was attached to the great American foreign-aid fraud as a means of letting the really important Communists and fellow travelers all over the world know the truth: That the whole plan had really been designed and initiated by the Communists themselves for ultimate Communist purposes. This book will certainly go far to explain why such a trademark would have been — and was — so readily understood by those "in the know."

Sincerely,

Robert Welch

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# AMERICA'S RETREAT *from* VICTORY

*The Story of*

GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL

*by*

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy

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# America's Retreat From Victory

CHAPTER ONE

## *Background Leading Up To The Marshall Speech*

On June 14, 1951, I reviewed the public career of George Catlett Marshall from the beginning of World War II before the United States Senate. It was an exhaustive review, running to 72,000 words, drawn from the acknowledged sources of this period.

Among the questions raised by that speech were these: What were McCarthy's motives? Why did McCarthy single out the Secretary of Defense and spend so much time preparing such a searching documentation of his history?

Those questions recalled the advice given me by some of my friends before I gave the history of George Marshall. "Don't do it, McCarthy," they said. "Marshall has been built into such a great hero in the eyes of the people that you will destroy yourself politically if you lay hands on the laurels of this great man."

My answer to those well-meaning friends was that the reason the world is in such a tragic state today is that too many politicians have been doing only that which they consider politically wise —only that which is safe for their own political fortunes.

My discussion of General Marshall's career arose naturally and inevitably out of a long and anxious study of the retreat from victory which this Administration has been beating since 1945. In company with so many of my fellow citizens I have become alarmed and dismayed over our moral and material enfeeblement.

The fact that 152 million American people are officially asked by the party in power to adopt Marshall's global strategy during a period of time when the life of our civilization hangs in the balance would seem to make it imperative that his complete record be subjected to the searching light of public scrutiny.

As a backdrop for the history of Marshall which I gave on June 14, there is the raw, harsh fact that since World War II the free world has been losing 100 million people per year to international Communism. If I had named the men responsible for our tremendous loss, all of the Administration apologists and the camp-following elements of press and radio led by the *Daily Worker* would have screamed "the Big Lie," "irresponsible," "smear," "Congressional immunity," etc., etc., etc. However, it was the Truman branch of the Democratic Party meeting at Denver, Colorado, which named the men responsible for the disaster which they called a "great victory"—Dean Gooderham Acheson and George Catlett Marshall. By what tortured reasoning they arrived at the conclusion that the loss of 100 million people a year to Communism was a "great victory," was unexplained.

The general picture of our steady, constant retreat from victory, with the same men always found at the time and place where disaster strikes America and success comes to Soviet Russia, would inevitably have caused me, or someone else deeply concerned with the history of this time, to document the acts of those molding and shaping the history of the world over the past decade. However, an occurrence during

the MacArthur investigation was the immediate cause of my decision to give the Senate and the country the history of Marshall.

A deeply disturbed Senator from the Russell Committee came to my office for information. "McCarthy," he said, "I have always considered Marshall as one of our great heroes and I am sure that he would knowingly do no wrong. But, McCarthy," he said, "tell me who prejudiced the thinking of this great man? Why, for example, did he keep from Roosevelt the complete and correct intelligence reports at Yalta? Why did he, as Roosevelt's military adviser, approve that Yalta agreement which was drafted by Hiss, Gromyko, and Jebb? Who persuaded him to disregard the intelligence report of 50 of his own officers, all with the rank of colonel or above — an intelligence report which urged a course directly contra to what was done at Yalta and confirmed at Potsdam?"

He handed a copy of that report to me and asked: "Why did a man of Marshall's intelligence ignore such a report as this compiled by 50 of his own top intelligence officers?" The report, dated April 12, 1945, read as follows:

> The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military significance at this stage of the war would be relatively unimportant. * * * The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.
>
> If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence, to become the Poland of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Rumania; Manchuria, the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize.
>
> To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time—at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future — and simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce.
>
> Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and moral position of the United States in Asia.

Marshall had ignored this report.

The Senator went on. "McCarthy," he said, "who of evil allegiance to the Kremlin sold him on the disastrous Marshall Mission to China, where Marshall described one of his own acts as follows: 'As Chief-of-Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions. Now with a stroke of a pen I disarm them'?

"When that was done," he asked, "who then persuaded Marshall to open Kalgan Mountain Pass, with the result that the Chinese Communists could make contact with the Russians and receive the necessary arms and ammunition to overrun all of China?

"McCarthy, who on earth could have persuaded Marshall to side with Acheson and against American interests on the question of Formosa and the use of the Chinese Nationalist troops?"

Upon searching for the answers for the Senator, I found to my surprise that no one had ever written the history of Marshall — Marshall, who, by the alchemy of propaganda, became the "greatest living American" and the recently proclaimed "master of global strategy" by and for the party in power. In view of the fact that the committee,

the Congress, and the American people were being called upon to endorse or reject Marshall's "global strategy," I felt it was urgent that such a study be made and submitted to the Congress and the people.

I decided that the record of Marshall's unbroken series of decisions and acts, contributing so greatly to the strategy of defeat, should be given not from the pens and lips of his critics but from sources friendly to him. I drew on the written record—on the memoirs of the principal actors in the great events of the last ten years. I drew heavily from the books out of which the history of these times will be written for the next 500 years; I drew from the pens of Winston Churchill, Admiral William Leahy, Cordell Hull, Henry L. Stimson, James F. Byrnes, Sumner Welles, Edward Stettinius, Jr., Robert Sherwood, Hanson Baldwin, General H. H. Arnold, General Claire Chennault, General Lucius Clay, General Mark Clark, General John R. Deane, General Omar Bradley, and others. No one of them alone was trying to or did give anything remotely approaching a complete record of Marshall. The picture emerges, however, as we piece together their recollection of the events in which he figures—oftentimes fragmentary, never directly uncomplimentary, but when fitted together, pointing unerringly to one conclusion.

It is from those sources, plus the State Department's record taken from Marshall's own files, that the picture becomes generally complete.

As I commenced to write this history of Marshall, one of the first things that impressed me was that Marshall, one of the most powerful men in the world during the past ten years, is one of the least known public figures. He shuns publicity. Back in 1943, Sidney Shalett, eulogizing Marshall in the New York *Times* magazine, quoted him as having said: "No publicity will do me no harm, but some publicity will do me no good." This perhaps is why Marshall stands alone among the wartime leaders in that he has never written his own memoirs or allowed anyone else to write his story for him.

One of the criticisms of the June 14 speech was that it was inadequate because of the omission of any references to Marshall's history prior to the winter of 1941 and 1942. I think this criticism is perhaps well taken. For that reason, I shall here attempt to cover briefly the pertinent aspects of Marshall's earlier history.

He was graduated from Virginia Military Institute and soon thereafter entered the army as a second lieutenant. He served creditably in World War I, finally at the end of that war reaching a position on General Pershing's staff which brought him the friendship of that great soldier. The postwar years are more pertinent because, having reverted to his permanent rank as Captain, Marshall underwent the usual disappointments and the boredom of our peacetime army. In his case, the disappointments were perhaps more grievous than with most of his fellow officers. In the *American Mercury* for March 1951, Walter Trohan published a sketch of General Marshall's career under the title "The Tragedy of George Marshall." The article is a study of Marshall's army life prior to accession to the office of Chief of Staff. Trohan deals with what must have been the gravest disappointment that befell Marshall. This happened in 1933. According to Trohan, Marshall, growing impatient over slow promotion, besought the intercession of General Pershing with General Douglas MacArthur, who was Chief of Staff. As Trohan puts it:

> MacArthur was ready to oblige, but insisted that the promotion go through regular channels. Pershing

agreed, confident Marshall could clear the hurdles. Friendly examination of the Marshall record showed what his superiors regarded as insufficient time with troops. MacArthur proposed to remedy this, giving him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort Screven, Ga., one of the finest regiments in the army.

Marshall was moved up from lieutenant-colonel to colonel, but his way to a general's stars appeared to be blocked forever when the Inspector General reported that under one year of Marshall's command the Eighth Regiment had dropped from one of the best regiments in the army to one of the worst. MacArthur regretfully informed Pershing that the report made promotion impossible. To this day Marshall is uneasy in the presence of MacArthur.

A footnote to that version appears in the quasi-biography written by Mrs. George C. Marshall in 1946 and published under the title *Together*. After Colonel Marshall had been removed from command at Fort Screven, he left for Fort Moultrie in South Carolina. The residence of the Commanding Officer of that post was a large, rambling structure, replete with 42 French doors opening on two verandas. Mrs. Marshall, as she reports it, had barely provided 325 yards of curtains for the French doors when orders came transferring her husband to Chicago as senior instructor of the Illinois National Guard. Mrs. Marshall describes what ensued in these words on page 18 of *Together:*

He [Colonel Marshall] wrote to General MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, that he was making the first request for special consideration that he had ever made while in the Army. After four years as an instructor at Fort Benning, he felt it would be fatal to his future if he was taken away from troops and placed on detached service instructing again. He asked that he might remain with his regiment. . . .

We left for Chicago within a week. The family, my daughter and two sons, waited in Baltimore until we could find a place to live.

Those first months in Chicago I shall never forget. George had a gray, drawn look which I had never seen before and have seldom seen since.

This was in 1933. Six years later, Marshall, who had been relieved of the command of a regiment by Douglas MacArthur, would be placed by Roosevelt in command of the entire United States Army. What happened to change the unsuccessful regimental commander into the first choice of the President for the highest army post still remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. Did Marshall rise during those six years on sheer merit? Was his military worth so demonstrated that he became the inevitable choice for the Chief of Staff upon the retirement of Malin Craig? Or were there political considerations that turned failure into success?

During the early years of the late depression the army was extensively employed by President Roosevelt in setting up his social welfare projects. The army supplied much of the high personnel for WPA. Many officers who there established contact with Harry L. Hopkins later reaped high command as a result. So it was with the CCC—Civilian Conservation Corps. At Fort Screven, Marshall had under his command the CCC activities of Georgia and Northern Florida. At Moultrie he directed the CCC in South Carolina. As we read Mrs. Marshall's biography, we note that Marshall devoted care and attention to his labors with the CCC. Mrs. Marshall wrote:

I accompanied him on many of his inspection trips to these camps

and always attended the opening of a new camp, of which he made quite a gala occasion.

That year, one of the camps under Marshall's supervision was rated the best in the United States. His activities in charge of CCC camps commended Marshall to the favorable notice of those persons in Washington interested in the CCC camps. Among them were Mrs. Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and Aubrey Williams, head of the National Youth Administration. However short Colonel Marshall's record as a regimental commander may have fallen in the eyes of the Inspector General and the Chief of Staff, his CCC exertions made him friends who perhaps were far more influential in his later career.

After 1933, when Marshall failed to be promoted to general because the Inspector General of the Army reported he was incompetent to handle troops, Marshall apparently discovered that there were other avenues to promotion and power outside the narrow military channels.

I think it is necessary, if we are fully to understand General Marshall, to see the disappointed and frustrated 52-year-old colonel of 1933 in the background of the world-famous Chief of Staff of 1945. At what point and with whom did he forge the alliances that suddenly were to propel him out of his obscurity into high position in 1939? Marshall, incidentally, is practically the only military man in the history of the world who received high rank with such a lack of combat duties. I know of no other general who served in the military through as many wars as Marshall with less participation in the combat of a single one.

In 1936 he became a brigadier and was appointed to command the Seventh Infantry Brigade at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, an old frontier post across the river from Portland, Oregon. It was at Vancouver that Marshall first reached the attention of the general public. His first appearance in the New York *Times Index* occurs in the fall of 1936. It grew out of the circumstance that the Soviet transpolar fliers, headed for a reception in Oakland, landed instead on the small airfield of Vancouver Barracks, where General Marshall was the commanding officer.

General Marshall came to Washington in the summer of 1938 as Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of War Planning. In less than a year's time, President Roosevelt sent for him to announce that he was to succeed General Craig upon his retirement as Chief of Staff in September. It came as a shock, because the public had expected General Hugh Drum to be appointed. Roosevelt had jumped Marshall over the heads of 20 major-generals and 14 senior brigadiers. The appointment was generally accepted as a personal one. Roosevelt, it was assumed, had followed his own judgment rather than the consensus of high army authorities, active and retired. We know from Robert Sherwood's book *Roosevelt and Hopkins* that Hopkins favored Marshall's appointment. It was also favored by Mrs. Roosevelt.

The part of General Marshall's career as Chief of Staff that relates to the activities of the enemies of our country has received too little notice. We know that the army, while Marshall was Chief of Staff, commissioned known Communists during World War II.*

While Marshall was Chief of Staff, there occurred the famous incident of the attempted destruction of the files, wherein the Army, acting under the highest authority, set out illegally to destroy the Army's counterintelligence files on subversives, including civilians

*Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, February-March hearings, pp. 3191-3193.

as well as officers and men. That unlawful attempt to protect enemies of our country, men who are by definition servants of Soviet interests, was frustrated only through the vigilance of Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire. I do not know whether the motion so to protect Communists in the army originated with General Marshall. I do know that it could hardly have reached the stage of action without his approval.

This generally hits the high points in Marshall's history up to the point where I picked it up in my speech of June 14. However, I note that in the history of Marshall covering the past ten years, I omitted a number of points of some interest during his tenure as Secretary of State. For example, during this time a Senate committee sent him a confidential report, which is here reproduced:

*CONFIDENTIAL*

June 10, 1947

Memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall

It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State Department under the administration of Dean Acheson.

It is evident that there is a deliberate, calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places, but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity.

Regarding the much-publicized MARZANI case, the evidence brought out at his trial was well known to State Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act for a full year.

MARZANI and several other Department officials, with full knowledge of the State Department, and with Government time and money, promoted a scheme called PRESENTATION, Inc., which contracted with a Communist dominated organization to disseminate propaganda.

Security objections to these and other even more dangerous developments were rebuffed by high administrative officials; and there followed the substitution of unqualified men for the competent, highly respected personnel who theretofore held the intelligence and security assignments in the Department. The new chief of Controls is a man utterly devoid of background and experience for the job who is, and at the time of his appointment was known to those who appointed him to be, a cousin and close associate of a suspected Soviet espionage agent. The next development was the refusal of the FBI, G-2, ONI, and other federal agencies to continue the wholehearted cooperation they had for years extended to the State Department.

On file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves a large number of State Department employees, some in high official positions. This report has been challenged and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the Department, with the apparent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case break before the State Department acts, it will be a national disgrace.

Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the connection of State Department employees and officials with this Soviet espionage ring. Despite this, only two persons, one of whom is MARZANI, were released under the McCarran rider because of their subversive activity. [Nine other named persons] are only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security. There

is also the extensive employment in highly classified positions of admitted homosexuals, who are historically known to be security risks.

The War and Navy Departments have been thwarted for a year in their efforts to carry out the German Scientist program. They are blocked by one man in the State Department, a protege of Acheson named ————, who is also the chief instrument in the subverting of the overall security program.

This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down the line. Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded himself with men like ———— and ————, who bears a notorious international reputation. The network also extends into the office of Assistant Secretary Benton.

Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

[Signatures of Committee members]

This report was completely ignored by Marshall. He failed to take any action of any kind on it. In fact, he did not even give the Committee the courtesy of acknowledging the report.

He did act, however, and very promptly, in another case. On Friday, June 16, 1948, while Marshall was Secretary of State, Robert C. Alexander, who was employed in the Visa Division of the State Department, testified under oath that Communists were being allowed to enter the United States under the aegis of the United Nations. Marshall immediately denied the truth of this statement and set up a committee which denounced Alexander's allegations as "irresponsible and untrue."

On September 9, 1948, Alexander received a letter from the State Department which contained the following:

> The Department proposes to take appropriate disciplinary action against you * * * for misconduct in office and dereliction of duty.
>
> The intended action grows out of your testimony and inferences arising from your statements made before the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

On June 30, 1949, Senator McCarran wrote Admiral Hillenkoetter, who was then head of the Central Intelligence Agency, to inquire whether Communists actually were coming into the country through the United Nations. He wrote as follows:

> Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:
>
> There is attached to this letter a list of the names of 100 persons.
>
> This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas have been issued for admission into the United States either as affiliates of international organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments, and their families. . . .

Many of the names given in McCarran's letter were names which had previously been referred to by Mr. Alexander.

I now quote two pertinent paragraphs from Admiral Hillenkoetter's answer:

> Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.
>
> Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached letters are high-ranking Communist Party officials.

Shortly thereafter, Admiral Hillenkoetter was removed as head of the Central Intelligence Agency and assigned to a post of duty in the Western Pacific.

Another incident in the Marshall history, omitted from the June 14 speech, is described by George Morgenstern in his book *Pearl Harbor* as follows:

> The key witness on the "winds" message, Capt. Safford, received special attention from Sonnet and Hewitt, but steadfastly stuck to his story that the "winds" signal had been intercepted, that he had handled it, and that he had seen that it reached his superiors. (pp. 202-203)

The "winds" message was a Japanese coded message as to the time and target of their attack.

Morgenstern then describes the pressure put upon Safford to change his testimony. On page 204, the following is found:

> Despite all this pressure upon him, Safford, when he was called as a witness before the congressional committee on February 1, 1946, opened his statement with the flat assertion: "There was a 'winds' message. It meant war — and we knew it meant war."
>
> Safford said that the "winds" message was part of a Japanese overseas news broadcast from station J-A-P in Tokyo on Thursday, December 4, 1941, at 8:30 a.m., Washington time.

According to Morgenstern, page 216, Safford testified that he had been told by W. F. Friedman, chief Army cryptanalyst, that the "winds" message had been destroyed prior to the Pearl Harbor investigation "on direct orders from Chief of Staff Marshall." However, for some mysterious reason, Friedman was never called either to support or repudiate this testimony of Safford's.

Another interesting point brought out by Morgenstern on pages 201 and 202 was that Marshall, fearing that Thomas E. Dewey, in the 1944 campaign, was about to expose Marshall's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster, sent to him a staff officer with letters from Marshall, and persuaded Dewey that such an exposure would inform Japan that we had broken her code and would thereby impair our military efforts. Dewey was apparently convinced and, being a loyal American, did not mention this matter during the campaign. On page 202, Morgenstern points out that this was a deliberate deception practiced upon Dewey, because Marshall knew the Germans had found out as early as 1941 that we had broken the Japanese code and had so informed the Japanese.

Incidentally, I do not know what has happened to Captain Safford, but I do recall having read of his being promoted.

Another item of interest in regard to Marshall is found in the *Reader's Digest* of January 1944.

The late Frederick C. Painton was describing an interview had with General Marshall by 60 Anglo-American correspondents in Algiers:

> A door opened, a hush fell, General Marshall walked in. He looked around the room, his eyes calm, his face impassive. "To save time," he said, "I'm going to ask each of you what questions you have in mind." His eyes turned to the first correspondent. "What's your question?"
>
> A penetrating query was put; General Marshall nodded and went on to the next man—and so around the room, until 60 correspondents had asked challenging questions ranging from major strategy to technical details of the war on a dozen fronts.
>
> General Marshall looked off into space for perhaps 30 seconds. Then he began. For nearly 40 minutes he spoke. His talk was a smooth, connected, brilliantly clear narrative that encompassed the war. And this narrative, smooth enough to be a chapter in a book, included a complete answer to every question we had asked.
>
> But what astounded us most was this: as he reached the point in his narrative which dwelt upon a speci-

fic question, he looked directly at the man who had asked the question!

Afterward I heard many comments from the correspondents. Some said they had just encountered the greatest military mind in history. Others exclaimed over the encyclopedic detail Marshall could remember. All agreed on one thing: "That's the most brilliant interview I have ever attended in my life."

The above interview becomes extremely interesting when compared to Marshall's inability to recall what he was doing on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Originally, Marshall testified that he was out horseback riding and for that reason could not be contacted. Later, he testified his memory had been refreshed and that he actually had not been horseback riding but was at home with his wife. The third version of where the Army Chief of Staff was on that fateful morning is contained in Arthur Upton Pope's book *Litvinoff*, in which the diary acount of Litvinoff's trip from Russia to the United States shows that Marshall was meeting Litvinoff at the airport on Pearl Harbor morning. While the question of whether Marshall was riding horseback, or with his wife, or with Litvinoff seems unimportant today, it does form a very interesting comparison of Marshall's memory on these two occasions.

From here we proceed to the history of Marshall which I gave on June 14, 1951.

## CHAPTER TWO
## *Marshall and the Second Front*

I begin my review of George Catlett Marshall's history with the winter of 1941 and 1942, when the comprehensive outlines of Anglo-American strategy were drawn. During the Christmas holidays of 1941 Winston Churchill, attended by his military advisers, came to Washington and held a series of conferences at the White House with President Roosevelt and his military advisers. Japan had struck at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. Our fortunes were then joined with those of the British and the lesser powers engaged against Japan and Germany. We faced, for the first time in our history, global responsibilities. We were everywhere on the defensive. The British occupied a precarious foothold in Egypt. We still held Corregidor and Bataan, although the end there was in sight. Singapore had not yet fallen, but the Japanese were well advanced in their southward drive. Germany, master of the continent as far as the Pyrenees and the North Cape, was still marching toward the east into Russia.

The President and the Prime Minister, with their military counselors, agreed then upon a strategic plan embracing the globe. Included in this plan was a provision for the invasion of the mainland of Europe at some time during 1943. It was rightly considered that we would lack the men and the equipment to cross the Channel before 1943. What came to be known as the second front was allotted its appropriate place in the world-wide scale as this conference came to a close in the middle of January. It was at this time that the enormously destructive battle of the Atlantic began—the ruthless submarine warfare aimed at our shipping—which was to hamper our war effort far more than the conferees at the White House had expected.

The Soviet Union, its armies reeling back, had been beseeching the British since the preceding summer to attack Germany across the Channel as a means of relieving their dire pressure. After the White House conference known as Arcadia ended, the efforts of the Russians to promote a diversion in Western Europe were redoubled. The pressure was not alone maintained

against our government; it took the form of public propaganda, in which the Communists both of England and America, and their friends and well-wishers, took a leading part.

Sometime between the end of the Arcadia Conference and the 1st of April, General Marshall, who was then, as we remember, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had prepared in the War Department Planning Section a plan for the invasion of Western Europe in 1942. This planning section was under the command of Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower. I might say, parenthetically, that at Arcadia in a closed session among the President, the Prime Minister and Ambassador Litvinoff, the President had, with characteristic impulsiveness, given Litvinoff some cause to hope that the western allies might find it possible to mount this invasion in 1942. At Arcadia the President had proposed an intermediate attack in North Africa for the purpose of gaining command of the Mediterranean and threatening the Nazis from the south. It was over these two projects that the violent disputes of the next three months were to wage, disputes largely hidden from the public at the time, but in which General Marshall and the Prime Minister played the leading roles.

The plan for a "second front now" has been described by the late Secretary Stimson as "the brain child of the American Army." There can be no doubt that it was General Marshall's plan. He fought for it with the utmost vigor, a vigor going far beyond the call of duty of a purely military adviser. As Mr. Churchill once put it in a cable to Mr. Roosevelt, the matter was "a political, more than a military, issue." The text of this cable may be found on page 43 of Mr. Churchill's book, *The Hinge of Fate*. By March 9, 1942, we are told by Mr. Robert Sherwood, the President had fallen in to some extent with the Marshall plan, cabling Churchill on that date:

> I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front (on the European continent) this summer.

By the first of April, Mr. Roosevelt had been induced, as Sherwood explains on page 521 of his book *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, by Stimson, Marshall and Hopkins to supersede the North African venture known as Gymnast in favor of the transchannel operation. By then, as Sherwood puts it, "Roosevelt was attaching great importance to the political importance of this in relation to Russia." Hopkins and Marshall were sent to London to persuade Churchill. The Americans found Churchill reluctant. With his customary eloquence, the Prime Minister explored the difficulties of the operation. They lacked the landing craft necessary, they lacked the air cover and naval support. The venture would be costly, the Prime Minister believed, and he foresaw the channel turned into a "river of Allied blood." Should it fail, said Churchill, it would not only expose our friends on the Continent to great disappointment, it would hearten the Nazis and prejudice subsequent attempts to invade the Continent. However, the British agreed to give the matter careful study, which they did.

The American strategists continued hurriedly and confidently to plan for a "second front now" until early in June, when disquieting news reached Washington with the arrival of Lord Louis Mountbatten. He reported to the President that the British military experts could find no feasible method by which the invasion could be mounted. By this time the invasion bore the name Sledgehammer. Churchill followed Mountbatten to Washington, and under his representations of the difficulties, the

President weakened, returning to his preference for Gymnast. When the President sought to moderate Marshall's views, "he met with," as Mr. Stimson put it, on page 424 of his book *On Active Service in Peace and War*, "a rather robust opposition." The general quickly submitted a new paper in support of the "second front now" and against Gymnast.

On July 10, as Stimson reports it, Marshall returned from a White House conference "very stirred up and emphatic over a British War Cabinet paper vetoing Sledgehammer and calling for Gymnast." Still following Mr. Stimson's version of the occasion, Marshall

> proposed a showdown which I cordially endorsed. As the British will not go through with what they agreed to, we will turn our back on them and take up the war with Japan.

Stimson in retrospect was "not entirely pleased with his part in this venture," it should be noted. The Army Chief of Staff acquired the support of his colleagues, Admiral Ernest J. King and General H. H. (Hap) Arnold. This is the appropriate time to point out that during the war Admiral King's preoccupations were almost wholly with the Pacific theater. He had little or no interest in the strategy of the war in Europe and Asia and only exercised himself there when the claims of those theaters infringed on his own supply of ships and men. I find no evidence in the sources I have consulted that General Arnold ever took a leading part in these strategical questions. To all intents and purposes it is quite clear that General Marshall spoke the voice of the Joint Chiefs in matters of overall strategy. Returning to the Sledgehammer quarrel, Marshall submitted to the President a paper, signed by all three chiefs, proposing that we withdraw from the war in Europe unless the British acceded to his plan. Here I quote Mr. Stimson, page 425:

> The President asserted that he himself was absolutely sound on Bolero (Sledgehammer), which must go ahead unremittingly, but he did not like the manner of the memorandum in regard to the Pacific, saying that it was a little like "taking up your dishes and going away."

What Stimson came to describe as a "bluff" by Marshall was never tried. Furthermore, Stimson knew that the President had a "lingering predilection for the Mediterranean," and the Prime Minister had shown on his last visit that he, too, knew the President's feeling; on June 21 he "had taken up Gymnast, knowing full well I am sure that it was the President's great secret baby." The quotation is from Stimson.

Mr. Sherwood, in commenting on these events — page 594 — recalls that Roosevelt described the Marshall showdown as "a red herring," a phrase that has a familiar ring. Sherwood does not agree with Stimson that it was a tactical maneuver in the struggle between Marshall and Churchill, saying, "It is my impression that the plan was far more than a bluff in General Marshall's mind and certainly in Admiral King's. Indeed, the first step in it — the assault of Guadalcanal — was approved on June 25, the last day of Churchill's stay in Washington."

The President resolved the crisis by dispatching Marshall, Hopkins, and King to London to have it finally out with the Prime Minister and his advisers. They arrived in Scotland on a Saturday, finding the Prime Minister's train and an invitation to Chequers, the Prime Minister's country place, awaiting them. Rather mystifyingly Marshall, who was so obviously the guest of the Prime Minister, bluntly

declined his invitation to stop at Chequers and insisted on proceeding directly to London. Churchill protested this "rudeness" in talks with Hopkins. Marshall, it was clear, did not want to put himself under the persuasive fire of Churchill. Sherwood testifies that those were tense days for the Anglo-American Alliance. Marshall found heavy going in London. Before long Admiral King had been alienated by representations of the Royal Navy that the French coast would become a lee shore in September and hence difficult to invade.

What was perhaps the most crushing argument against Sledgehammer was dealt by a general who was taking no sides in the political question, Mark Clark. Clark was then in command of all American Army forces in the British Isles. Rather belatedly, it seems, he was called before the Combined Chiefs of Staff and asked by Marshall what American forces could be contributed to a "second front now." I quote from page 34 of Clark's book *Calculated Risk* his version of that occasion:

> I pointed out that all we could count on using would be the Thirty-fourth Division then in North Ireland. * * * The Thirty-fourth, however, had little amphibious training, it lacked antiaircraft support and it had no tanks. The First Armored Division, also in Ireland, was not yet fully equipped, nor would any other units scheduled to arrive before September 15 be prepared for battle. * * * There would be a difficult problem getting the men and equipment together and * * * there seemed to be no possibility that invasion boats would be ready * * * to say nothing of bad weather conditions prevailing at that time of year * * * the American forces will be ready to contribute comparatively little until spring of 1943.

With Clark's report it at once becomes evident that Marshall had virtually nothing to contribute in support of his plan. What he was, in effect, doing was calling upon the British to execute an operation in which they firmly disbelieved with scarcely any support from his own forces.

I leave it to the reader to characterize the general's zeal. We were to learn later that as far along as the spring of 1943, the Nazis had 1,300,000 troops in France and the Low Countries.

It should here be noted that the first troops that we sent abroad in 1942 were, as we discovered in North Africa, insufficiently trained for combat. It is no reflection upon them to say that in the first weeks of the American Corps' venture into battle they did not behave as hardened veterans. Indeed, General McNair, who unhappily lost his life by misdirected American air fire in the Normandy invasion, observed to General Clark after a visit to the North African front, "The American soldiers are not fighting in Tunisia." This may be found on page 168 of General Clark's memoirs. He qualified that in favor of the First Division. McNair attributed their lack of battle stability to the failure to inculcate discipline in their training here at home.

We have been assured times without number that General Marshall's greatest achievement in World War II was the organization and training of our armies. When our forces in North Africa had become battle-hardened and General Clark and General Patton had put them under advanced training, they behaved in the best tradition of the American Army. But what would have happened had we thrown the green troops of Kasserine Pass against Hitler's Panzers in the fall of 1942? We find a curious retrospective glance at that incident in Sherwood's recollections, where on page 807, he quotes Hopkins to this effect:

> In trying to figure out whether we could have gotten across the channel successfully in 1942 or 1943, you have got to answer the unanswerable question as to whether Eisenhower, Bradley, Spaatz, Patton, Bedell Smith, and also Montgomery and Tedder and a lot of others could have handled the big show as they would if they hadn't had the experience fighting Germany in North Africa and Sicily.

So at London in July of 1942, the plan of the "master of global strategy" went awry and the Combined Chiefs settled on Gymnast. Sherwood recalls that "General Marshall had firmly opposed it and so had General Eisenhower, who is quoted as having described the day when the decision was made by Roosevelt as possibly the blackest day in history."

In this connection, I should like to summon as a witness Hanson W. Baldwin, the distinguished military critic of the New York *Times,* whose strategic insights are universally recognized.

I think it goes without saying that the wisdom of Marshall's fervent determination to cross the Channel in the fall of 1942 or the spring of 1943 is open to grave doubts. It was, in fact, the first of a series of major decisions made by this "master of global strategy," some of them producing consequences which today increasingly threaten the well-being and survival of the West. In his book *Great Mistakes of the War* Baldwin says on page 33:

> In retrospect it is now obvious that our concept of invading Western Europe in 1942 was fantastic; our deficiencies in North Africa, which was a much-needed training school for our troops, proved that. The British objection to a 1943 cross-channel operation was also soundly taken militarily; we would have had in that year neither the trained divisions, the equipment, the planes, the experience, nor (particularly) the landing craft to have invaded the most strongly held part of the Continent against an enemy whose strength was far greater than it was a year later.

Baldwin's estimate goes far to support Churchill's objections that a disaster on the French coast due to a hasty, reckless invasion might have proved "the only way in which we could possibly lose this war." That Churchillian remark appears on page 590 of Sherwood.

It was at this time, whether or not because of the fervor with which Marshall pushed his plan, that Roosevelt superseded him in the military circle around the White House. The President chose Admiral Leahy, a naval officer of eminent achievements and the saltiest of common sense, as his personal Chief of Staff. Leahy became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and thus, nominally, Marshall's superior, although, as we shall see, Marshall overcame him at several of the most critical junctures. Although Leahy came on the scene, having been our Ambassador at Vichy, too late to participate in the discussions of Sledgehammer, he was familiar with their general setting. He wrote on page 110 of his valuable book of memoirs *I Was There* his own judgment of that sorry and provocative incident. Leahy wrote:

> The Russians could not have been more disappointed than our own Army people. * * * There was much grumbling about Britain and much criticism of Winston Churchill. The Prime Minister was convinced that England was not ready to undertake such a major effort and I did not think that we were either. He [Winston Churchill] wanted to have much more assurance of success than General Marshall could give him.

It became evident with the Sledge-

hammer quarrel that Marshall intended to make his mark on the political and strategic decisions of World War II. The next assertion of his will came late in August 1942 when, without advance notice, the American Chiefs of Staff—meaning Marshall—served notice on the British that they opposed the hitherto agreed upon plans to invade North Africa by way of the Mediterranean as well as the Atlantic coast of Morocco. "The Army," as Admiral Leahy wrote, "was not well disposed toward the adventure." The North African expedition had by now been christened Torch. The news reached Churchill on the 25th of August. Until that moment plans had been proceeding full speed ahead for landings at Casablanca on the Atlantic, Oran, which is at the western end of the Mediterranean coast of Algiers, and at a point or points further east toward Tunisia. Suddenly the American chiefs notified the British that they now believed the Mediterranean landings too hazardous to undertake.

Upon receipt of the advice from Washington that Torch had been ditched by Marshall and his associates, Churchill wrote a disparaging letter to Hopkins. This was on the 4th of September and the text of the letter appears on page 540 of *The Hinge of Fate*. He wrote Hopkins:

> Frankly, I do not understand what is at the back of all this. I thought there was agreement with Marshall and that King had been paid off with what he needed for his Pacific war. But now it seems there is a bad comeback from the professional circles in the American Army and I have a deep and growing fear that the whole of the President's enterprise may be wrecked bit by bit. With it will fall the brightest hope of the Allies and the only hope this year.

The Prime Minister's letter was never mailed. Before it could reach the letter box he had a cablegram from the President announcing that he had overcome the opposition of his staff and that the bell could again be rung for full speed ahead on Torch. Had Roosevelt not overruled Marshall at this critical time, undoubtedly Russia would enjoy the same domination over the Mediterranean area which she now enjoys over the other unhappy areas behind the Iron Curtain. As early as the White House conference known as Arcadia, the President had given his full support to North Africa, saying at that time, as quoted by the late General Arnold in his memoirs *Global Mission*, "We must get into North Africa before the Germans." In this connection it may be mentioned that Stimson remarked in his book that "The Mediterranean Basin always fascinated Roosevelt." Sherwood likewise recalls the President's strong preference for this operation, basing it upon Roosevelt's "naval mindedness," and his knowledge that by ridding North Africa of the Nazis we would free the lifeline to the Middle East and the Far East by way of Suez, thus obviating the long voyages around the Cape and providing for ourselves a whole new theater from which the assault against the Nazis could be carried out.

It is an interesting speculation as to the future of World War II had we abandoned Torch or curtailed it by landing on the Atlantic alone. There was strong British sentiment to land in Tunisia as well as Tangiers at that time. A proposal from British quarters suggested that several thousand soldiers could be flown from Malta into Tunisia, which was only weakly garrisoned by the French, to coincide with the landings in Morocco and Algiers. This was vetoed. As it turned out, Hitler was able to send more than

100,000 of his best troops into Tunisia. These forces, with Rommel's army retreating before Montgomery, made a formidable opposition, and it may be assumed that without the overpowering strength in the air which the Allies were able to command, the war in North Africa might have dragged on indefinitely. Suppose we had not landed in Algeria, suppose that the battle of North Africa had continued for months on end and engaged ever larger numbers of our forces—in whose interest would that have been? By winning the war in North Africa and by our subsequent conquest of Sicily and Italy — enterprises which were unflaggingly opposed by Marshall—we, instead of Russia, were able to hold postwar command of at least the Mediterranean away from the Red armies. The European picture as of today would have been far different if the Red armies had themselves received the surrender of Italy. As it stands, we have Italy and a foothold on the opposite shore of the Adriatic at Trieste, a foothold which is no doubt today a reassurance to Tito.

No sooner had the North African campaign been launched than Marshall again began to press his views in opposition to what Churchill called the exploitation of the prospective victory. In spite of Churchill's most eloquent pleading, Marshall only very reluctantly agreed to the attack on Sicily and with even greater reluctance to the further assault on the Italian mainland. In all these attitudes, Eisenhower, who had become commander in chief in North Africa, was Marshall's firm supporter.

CHAPTER THREE

## *The Struggle for Eastern Europe*

We now come to what was without question the most significant decision of the war in Europe: the decision by Marshall, which was made against Roosevelt's half-hearted wishes and Churchill's bulldog determination, to concentrate on France and leave the whole of Eastern Europe to the Red armies. This strategical struggle was pursued with great vigor, sometimes becoming very violent on both sides. It only reached its terminal point at Teheran, as we shall see, where the combined weight of Stalin and Marshall defeated Churchill. I cannot dwell too urgently on this great decision. Its military effects were of no very great importance, although the unnecessary invasion of southern France, enjoined by Stalin and Marshall, gave Kesselring a welcome breathing spell in northern Italy and protracted Mark Clark's campaign for the Po with an attendant loss of American lives. It is the political consequences of this controversy which stand forth in all their stark implications for us today. I will attempt to summarize the debate briefly.

The British, from the beginning of the strategical discussions over North Africa, had been intent on carrying the war into the Mediterranean. Their motives were mixed. Foremost perhaps was their desire to relieve their forces in Egypt, which had suffered several crushing blows. Secondarily, they wanted the use of the Mediterranean for very obvious purposes of communication. Thirdly, the British have had for many generations a paramount position in the eastern Mediterranean and had wide interests both in those lands and in the Suez Canal as a gateway to India and their great possessions and dependencies in the Orient and the Southern Seas. There was a further and personal factor, which Marshall frequently characterized as the Prime Minister's preoccupation with eccentric operations, such as the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign in World War I with which Churchill's name will be forever associated. Overshadowing and of

much more importance, of course, as we see it now and as we get glimpses in the writings of the principal actors of those times, was a steady desire on the part of the British to reach Eastern Europe and the Balkans before the Red armies.

I think there can be no question that Hanson Baldwin is correct when he stigmatizes our military planning in this connection as short-sighted. Churchill, with his intimate and profound knowledge of the continuing drama of Europe, knew that a war is only a phase of history. Victory is one thing; where you stand at the end of a war is another. He had the ability to foresee what Europe would look like as a result of certain policies.

Marshall triumphed over Churchill at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943 with reference to this question. That conference marked the end of Churchill's sway over the great decisions of the war. Thereafter the policy of the United States in the European war was wholly and without deviation the policy announced by Joseph Stalin. There was a break in the relations between the two English-speaking powers, which were carrying the brunt of the war, and the United States thereafter was found always on the side of Stalin. To obtain this result, Marshall bore down on British preoccupation with the Mediterranean. I have enumerated some of the basic factors in the British position. Marshall ignored all of these except the one addressed to British self-interest. He minimized and derided the British position, likewise ridiculing the Prime Minister's strategical judgment by frequent references to the Dardanelles.

I believe that the rupture of interest between the United States and Great Britain signified by this decision was one of the most fateful changes in world relationships of our times. It embittered our relationships at the first Quebec meeting, at Cairo, and at Teheran.

At the moment let me generalize that the year 1943 was by all odds the critical year of the war, casting its shadow over the whole postwar period in which we now find ourselves convulsed by anxiety and doubt. It was in February of 1943 that the Russian achieved victory over the Germans at Stalingrad. In fact, it can, I believe, be safely stated that World War III started with the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Thereafter, they opened their diplomatic war against the West when they gave every evidence of turning upon the Polish armies, the Polish people, and the loyal and devoted Polish government in exile in London.

The Kremlin's treatment of the Poles, beginning in the spring of 1943, was the touchstone of this whole period, and it was at the Quebec Conference that the whole dangerous policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was forecast and prefigured. At Quebec the decision was made to invade Southern France and keep the weakened American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army indecisively engaged in Italy. It was at Quebec also that the most amazing and indicative document that has so far emerged from the voluminous records of World War II was brought to bear. This document, a memorandum entitled "Russia's position," affords us clear insight into our subsequent surrenders at Teheran and Yalta as well as at Potsdam. The document appears, and only there, in Sherwood's book about Hopkins. It is on page 748. The memorandum is ascribed there to "a very-high-level United States military strategic estimate." Sherwood reports that Hopkins had it with him at Quebec. Can it be doubted that this document emanated from General Marshall, whoever draft-

ed it? The question of its authorship is extremely important and I hope that some day its authorship will be fixed for all to see.

No document of World War II was more controlling on our fate. Here it is in full:

> Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.
>
> The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.
>
> Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive.

Sherwood understood the memorandum's significance. He wrote, "This estimate was obviously of great importance as indicating the policy which guided the making of decisions at Teheran and, much later, at Yalta." What this document is, in effect, is a rationalization of the whole policy of submission to Russia during the remainder of World War II and, most notably, in our relationships with China thereafter. What it said was that as a result of the utter destruction of Germany which we had erected into a policy at Casablanca with the phrase "unconditional surrender," Russia would be the unquestioned "top dog" in Europe after the war, and that it behooved the great, enlightened, and truly progressive English-speaking peoples therefore to cater to, to placate, and, in fact, to submit to the will of the Kremlin thereafter. It said unmistakably that the British endeavors in the Mediterranean, which Marshall had succeeded in blocking, were aimed at balancing power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia.

That is bad enough. But the document went further. It insisted that we must carry this attitude of solicitude and deference beyond Europe. We must bow to Russia in the Far East as well. It is here that we find the first explicit delineation of the policy which produced the shameful betrayal of China at Yalta, the blackmail paid by Roosevelt to get Russia into a war which she had already announced her eagerness to wage.

The debate over Mediterranean policy had reached a focus at the White House late in May of 1943 when Churchill again crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of a common objective. He found that Marshall was opposed to any action in the Mediterranean beyond taking Sardinia after the occupation of Sicily, and that then all of our subsequent efforts were to be devoted to what the late Sir John Dill, who was Chief of the British Military Mission in Washington, once referred to in a letter to Churchill as "Marshall's first love" — the transchannel invasion. Roosevelt was pulled and hauled on this issue as much as on any in the war.

His inclinations, based upon his knowledge of geography and his adventurous strategic desires, were toward expanding the war into eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, Roosevelt went along with Marshall.

So determined was Churchill at the White House in May to have his views prevail that he induced Roosevelt to send Marshall with him to North Africa for a further discussion with military leaders in that theater. I gather from *The Hinge of Fate* that it was at this point that Churchill realized that his great antagonist in the war was Marshall, that he and Marshall were virtually contending for the mastery of their views over the impulsive will of the President. It was in connection with that journey by Churchill and Marshall to North Africa that the Prime Minister wrote in *The Hinge of Fate,* pages 812 and 813, a tribute to the general as a "statesman with a penetrating and commanding view of the whole scene." It may be noted that Churchill did not ascribe to Marshall a correct and trustworthy view of the whole scene and it may be wondered, in the light of their great conflicts, whether the Prime Minister was not perhaps indulging his rather frequent taste for irony.

In Tunis, Churchill brought to bear upon Marshall and Eisenhower, who invariably sided with Marshall, the whole battery of persuasion of himself and his military subordinates. The views of the British were made more persuasive by the fact that they had carried the major burden of the war in North Africa. Marshall resisted, remaining, as Churchill comments, "up 'til almost the last minute, silent or cryptic." The upshot was that Marshall insisted upon deferring the decision until Sicily had been made secure and "the situation in Russia known." The quotation is from Churchill's report of the conference.

We recur to the Quebec Conference of August 14, as Admiral Leahy reports it on page 175 of his book:

> General Marshall was very positive in his attitude against a Mediterranean commitment.

Churchill did, however, temporarily prevail, and we invaded Italy; but Marshall and Stalin won out in the end when Roosevelt sided with them at Teheran, where there was thrown away the advantage of the Italian campaign. We are indebted to Mr. Sherwood for the fullest account of the Stalin position at Teheran. This account was obtained, of course, from Hopkin's oral and written recollections. At one point, quoted on page 780 of Sherwood's book, Stalin urged that the "entry of Turkey into the war — a development to which Churchill was passionately committed, and which the Russians had been previously urging — might be helpful in opening the way to the Balkans, but the Balkans were far from the heart of Germany, and the only direct way of striking at that heart was through France." Here Roosevelt suggested that it might be useful if the Americans and British marched east in conjunction with Tito's Partisans into Rumania and joined with the Reds at Odessa. Stalin inquired if that would affect the thirty-five divisions earmarked for the transchannel invasion of France. Churchill replied that it would not. Sherwood comments, however, that "nothing could be further from the plans of the United States Chief of Staff." It was then that Stalin brought his powerful guns to bear to conclude the controversy. I am quoting from Sherwood—and he wrote:

> Stalin then expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to scatter forces in various operations through the eastern Mediterranean. He said

> he thought Overlord (the name given to the crosschannel invasion) should be considered the basis of all operations in 1944 and that after the capture of Rome, the forces used there should be sent into southern France to provide a diversionary operation in support of Overlord. He even felt that it might be better to abandon the capture of Rome altogether, leaving 10 divisions to hold the present line in Italy and using the rest of the Allied forces for the invasion of southern France. He said it had been the experience of the Red army that it was best to launch an offensive from two converging directions, forcing the enemy to move his reserves from one front to the other. Therefore, he favored simultaneous operations in northern and southern France, rather than the scattering of forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

We may be sure that Stalin's didactic observations fell upon Marshall's ears with the authority of revelation. It was made abundantly evident at Teheran that Marshall had earned the warm approval of Stalin. On page 783 of the Sherwood record, the author notes that both Stalin and Voroshilov obviously recognized Marshall as the supreme advocate of Overlord and therefore their friend.

Sherwood notes that after Marshall had discussed the difficulties of Overlord, Voroshilov turned to him and said admiringly, "If you think about it, you will do it."

On page 791, in discussing the moot question at that time of who was to command Overlord, Sherwood repeats a report that Stalin, in discussions with Roosevelt, made evident his conviction that "no wiser or more reassuring choice" than Marshall could be made.

It is noteworthy that the brusque, cynical Stalin exhibited fondness for no other American at Teheran with the single exception of Hopkins, with whom he had a personal acquaintance dating from Hopkins's visit to Moscow in August of 1941 upon an errand which must have gratified the tyrant's heart. It was then that Hopkins offered the bountiful support of the United States to the Kremlin's resistance of the Nazi invaders without stint, *quid pro quo*, or any reservations whatsoever.

General "Hap" Arnold, who was not present at Teheran because of illness, himself commented on the reports as he received them. His comments will be found on page 465 of *Global Mission*. Said Arnold:

> Apparently Uncle Joe had talked straight from the shoulder about how to carry on the war against Germany, and his ideas, it seems, were much more in accord with the American ideas than with those of the British.

Admiral Leahy, who was there, adds his comment after giving his own version of the Stalin speech I have quoted from Sherwood. He wrote, and this is on page 204 of his book:

> The Soviets and Americans seemed to be nearly in agreement as to the fundamental strategic principles that should be followed.

Teheran took place in November and December of 1943. The projected invasion of southern France was given the name Anvil. Although Churchill and his advisers continued to fight for the eastern operation, it was manifestly a losing struggle. Churchill himself employed his stormy eloquence on Mark Clark, as that great American general was fighting his way up the Italian peninsula, assuring Clark that, given his way, the Western Powers could "slit this soft under-belly of the Axis." The Prime Minister was pursuing a lost cause. After the capture of Rome, the Fifth Army which had be-

come, as Clark proudly asserts, "a tremendous fighting machine" with "horizons unlimited," was disrupted. Over Clark's strong protests, he lost the Sixth Corps and seven crack French divisions, all withdrawn for Anvil. Clark was compelled to abandon his drive to the Po, giving Kesselring respite, a decision that puzzled the German high command, as we were to discover after their surrender. Writes Clark on page 371 of *Calculated Risk*: "It was a decision that was likely to puzzle historians for a much longer time." In considering his impression of that period when he sat down to write his memoirs after the war, Clark says, on page 368:

> Stalin, it was evident throughout the Big Three meeting and negotiations at Teheran, was one of the strongest boosters of the invasion of southern France. He knew exactly what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans, which he had staked out for the Red Army. If we switched our strength from Italy to France, it was obvious to Stalin * * * that we would turn away from central Europe. Anvil led into a dead-end street. It was easy to see why Stalin favored Anvil at Teheran and why he kept right on pushing for it.

I come to a most significant passage which deals specifically with what lay before Clark and was denied him by Marshall in collaboration with Stalin. Says Clark:

> After the fall of Rome, Kesselring's army could have been destroyed if we had been able to shoot the works in a final offensive. Across the Adriatic was Yugoslavia * * * and beyond Yugoslavia were Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.

At this point may I remind you that wherever the Russian armies came to rest, there they stayed and there they remain to this day. The Red armies have not relinquished one inch of the soil upon which they stood at the defeat of Germany. General Clark continues:

> There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British mind, but so far as I ever found out, American top-level planners were not interested. It was generally understood that President Roosevelt toyed with the idea for a while but was not encouraged by Harry Hopkins. After the fall of Rome, we "ran for the wrong goal," both from a political and strategical standpoint.

Clark has, moreover, a superior vantage point from which to judge the consequences because he served with the utmost distinction as the American military governor of Vienna after the war. It was there that he felt the iron determination of Soviet imperialism to prevail over eastern Europe. It was there that he had ample opportunity to consider how differently things might have been had we proceeded east from the valley of the Po instead of turning our forces into the trivial and wholly unnecessary operations in southern France. General Clark concludes on page 3 of his book, and I here summon him as the most highly qualified witness in this matter:

> Yet, I believe our mission was fulfilled and, save for a high-level blunder that turned us away from the Balkan states and permitted them to fall under Red Army control, the Mediterranean campaign might have been the most decisive of all in postwar history.

At another place, expressing his frustration over the enfeeblement of his campaign in Italy— and this is on page 368—Clark writes:

> A campaign that might have changed the whole history of the relationships between the Western World and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away. * * * The weakening of the campaign in Italy * * * was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war.

Where, until President Truman's appointment of this great General to the nonmilitary post of Ambassador to the Vatican, at this writing not yet confirmed, was Mark Clark, a man pronouncedly in his military prime, a man of great achievement in Italy and of outstanding political and diplomatic accomplishment in Austria? After his return home from Vienna, General Clark was consistently relegated to secondary commands.

So also is this true of General Wedemeyer, likewise in his prime, likewise a soldier of great brilliance and great devotion to his country. Both Wedemeyer and Clark dared to oppose the judgment of General Marshall in his history-making decisions, Clark in Europe, Wedemeyer in Asia.

Where is Lucius Clay? Like MacArthur and Clark, a great proconsul; young as generals go, brilliant and steadfast in devotion not to party but to country. Clay insisted on resisting the Russians at Berlin.

The lessons must be plain as a pikestaff to the military leaders of our establishment. A prudent officer, looking forward to his continued career and his pension, certainly has to think twice before he expresses an objective and disinterested opinion of strategy or of the conduct of our military operations.

General MacArthur is not the only monument to the determination of Marshall to rule our politico-military policies now as he ruled our policies in World War II.

The evidence is overwhelming that at Teheran we had no political policy. It so appears in the recollections of Major-General John R. Deane. After observing, on page 43 of his book *The Strange Alliance*, that "Stalin advocated the American point of view in our differences with Britain" and again that "Stalin's 'position' coincided with that of the American Chief of Staff and every word he said strengthened the support they might expect from President Roosevelt in the ultimate decision," Deane continues:

> Stalin appeared to know exactly what he wanted at the conference. This was also true of Churchill, but not so of Roosevelt. This is not said as a reflection on our President but his apparent indecision was probably a direct result of our obscure foreign policy. President Roosevelt was thinking of winning the war; the others were thinking of their relative positions when the war was won. Stalin wanted the Anglo-American forces in Western and southern Europe; Churchill thought our postwar position would be improved and British interests best served if the Anglo-Americans, as well as the Russians, participated in the occupation of the Balkans. From the political point of view, hindsight on our part points to foresight on Churchill's part.

The political immaturity of our generals, mentioned by Hanson Baldwin, was never so glaringly manifested as at Teheran—if, indeed, it was political immaturity and not the consequences of some hidden, and so far undisclosed, influence binding us to Stalin's world policy.

Could it be that, like children, our military advisers at Teheran dwelt only on the pleasures and tasks of the day with no thought for the morrow? Could they not envisage what was so clear to many other minds, that after the conclusion of hostilities the Soviet Union, conscious of its vast and violent world

mission, might be ranged against us in every quarter of the globe? Or did Marshall and his supernumeraries on the Joint Chiefs at Teheran think of England instead of Russia as the future enemy?

Before quitting this question of the Marshall—Churchill conflict over the most important phases of the recent war, I shall cite another example of the ruthlessness with which Marshall prosecuted the rift. It should be noted that Churchill, who is an indomitable adversary in the House of Commons and elsewhere, fought on against Anvil long after his was a lost cause.

At Malta, where the Yalta conferees on the Anglo-American side met before proceeding to that Black Sea conference, the British chiefs still persisted in the hope of accomplishing some Mediterranean operations while preparing for the attack across the Channel. In Sherwood's book, page 848, is a revealing passage concerning those discussions of the combined chiefs:

> The arguments reached such a point that Marshall, ordinarily one of the most restrained and soft-spoken of men, announced that if the British plan were approved by the Prime Minister and the President, he would recommend to Eisenhower that he had no choice but to be relieved of his command.

Again, as in the case of the ultimatum over the "second front now," Marshall was threatening summary action unless his will prevailed. Why was it so important to Marshall that the British, as a full partner in the Anglo-American war effort, should be prevented from creating that balance of military power in the Mediterranean spoken of in the memorandum circulated by Hopkins at the first Quebec conference?

Before we proceed to other matters of political strategy, let us consider instances in the management of American military affairs in World War II where Marshall's actions operated directly against the interests of the United States.

General Deane is an uncommonly friendly witness for George Marshall. He was Marshall's protégé, having served as secretary of the combined chiefs in Washington until Marshall sent him in the fall of 1943 to Moscow as chief of our military mission in Russia. It should be noted that we had withdrawn our military and naval attachés from Moscow because, in fulfilling the time-honored and expected duties of military attachés, they had aroused the resentment of the Kremlin. Those duties include discovering and reporting to the home government all information that can be obtained legitimately regarding the armed forces of the country to which the attachés are accredited. The information thus sought has to do with weapons, tactical programs, and methods, and the size, training, and disposition of that country's military forces.

Before General Deane departed for his mission in Moscow, he had a long interview with General Marshall, in which the Chief of Staff cautioned Deane to seek no information about these matters for fear that he might "irritate" the Russians. We were then devoting a substantial part of our military production to Russia's war effort, and doing so in entirely good faith. It was not long after General Deane reached Moscow that he began to be impressed with the extraordinary contrast between the Russian attitude and our own. This he describes on page 49 of his book:

> We had thousands of Soviet representatives in the United States who were allowed to visit our manufacturing plants, attend our schools, and witness tests of aircraft and

> other equipment. In Italy, and later in France and Germany, Russian representatives were welcome at our field headquarters and allowed to see anything they desired of our military operations. Our policy was to make any of our new inventions in electronics and other fields available to Russia * * * each month I would receive a revised list of secret American equipment about which Russia could be informed in the hope that if it could be made available, it might be used on the Russian front. We never lost an opportunity to give the Russians equipment, weapons, or information which we thought might help our combined war effort.

The head of the American military mission in Moscow encountered the Iron Curtain long before Churchill coined the phrase. Toward the end of the war, when our always excessive solicitude seemed to him no longer warranted, he advised a more resolute attitude toward the Russians. Each time he suggested that we demand a fulfillment of an agreement—and they broke virtually every agreement we made with them—he was called off in Washington. By whom? Deane's reports went directly to General Marshall.

Why have we not had, and do not have at this moment, an American, or at least an allied, corridor to Berlin? Why are we at the mercy of the Russians in our access to the joint capital of the occupying powers? Why was it possible for the Russians to produce the blockade of Berlin with a simple set of instructions with which General Clay found it impossible, as a man of honor and a great American soldier, to comply?

It has been the fashion to place the blame for this lack of foresight upon the late John G. Winant. As our Ambassador to London he sat on the European Advisory Commission, which worked out under the direction of the respective governments the zoning of Germany for occupation purposes. Winant cannot answer our questions now. General Clay, in his report on his great career as the American governor in Germany, *Decision in Germany*, accepts the version that shoulders the blame onto Winant. Subsequently, on page 26, he himself takes the final blame. He was in Berlin in late June of 1945 arranging with Marshall Zhukov for the entry of American forces into their occupation position in Berlin.

The Russians were, as usual, hard to deal with. Clay was eager to get his occupation going and to have American forces on guard in Berlin. Instead of pressing the matter of a corridor under American rule, guarded by American troops, with supply and communication beyond the reach of Russian interference, he accepted an oral understanding with Zhukov that nothing would ever occur to impede American access to Berlin. Our zonal border, it will be recalled, had been set at a distance of 100 miles from Berlin.

The legend which saddled the late Winant with the responsibility for this tragic blunder in postwar arrangements has been vigorously challenged by Hanson Baldwin, who fixes the responsibility not on Winant but squarely on the War Department. "War Department" at that time meant George Catlett Marshall. From the fall of 1939 until the fall of 1946, Marshall was, in effect, the War Department. I cannot find in Mr. Stimson's memoirs any occasion on which he opposed the will of General Marshall.

On page 47 of Baldwin's book, he expresses his conviction that "the blame for Berlin cannot be laid—exclusively, or even to a major degree—upon the shoulders of Winant." Two pages later, in reviewing the background of this deplorable situation, Baldwin notes that

the State Department at the end of 1943 proposed that the zones of postwar occupation "be so drawn as to bring each into contact with Berlin." I hasten to add that Cordell Hull—not Marshall or Dean Acheson—was then the Secretary of State.

I go on with Baldwin:

> For some reason that defies logical understanding now, the War Department rejected this suggestion, which would have solved nearly all our postwar Berlin difficulties, so that it was never even broached in the EAC.
>
> In February 1944, the British informally suggested that a corridor to Berlin be established and defined, but the War Department again objected, stating that this was not a subject for the EAC, but that the entire question of access to Berlin was a military matter which should be settled at the proper time by military representatives.
>
> And this eventually was the solution, but the military representatives made a botch of it. In May 1945 our allies stood deep on German soil. The zonal occupation agreements for Germany * * * placed Berlin in the Russian zone * * *. In May 1945 ECA's work was done and SCAEF was briefed as to its accomplishments.

The military were told the history of the problem. They were told that the War Department had blocked any consideration of it by EAC and were advised that the EAC staff believed we should have an indisputably American corridor under our own military supervision and guard. As we have seen, neither Marshall nor Eisenhower made provision for a corridor; General Clay concluded his improvised agreement with Zhukov, and the fat was in the fire.

Why did the War Department, meaning Marshall, leave us at the mercy of the Russians in Berlin? Why did not our forces march first into Berlin? Why was General Patton not allowed to take Prague? We have only glimpses of the inner reality behind these questions. We gather from General Bradley's memoirs that Eisenhower's decision not to reach Berlin first was conditioned to some extent by the flagrant quarrel that had arisen between Bradley and General Montgomery. In his version of the matter, appearing on page 69 of *Life* magazine for April 30, 1951, Bradley relates a discussion with Eisenhower wherein it was decided not to allow Montgomery the forces with which to push on to Berlin. Eisenhower was principally concerned at the moment lest the armies of Russia and the English-speaking powers should meet in a head-on collision somewhere in Germany. I quote Bradley on how Eisenhower solved the problem:

> Five days before Hodges and Simpson closed their trap around the Ruhr, Eisenhower radioed Stalin through the United States Military Mission in Moscow of his plan to push east with a powerful force in the center to the line of the Elbe.

The Elbe line was where Eisenhower proposed to Stalin that he would bring the American armies to rest. Eisenhower fixed this highly important point, be it noted, with Stalin. It is clear from Bradley's recollections that Eisenhower acted on this highly political question without consulting with Churchill. Whether he consulted Roosevelt and Marshall is not mentioned by Bradley. Certainly he must have consulted Marshall. I continue to quote Bradley:

> Although Churchill protested Eisenhower's radio to Moscow as an unwarranted intrusion by the military into a political problem, he reserved his angriest vituperation for the plan Eisenhower proposed.

> The Prime Minister, according to Eisenhower, was greatly disappointed and disturbed that SCAEF had not reinforced Montgomery with American troops and pointed him toward Berlin in a desperate [sic] effort to capture that city before the Russians took it.

We gain another bit of insight into this situation—which provides a somewhat more startling example of command discretion than any displayed by MacArthur in Japan—from Edward Ansel Mowrer in his book *The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy,* in which he relates having been personally told by the White House that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, meant Marshall.

We have been reviewing General Marshall's record as it applies to the war in Europe with an eye to his competence and the extent to which he backed up Stalin in political decisions. The Democrats in Denver proclaimed him "a master of global strategy." The term, of course, implies much more than purely military planning. As we have seen, when you reach the upper levels of command inhabited during the recent war by Marshall, Churchill, and Roosevelt, the military decisions blend everywhere with the political. They cannot be dissociated. A war is not conducted merely as a means of killing the enemy, although during the late war Mr. Roosevelt expressed so much joy over Russia's accomplishments in that line that it might be questioned if he always understood the nature of war. We have seen recently in Korea where, beggared of any respectable and intelligent war purpose, our forces were led to believe from Marshall's testimony that the only objective of that war was to kill the enemy. I put aside the ethical considerations raised by such an attitude and point out that the enemy's extermination is not enough. Of course, it is necessary to have the enemy's submission. But, also, great powers must have some understanding of what that submission portends and what they intend to do with the world over which they will exercise sway once the enemy is defeated.

We have observed what calamities might have befallen the allied cause had Roosevelt accepted Marshall's persistent demand for a "second front now." We have seen the equivocal and dangerous nature of his counsel with reference to the North African invasion. We have observed how closely he fitted his views into those of Stalin over every major issue of the war. We have seen further how, in his instructions to General Deane, his refusal to exercise foresight over the corridor to Berlin, and his wish that the Russians might first enter that great and shattered city, General Marshall's decisions paralleled the interests of the Kremlin.

The Democrats at Denver may have been correct in their appraisal of General Marshall's attainments as a strategist. The question that arises, after examining the facts we have enumerated and those we shall enumerate, is, in whose interest did he exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been successful in the highest degree.

## CHAPTER FOUR
## *The Yalta Sellout*

We turn now to the Pacific side of the recent global war and an examination of General Marshall's behavior in that vast theater.

First, we must consider what went on at Yalta. If, as Hanson Baldwin

observes, we lost the peace because of great political mistakes in World War II, then it is clear that those mistakes culminated in the controlling decisions made at the conferences of Teheran and Yalta. It is my judgment that we lost the peace in Europe at Teheran. It is even clearer that we lost the peace in Asia at Yalta. At Teheran, Marshall's will prevailed in concert with that of Stalin regarding the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. At Yalta, Marshall's will prevailed, with that of Stalin, regarding Russia's entry into the far Eastern war as a full-fledged partner entitled to the spoils of such participation.

Yalta is a former resort of the Romanoff Czars on the shores of the Black Sea. Yalta is where Roosevelt, already suffering from the enfeeblement that brought his death four months later, went to meet again with the bloody autocrat of all the Russians and the Churchill with whom he had signally differed at Teheran.

The President, bearing the marks of his approaching dissolution, traveled the thousands of weary miles by plane, by ship, and, at the end, by motorcar, to treat with the tyrant, to seek accord with him, and to make the bargains over Poland and China that today plague and shame us all. The principal, the most utterly damaging, of these bargains contained the bribe he paid to Stalin for his eleventh-hour participation in the war against Japan.

Manchuria is the richest part of China. In terms of area and natural resources it may described as the Texas of China. But Manchuria has not been China's to enjoy for many years. It must be recalled, and this is a key to much of China's fearful history during the last generation, that the age-old empire of China came to its end in the years before World War I. The causes of that event need not take up too much of our time. The imperial court, presided over by the aged dowager empress, was beset by western ideas, western-trained Chinese reformers, notably Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by the incompetence of the empress' advisers and by the conflicting and greedy claims of the Great Powers. And so it fell, and for a generation China has known neither peace nor freedom from foreign invasion.

Manchuria itself has been the scene and occasion of wars for more than half a century. Japan and Russia alike have fought for its mastery since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. When, after that war, the Japanese were prevented by the European powers from enjoying the fruits of victory in Manchuria, Russia lunged down from the Maritime Provinces of Siberia to fill that vacuum.

By the year 1904, Japan felt strong enough to challenge Russia over Manchuria. That was what the Russo-Japanese War was about, a war in which Theodore Roosevelt backed Japan by deed and sentiment, out of fear of the growing might of Russia in eastern Asia. Theodore Roosevelt was solely pursuing American interest, and when he saw that Japan, if it won too conclusive a victory, might succeed to Russia's mantle and advance farther into China, Roosevelt intervened. He brought the Japanese and Russians together at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to negotiate a peace which checked Japanese ambitions even as it also ended Russian sway in Manchuria.

The intervening years saw a steady encroachment by Japan over Manchuria, an encroachment viewed with alarm by the single-minded Americans who then conducted our foreign policies, until the climax was reached in 1937 when Japan launched full-scale war against China for undisputed control of Manchuria and northern China.

Korea, which is a geographical dependency of Manchuria, had, of course, been sacrificed to Japan's imperial ambitions along the route and had long since been integrated into the empire of Nippon.

The historic route of the invaders of China has been from the north. During many centuries, China has mounted guard on its northern frontiers against the peoples of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia, who have, for as many centuries, been regarded as barbarians by the civilized Chinese. Manchuria has been the key to the security of China since the Manchu conquest nearly four centuries ago. This fact we should remember and consider, as we remember Yalta.

It was a rich, highly developed Manchuria that was at stake at Yalta. It was Manchuria which Franklin D. Roosevelt thrust upon the Russians; it was, moreover, conferred upon the new barbarians with full understanding that the United States was thereby satisfying an old imperialistic design of the Kremlin. The very language of the secret protocol which sealed the bargain at Yalta recognized this fact. What Roosevelt ceded to Stalin at Yalta, without the knowledge or consent of the Chinese, whose sovereignty there we always had upheld, was, and I quote from the work of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians,* page 93, in restoration of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." The testimony before the Russell Committee shows that Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to the Yalta Conference and that the terms of the agreement selling out Chinese interests were kept secret from him. At the Cairo Conference, however, it was solemnly agreed with him that China's rights in Manchuria would be fully respected and protected. When Wedemeyer appeared before the Russell Committee, he testified that when Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek of the Yalta agreement which sealed the doom of the Republic of China, Chiang was so shocked that he asked Hurley to repeat it before he could believe it.

The project was not disguised. It was a nakedly imperialistic aggression over the prostrate body of China. What Roosevelt sealed and delivered in the protocol agreed upon by him and Stalin in a secret parley consuming only eleven minutes, and thereafter kept locked away in a White House safe for many months, were the historic levers of power over China—the ports of Darien and Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. It was through these ports and along those railways, with their armed guards and command of all the communications, including the telegraph lines, that first Russia, then Japan, and now again Russia, with her satellite, exercised mastery over Manchuria.

According to the terms of the bribe, drawn up in Moscow by that elusive statesman of the half world in which our relations with Russia dwell, Averell Harriman, Dairen was to be "internationalized," the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union being safeguarded, and "the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored." I have quoted from the protocol as published by Stettinius. I again quote:

> The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provides an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

There were other provisions. Russia's

long-standing protectorate over Outer Mongolia was ratified, the southern end of Sakhalin, of which Russia was deprived by the treaty of Portsmouth, was restored to her, and, as if to boot, the Kuriles were handed her. The Kuriles had been Japanese, never Russian.

What shall we say of Roosevelt's cynical submission to Russian imperialism in that deal? This was the Roosevelt, mark you, who is represented to us in Sumner Welles's book *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, as the high-principled opponent of imperialism in Hong Kong and India. This is the Roosevelt who steadfastly through the war sought to persuade Churchill to get out of India and surrender the British leasehold of Hong Kong. This was the Roosevelt who proposed to Stalin at Yalta—and I find this in Sherwood on page 866—that Hong Kong be handed to the Chinese or internationalized and that colony turned over to a United Nations trusteeship. This was the Roosevelt who suggested that French Indochina be placed under a trusteeship. He broached this idea to Sumner Welles.

What does this whole sordid transaction teach us about the good faith of the advisers of Roosevelt and the assorted liberals, Communists, Communist sympathizers, and agents of the Kremlin — the Achesons, the Lattimores, the Phillip Jessups, and the Institute of Pacific Relations — who have for so long been insincerely befuddling the people with talk of imperialism and people's rights in Asia?

Why, merely this, that in their minds the imperialism of the west, that decaying instrument of European expansion, is wicked and must be opposed. The imperialism of Russia is not only commendable but must be advanced by every means of diplomacy and war at whatever cost to the United States. That is the liberal-leftist doctrine on imperialism. Have we heard one liberal voice raised in the Senate or elsewhere in condemnation of Roosevelt's surrender to Russian imperialism at Yalta? This is the test, and by it we may measure the monstrous hypocrisy of the liberal elements in Congress and in the country which have assisted in and applauded the surrender of all China to Russia without the firing of a single Russian shot.

The apologists for Mr. Roosevelt have attempted to palliate his offense. Robert Sherwood suggests that Roosevelt was enfeebled. I quote him: "Had it not been that the Yalta Conference was almost at an end and he was tired and anxious to avoid further argument," Roosevelt, in his opinion, might have refused to sign the protocol. This is on page 867 of *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. Yet on the preceding page he nullifies the argument of fatigue by conceding:

> It is quite clear that Roosevelt had been prepared even before the Teheran conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East, for they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges taken by the Japanese from the Russians in the war of 1904.

And Sherwood elsewhere reports Roosevelt offering Stalin the "warm-water port" of Dairen as early as Teheran. Mr. Sherwood is known as a fervent and practicing "liberal." He sees nothing wrong in restoring the imperialistic "possessions and privileges" which had been wrested from a dying Chinese empire by the forces of Czarism. The insincerity, the speciousness, the nonlogical workings of the liberal mind when it comes to Russian ambitions are clearly manifested by Mr. Sherwood. Mr. Welles presents a better case. He, too, is a "liberal," but with a higher sense of responsibility to

history. I need not introduce Mr. Welles to the reader. He served in the Department of State until the fall of 1943, when his long-standing feud with Cordell Hull brought about the termination of his public service. Mr. Welles was Under Secretary of State when dismissed. His book *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* is an apologia for his late chief, Roosevelt, and a justification for certain events in his own career.

Mr. Welles insists that Roosevelt's betrayal of China and the United States at Yalta is excusable. On what ground? The ground of military necessity. When Roosevelt acted, according to Welles, he did so because he believed that we must entice Stalin into committing what we see as a plain act of self-interest, namely, getting into the war against Japan before it was too late. The President made that judgment because he had been advised by his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that we had a long, hard row to hoe with the Japanese and that without Russia's help we might not achieve victory.

That is the Welles doctrine. It is likewise the Marshall-Acheson-State Department line. Where Welles differs is that he exposes that the military advice upon which Roosevelt acted was false and misleading. And where does the pursuit of this rationalization lead us?

As we might suppose—to Marshall.

It was Marshall who stood at Roosevelt's elbow at Yalta, urging the grim necessity of bribing Stalin to get into the war. It was Marshall who submitted intelligence reports to support his argument, suppressing more truthful estimates, according to Hanson Baldwin on page 81, and keeping from the stricken Roosevelt knowledge that the Japanese were even then feeling for peace in acknowledgment of defeat.

Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy to advance American interest? Did we sorely need Russian assistance? Or was it another in the baffling pattern of General Marshall's interventions in the course of the great war which conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin?

The desire to have Russia's help in the Far East arose with Marshall and was embodied, as we know, in the fateful appeasement memorandum of the first Quebec conference in August of 1943; the document which charted our course, at Teheran and Yalta and thereafter. The desire to entice Russia into the Japanese war was officially embodied in a combined Chiefs of Staff doctrine which I have previously discussed and which was presented at second Quebec, in September of 1944. Back in the fall of 1943 the President sent Averell Harriman to Moscow as his Ambassador and Marshall sent General Deane, their "prime objective," as Deane describes it on page 25 of his book, being "to induce Soviet participation in the war with Japan."

Were inducements necessary? Was it in the Kremlin's interest to become a full-fledged combatant in the war in the Far East, to take part in the defeat of Japan and have a seat at the peace table where the spoils of war would be divided? Was it to the Kremlin's interest to march its armies into Manchuria, from which they had been barred since 1905 by the Kwantung army, and to be in possession there when the war ended? If some Americans did not grasp the strategic importance of Manchuria, there is certainly abundant evidence that the Kremlin, faithful to Lenin's dictum that "he who controls China controls the world," never lost sight of it. To ask these questions is to answer them, even if we lacked the indications of Stalin's determination to be in at the Far Eastern kill, which we have. Any intelligent American, after giving the

matter sufficient thought, would know that the aim of Roosevelt and Marshall at Yalta should have been not how to get the Russians in, but how to keep them out.

I have evidence of four occasions before Yalta on which Stalin indicated to American officials his desires in this respect. The first such suggestion was made to Averell Harriman when, in August of 1942, he went to Moscow with Churchill to deliver the word that the operations in North Africa had been substituted for the second front now so exigently demanded by Stalin and Marshall. The occasion is reported by General Deane on page 226 of his book:

> Stalin told Harriman then that Japan was the historic enemy of Russia and that her eventual defeat was essential to Russian interests. He implied that while the Soviet Union's military position at that time would not permit her participation, eventually she would come in.

Roosevelt knew of this: so, presumably, did Marshall. It should be noted that Stalin ascribed Russian interests as his motive for fighting Japan.

The Red Czar next informed General Patrick J. Hurley of his intentions. And in April of 1943 Hurley so reported to Admiral Leahy. The reference is on page 147 of Leahy's book, and I quote him:

> Hurley saw Stalin * * * and the Marshal told him that after Germany was defeated, he would assist America in the war against Japan. * * * The [our] army, in its plans for the defeat of Japan, was anxious to have the help of Russia. It was my opinion that we could defeat Japan without Russian assistance.

The stouthearted old sea dog Leahy held to that opinion throughout, being overborne always by Marshall. The history of the war in the Far East and our postwar loss of China, with the resultant war in Korea, would have been far different had Leahy been, as his rank prescribed, the principal military adviser to Roosevelt. That was not to be. The iron will of Marshall prevailed over Leahy, as it did over Roosevelt and, after the invasion of Italy, over Churchill.

I digress to report the substance of Leahy's opposition to asking the Russians in, because it bears so pertinently on the issue and because Leahy's qualifications were so high, his reasoning so soundly American. In the record of World War II, where Leahy occupies an honorable place, no question can arise at any time as to where his loyalties lie.

In the strategical discussions about how to end the war with Japan, Marshall urged that a land invasion was necessary; an invasion beginning in the southern islands of the Japanese homelands and proceeding north; an invasion requiring upward of 2,000,000 riflemen and entailing, according to Marshall's estimates, casualties of half a million.

Leahy reports a conference at the White House on the 10th of July, 1944. This is on page 245 of his book. Wrote Leahy:

> It was my opinion, and I urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that no major land invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war.

Far more impelling even than Leahy's own judgment was the agreement he reported, page 251, between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz at Honolulu on that point. Leahy accompanied Roosevelt, it will be recalled, on that excursion, which coincided with the Democratic National Convention of 1944. He attended the

conversations at which the President and the Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific projected victory over Japan. These—Nimitz and MacArthur—were the true experts on the Pacific. Let us have their judgment and Leahy's conclusions thereon:

> The agreement on fundamental strategy to be employed in defeating Japan and the President's familiarity with the situation acquired at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's ground forces in their own country. MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement that the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the western Pacific and that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland.

There we have the strategy of MacArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy for winning the war in the Pacific—but not Marshall's. Who was right?

Yet, despite this expert advice, Marshall persisted. At the staff discussions before second Quebec, two months later, Leahy had this to report on page 259:

> By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade. However, a proposal was made by the Army to force a surrender of Japan by an amphibious invasion of the main islands through the island of Kyushu. * * * The Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan. The Army not only was planning a huge land invasion of Japan, but was convinced that we needed Russian assistance as well to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion.

So much for the strategy of the matter.

I return to the indications of Russia's intentions in the Far East. Cordell Hull was the unexpected and extremely gratified recipient of the third such proffer of help in the Far East. The venerable Secretary of State, an upright and proud man, although he did not wholly understand the currents of high policy that swirled about him, went to Moscow in October of 1943 to attend a conference of the Allied foreign ministers. It was a momentous occasion for Mr. Hull, the crowning accomplishment of a lifetime devoted to public service. At that time Mr. Hull suffered from the current credulity about Russia's good faith in the highest American circles. He was insisting, to the annoyance of subtler minds, that Russia was one nation, Britain another, equal in merit as in menace, and that we must treat them with equal and exact consideration. A fair-spoken man himself, Mr. Hull assumed that he was dealing with men of like scruple.

On the final night of his stay in Moscow, Mr. Hull attended the usual state banquet with which the master of the Kremlin regales his visitors. The banquet took place in the Hall of Catherine the Great at the Kremlin. They dined upon the gold plate and drank innumerable toasts from heavy crystal.

Mr. Hull felt himself honored at being on the right of the prime author of world misfortune. After having suitably flattered Stalin, Hull was "astonished and delighted" when the Marshall turned to him and said, as recorded on page 1309 of Mr. Hull's *Memoirs*:

> clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies had succeeded in

> defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan. Stalin had brought up this subject entirely on his own. * * * He finished by saying that I could inform President Roosevelt of this in the strictest confidence. I thanked him heartily.

The Secretary of State lost no time in cabling the promise to Roosevelt, using both the Army and Navy ciphers in the hope of keeping the news from the British. It was Mr. Hull's belief, a belief too often verified, that the Foreign Office in London leaked secrets.

In his reflections over Yalta—Hull had by then resigned—he seemed to think it passing strange that Roosevelt had had to acquire Stalin's assistance by means of "numerous territorial concessions." He added, "When Stalin made his promise to me it had no strings attached to it."

The fourth assurance from Stalin regarding the Far East came at Teheran, where he observed that, once peace came in Europe, "by our common front we shall win" in that quarter. But by that time, recognizing that Harriman and Deane had come to Moscow to ply him for assistance, Stalin was, quite naturally, thinking of his price. The price was not cheap. In October of 1944, during Churchill's second visit to Moscow, Harriman got Stalin on the subject of the war against Japan. Deane noted, page 247 of his book, that Stalin agreed that

> the Soviet Union would take the offensive after Germany's defeat, provided the United States would insist on building up the necessary reserve supplies (for 60 divisions in Siberia) and provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified. His latter proviso referred to the recognition by China of Russian claims against Japan in the Far East.

At this sitting Stalin agreed that the United States Navy might have Petropavlosk on the Pacific as a naval base and our air forces the sites for heavy bomber bases in the Maritime Provinces, but denied us use of the Trans-Siberian railroad to haul in supplies.

Thus was the gun pointed at Roosevelt's head. If we wanted Russia in, we had to supply her armies and force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the loss of Manchuria, which had been solemnly promised him by Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo. Marshall insisted, again beyond the call of duty, that we needed Russia. Roosevelt believed him. The cost of supplies was fairly heavy, the Russians stipulating what amounted to 860,410 tons of dry cargo, 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. All this in addition to the supplies for the war in Europe called for under the fourth protocol. The Russians got 80 per cent of their Far Eastern requirements. One item was 25,000 tons of canned meat. That would provide at least 50,000,000 meat courses, at a pound each, for the Red soldiers.

I return to Yalta, where Stalin got his price in full, the conference which is described by Hanson Baldwin as "the saddest chapter in the long history of political futility which the war recorded."

What was the war situation in the Pacific in January of 1945? Leyte was ours, the Japanese fleet was defeated, Manila fell during the Yalta Conference, Okinawa lay ahead, but the Air Force was daily raining destruction and fire on Japanese cities. General William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services was reporting from China that the Kwantung army had been dissipated and depleted. In any case, said the OSS, what was left could not be moved to the Japanese home islands because of the lack of shipping. Nor could the Japanese troops in China

be moved. Everywhere the story was the same. The Japanese merchant marine was beneath the sea. The blockade was strangling Japan. Admiral Leahy wrote on page 293 of his book concerning his own views of the situation at this time:

> I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me and Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin.

Hanson Baldwin, writing after the event, endorsed Leahy's conclusions, saying, on page 79 of his book:

> At the time of Yalta, Japan was already beaten—not by the atomic bomb which had not yet been perfected, not by conventional bombing then just starting, but by attrition and blockade.

Yet, at Yalta, General Marshall redoubled his endeavors for Russia's entrance with all the indomitable persistence he had applied to the "second front now" and to blocking Mark Clark and the British over the eastern European strategy. The late Edward Stettinius, who, as Secretary of State, played a hand at Yalta, recalled on page 90 of *Roosevelt and the Russians*:

> I knew at Yalta * * * of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the far-eastern war.

Before Stettinius left Washington he saw a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the State Department which said: "We desire Russia's entry at the earliest possible date."

In support of his urgent demand, Marshall used what Baldwin calls on page 80 of his book "a pessimistic intelligence estimate," which placed the strength of the Kwantung army in Manchuria at 700,000, a total of 2,000,000 Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland—"all first-rate troops and well trained," according to Marshall. Far worse than this, Baldwin exposes the fact that more realistic intelligence estimates, corresponding to the facts as brought out after the war and held at that time by Leahy and others, "never reached the top echelon at Yalta." Even the Washington *Post*, that pillar of leftism and scuttle in Asia, felt moved on September 9, 1948, to declare that the Chiefs of Staff "made a blunder, to advise Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that Japan would last 18 months after VE-day."

Nor is this the end of this dismal story.

Rear Admiral E. M. Zacharias, in his book *Behind Closed Doors*, declares that a Japanese peace feeler had been received and transmitted to Washington by General MacArthur before Roosevelt departed for Yalta. So at the time we sold out China to Russia to induce Russia to come into the Japanese war, we already had Japan suing for peace, according to Admiral Zacharias. The peace overtures were to come thick and fast from Japanese sources after Yalta, and by the time of Potsdam they were so authentic that the Declaration of Potsdam was put forward to answer them.

Yet, late in April of 1945 Marshall was still intent upon wooing the Russians into the Far Eastern war. As Stettinius reports it on page 97:

> At a top-level policy meeting in the White House just before the San Francisco conference opened on April 25, President Truman, the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans. At this meeting the United States military representatives

> pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian entry into the far-eastern war.

Who advised patience with Russia? Marshall? At Potsdam, in July, Marshall's determination to have the Red Army equipped by us and moved into Asia had not abated. Stettinius reports with some perplexity on page 98:

> Even as late as the Potsdam conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos on July 16, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the far-eastern war.

In his endeavor to exculpate Roosevelt of blame for the shame of Yalta, Welles saddles the blame on the combined Chiefs of Staff. We know that it was Marshall who formed and carried through those decisions. Welles attributed Marshall's desire to have Russia in to "a basic misapprehension of existing facts." This appears on page 153 of his book.

Is that the answer? Or was Marshall's insistence that Russia should be allowed to serve her own interest—not ours—in eastern Asia a part of that pattern which has been emerging with ever greater clarity as we trace his career: a pattern which finds his decisions, maintained with great stubbornness and skill, always and invariably serving the world policy of the Kremlin?

The President had another adviser at Yalta, Alger Hiss. Was it upon the advice of Hiss, who served on the Far Eastern desks and was deep in the China plot, that Roosevelt, chatting companionably with Stalin, assured him that "the blame for the breach [in China] lay more with the Comintern and the Kuomintang than the rank and file of the so-called Communists?" The quotation is from page 868 of Sherwood's revelatory book. It will be noted that the Communists, the Kremlin lackeys who sent their armies against our own in Korea, were to Roosevelt only "so-called" Communists, and pretty good fellows at that, more reasonable, the President may have gone on to say, than Chiang Kai-shek's bunch or even your own fellows, Generalissimo, in Moscow! We shall encounter that view of the Chinese Reds as agreeable innocents again when we examine Marshall's mission to China.

Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in World War II was clouded by no ulterior objective, no hidden thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day. What kind of a "master of global strategy" would have made the mistake of Yalta? What kind of strategic genius does that display? The whole array of Marshall's strategical endeavors, from Sledgehammer, or the "second front now," through his timidity over invading Algiers by way of the Mediterranean, to his downright insistence upon invading southern France two months after D-day in Normandy, is unreassuring. We inevitably contrast Marshall's competence with MacArthur's during MacArthur's grand march from New Guinea to Tokyo. In the circumstances, how could we take Marshall's word on strategy? If he so overestimated the Japanese as to believe they could fight on for a year and half after the Germans quit in Europe, how can we place any reliance upon his estimate of the strength of the Russian empire and its Chinese satellite in eastern Asia at this moment?

So the A-bombs fell on Japan and the war was over, although so careful a military critic as Hanson Baldwin believes that the bombs hastened the end of the war, if at all, by only one day. Japan's fate had been determined long, long before. And with the end of the

war Yalta's chickens came promptly home to roost. The Red Army after a bloodless campaign of six days took over all Manchuria; it stood also in North China. The Reds were there by right, ceded them at Yalta.

And so we come to the question of Korea. Who divided that unhappy land at the thirty-eighth parallel, ordering that Russia should receive the surrender of Japanese forces above that line, the United States below it? Here we have one of the major mysteries of that time. At Yalta, Stalin had agreed with Roosevelt on a four-power trusteeship for Korea, the powers to be the United States, China, Russia, and Britain; a decision which he ratified when Harry Hopkins visited Moscow in the late spring of 1945. The trusteeship called for a unified administration of all Korea with a government of Koreans to be freely elected and governing the whole peninsula. What happened to the trusteeship? When Japan quit, there arose the problem of accepting the surrender of the forces in the field.

Welles covers the situation on page 167 of his book *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*:

> Some subordinate officers in the Pentagon hastily recommended that the Russians accept the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea, while the American troops would accept it south of that line.
>
> I am told that this line was fixed because it was convenient. Certainly it was fixed by officials with no knowledge of what they were doing, and without consulting any responsible members of the administration who might have had some regard for the political and economic considerations which the decision so lamentably ignores.

There the matter rested until Senator Brewster of Maine brought to light the fact that the thirty-eighth parallel has historic significance. I had wondered why the War Department in August of 1945 chose to divide Korea for purposes, as was said, of receiving the Japanese surrender, along the thirty-eighth parallel. Why not the thirty-seventh, or the thirty-ninth parallel? Why had it to be the thirty-eighth parallel?

The Senator from Maine, in delving into *United States Relations,* which is the continuing history of American foreign affairs as published periodically by the Department of State, found that the Russians had fixed the thirty-eighth parallel, nearly a half century ago, as the dividing line. They were negotiating with Japan over the division of Korea between the two imperial systems. So the Czar's diplomats proposed to those of the Emperor of Japan that the thirty-eighth parallel be the border between the two empires.

I refer to the testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees on June 8, 1951, when Secretary Acheson was being questioned by Senator Brewster on this point. Acheson disclosed that the decision was taken not by "some subordinate officers" but by the Secretary of War, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee, and by the President. This was a high-level decision, initiated by the Secretary of War. Who was, in effect, the Secretary of War during the later incumbency of Mr. Stimson? I think no one who was in touch with the inner workings of those adjoining offices at the Pentagon, who has read the late Secretary's explicit memoirs, who knows the inner relationships between the two men, can doubt that in matters of this sort it was Marshall who made the decisions, Stimson who rubber-stamped them.

It was Marshall who selected the line

for the division of Korea which was chosen by the Russian Foreign Office and General Staff nearly fifty years ago. It was Marshall who restored Russia's pre-1904 claims on North Korea in August of 1945.

I refer you particularly to this colloquy, the Senator from Maine asking, Secretary Acheson answering the questions:

> SENATOR BREWSTER. Isn't it rather interesting to note the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea was proposed 45 years earlier by Russia as a means of dividing the spheres of influence of Russia and Japan incident to the episodes around the Russo-Japanese War?
>
> SECRETARY ACHESON. I am not familiar with that, Senator.

I content myself with noting that a Secretary of State unfamiliar with the complex of imperial ambitions in the Far East during the days when the United States was playing a humane, a creditable and an American part in those affairs can scarcely qualify as an expert on the diplomacy of the Far East.

The war was over. Millions of Americans, mistakenly thinking that their international troubles were over too, had a 24-hour celebration only to awaken before long to find that, even as we were spending vast amounts of flesh and blood and steel to win the war, there was being conducted what appeared to be a planned loss of the peace.

## CHAPTER FIVE
## *Marshall and Stilwell*

Before we plunge into the Chinese situation as it developed, with Japan defeated but Russia replacing her in Manchuria, let us have a brief look at what had been happening in China that bears on the career of General Marshall. We come at once to the contentious figure of General Joseph W. Stilwell, known as "Vinegar Joe." Stilwell was Marshall's protégé. Marshall had him appointed American military representative and chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek in 1942.

I shall not elaborate upon "Vinegar Joe's" personal eccentricities, his self-assurance verging on arrant egotism, his contempt for Chiang Kai-shek, who was to him always "The Peanut," and for all the Chinese leaders except the Reds of Yenan. The dismaying chronicle of Stilwell is known. It was this twisted but courageous soldier who was set up by Marshall as our supreme military representative among the 450 million Chinese, who had for years been bearing the brunt of Japanese power, retreating and fighting, moving ever inland, but refusing with honor and dignity to make peace with the invader.

The greatest barrier to cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell was not the American's own unaccommodating spirit. Stilwell was surrounded in China by a clique of young Foreign Service officers supplied by the State Department, headed by John Paton Davies as his political adviser. Stilwell and Davies had been friends since 1938, when both were in Hankow, Stilwell as American military attaché, Davies as consul general. Those were trying days in the war between Japan and China. They were days also of the common front, when the Communists were nominally fighting alongside the Nationalists and ranks presumably were closed. The American colony at Hankow likewise included Captain Evans Carlson, later a brigadier general in the Pacific.

I would remind the reader that Stilwell and Carlson are the Communist heroes of our war in the Far East, that both were and are honored in the *Daily Worker* and throughout the Communist movement in this country.

Dominating the intellectual life of the American colony in Hankow, according to Freda Utley, who was also there, was that effective agent of Russian imperialism, Agnes Smedley. That Miss Smedley, a recreant American, was a Russian spy throughout her long career in China, is doubted by no instructed American. I quote from Miss Utley's new book, *The China Story,* a scholarly and temperate account of how the Hiss-Acheson-Lattimore-Marshall group and their accomplices converted the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949 into a Chinese-American war. I quote from pages 106 and 107:

> Agnes (Smedley) * * * captivated "Vinegar Joe". * * * Davies was also a great admirer of Agnes Smedley, whom he called one of the pure in heart. He used to invite us to excellent dinners at the American consulate, at which he expressed both his admiration and affection for Agnes. * * * He (Davies) became one of the most potent influences in the Department [of State] furthering the cause of the Chinese Communists.

Davies, as Stilwell's political adviser, surrounded himself with young men of his choice and ilk—John Stewart Service, Raymond P. Ludden, and John Emerson. We have heard of Service before. I do not ask you to believe upon the sole authority of my word that the full weight of Stilwell, of Davies, and these young men was thrown in the balance of the conspiratorial, subversive Chinese Reds and against our ally, the Government of China. The reader may have read the State Department's insincere and dissembling White Paper on the China question. I bid him read again, study, and mark the reports sent back to Washington by Stilwell's clique; read them with this in mind, that except for the reports of the naval attaché in China, these were the only advices the administration had to go on regarding the situation in that huge and distressed land.

The Army and the State Department were suffused with pro-Red propaganda emanating from Stilwell's circle. It is one of the few benevolent dispensations of fate in this situation that Admiral Leahy had a clear stream of information. Apart from his influence, and the word of honest travelers and finally the blunt advices of General Pat Hurley, I honestly believe that Stilwell would have been kept in China and the Reds have been able to conquer that land several years before they finally accomplished it.

Davies was suitably rewarded by Dean Acheson for his sell-out of an ally, serving as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Committee, where he is strategically placed to help further the betrayal he began in Chungking.

It was the constant endeavor of the Davies people in China to assure the Departments of War and State that the Chinese Communists were moderate reformers, simple agragrians in the style of Thomas Jefferson, with no subservience to Moscow.

We find an excellent example in this in report No. 34. document No. 109A7, dated September 28, 1944, a document signed by John Stewart Service and sent to the State Department:

> Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Communists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support.

We find the following in report No.

10, dated March 13, 1945, again signed by John Stewart Service:

> The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is the party of the Chinese peasant. Its program—reduction of rent and interest, progressive taxation, assistance to production, promotion of cooperatives, institution of democracy from the very bottom—is designed to bring about a democratic solution of the peasant's problems. On this basis, and with its realization of the necessity of free capitalistic enterprise based on the unity, not conflict, of all groups of the people, the Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China. These are the only possible guaranties of peace and stability.

This friendliness toward the Communists in Asia extended also toward the Japanese Communists. Luckily, General MacArthur was in Japan. The State Department's advice was not followed there. But let me quote again from a John Service document, S 187, with "Q" number 524:

> The Japanese Communist Party is still small (Mr. Okano himself does not claim more than a few thousand members), but it has the advantages of strong organization and loyal, politically experienced membership. If its policies, as claimed, seek to achieve our own hopes of a democratic, non-militaristic Japan, we may wish to consider the adoption toward it of an attitude of sympathetic support.

The Stilwell-Davies group took over in China in 1942. Soon thereafter Lauchlin Currie, at the White House, and John Carter Vincent and subsequently Alger Hiss, at the State Department, were exercising their influence at the Washington end of the transmission belt conveying misinformation from Chungking. The full outlines of Currie's part in the great betrayal have yet to be traced. That it was an important and essential part, I have no doubt.

What bearing did Stilwell's assumption of command in China in 1942 have on the acknowledgement made by Earl Browder before the unlamented Tydings subcommittee that our China policy from 1942 to 1946 undeviatingly followed the Communist line?

Is this mere coincidence? I do not think so.

Before coming to the dénouement of this sorry state of affairs, I give you another view of the activities of Stilwell and Davies in Chungking. This testimony comes from an eyewitness, a valorous retired major general of the United States Army Air Forces, Claire Lee Chennault, who won undying fame with his Flying Tigers. I am referring to Chennault's recorded experiences in China, *Way of a Fighter*, where he reviews Stilwell's behavior in unsparing detail. Chennault describes how Stilwell in the spring of 1944 sent a mission to his friends in Yenan. I quote from page 317 of *Way of a Fighter*:

> The American mission to Yenan was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking Government. Contents of secret reports from the Yenan mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff. No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists, who, they said, were really only "agrarian reformers" and more like New Dealers than Communists. The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with "hoarding lend-lease arms" to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade

the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese.

The American propagandists for Red China — men paid by all taxpayers — were mendacious as well as disloyal to our alliance and to American interest. I quote further:

> After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer conducted an exhaustive survey of all Chinese Army equipment and reported that not a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with the exception of 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow. The generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to Yenan. That they were also defending the Tungkwan Pass, one of the three vital gateways to west China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to bolster the sagging Salween offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Sian. Only a sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese offensive short of its goal.

I have quoted General Chennault at this length because these passages go to the heart of the means by which the American people were misled and Government policy distorted during World War II to bring about our present disasters. I continue to quote Chennault:

> The Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red armies. * * * Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke (in Chungking) that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies as secretary of state.
>
> During this period there was a strong group of left wingers in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department who used Stilwell's sympathy for the Chinese Communists and his violent antipathy to the generalissimo as a lever to shift American policy in favor of the Communists. Had Stilwell been retained in his China-Burma-India command their chances for success would have been brightened. The situation was so bad that when Wedemeyer arrived he found it necessary to make all American officers in China sign a formal statement saying they understood clearly their duty in China was to execute official American policy, not to make it.

Where does General Marshall stand in all this? After all, we are reviewing *his* career, not Stilwell's. Stilwell was his friend. He had nominated him for this job. What did Marshall do about this field commander who was, as we have seen, so disloyal to American policy, so flagrantly perverting our purpose in China, so grievously failing both as a soldier and a diplomat, and who, in the end, would avow his desire to take up arms with the Communists against America's ally?

Demands for Stilwell's removal from his disastrous command reached such a pitch in June of 1943 that President Roosevelt directed Marshall to recall him. Stilwell and Chennault, at loggerheads over the land-air strategy in China, had been brought back to Washington just previously, where they appeared before the Combined Chiefs and advanced their respective positions. Chennault won the decision.

Thereafter, Stilwell's strategy, his disposition, and his good faith were under constant and steady suspicion in the minds of all the American leaders save only those of Marshall and the old gentleman who had been captivated by him, Secretary Stimson.

Did Marshall yield to the President's wishes that Stilwell, who was proved to be supporting the Chinese Reds, be recalled? He did not. I quote from Mr. Sherwood's book *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* on page 739, where he recalls that incident, declaring George Marshall said that

> he realized that Stilwell was indiscreet but that he is the only high-ranking officer we have that can speak Chinese and that, while obviously he does not like Chinese officialdom, he has a great regard for the Chinese people.

I believe that we have in the clause I have just quoted a clue to Marshall's regard for Stilwell and to his obstinate determination to keep him and his bevy of Communist propagandists at Chungking. If Marshall had been entirely candid, I believe the words would have been, "He has a great regard for the Chinese Reds." As we all know, "people" in Communist parlance has a special meaning. It does not mean all the people in our sense. It is a catchword, an occult word, clear to the initiates, meaning Communists. They use it in a special sense to designate all their political organs. We all recall the various people's fronts organized to promote the Communist cause throughout the world. More specifically the Chinese Communist army was referred to in Communist parlance as the people's army. We shall find, as we pursue this subject, further evidences of General Marshall's affinity for the Chinese Reds.

Not only did Marshall brook the President's will in this instance; he risked a quarrel with Hopkins, the man who, as Sherwood elsewhere reports, had been his principal supporter for chief of staff when Marshall was unexpectedly jumped over many more highly qualified and experienced major generals and brigadier generals to that post in 1939. Sherwood is recording a conversation with Marshall, also on page 739, when he says:

> Marshall has told me that his only serious difference of opinion with Hopkins in the entire war was over this issue between Stilwell and Chennault. * * * Hopkins was on the side of Chennault, who was close to the Fascist-tinted Kuomintang.

I beg you to note the use of the Communist term "Fascist-tinted" to describe the Kuomintang. It is significant. The false and meaningless epithet "Fascist" was on the lips of every apologist and propagandist of Russian imperial designs in those days from Smedley to Alger Hiss and their journalistic echoes in the United States. One might also check the accuracy of Marshall's views regarding the superior fighting value of the Chinese Reds with Chennault's plain, unvarnished opinions, with those of General Wedemeyer, and with a host of other loyal Americans who know whereof they speak. The legend that the Reds were genuinely fighting the Japanese was another of the big lies with which American opinion and judgment were corrupted and subverted at that time.

Roosevelt did not press for Stilwell's recall. Sherwood gives a partial explanation of why he did not do so in a continuation of the foregoing passage:

> Roosevelt had high regard for both Stilwell and Chennault, as fighting men, but his overriding concern was to keep China in the

> war and to hold the friendship of the Chinese people for the United States, and he had those objectives in mind in every decision he made.

I think it is evident that Roosevelt did not know what we know. A great deal of water has gone over the dam; we are better informed and more vigilant now. We know that Stilwell and his gang were a nest of anti-American activity at the Chinese capital, that they did us unmeasured harm both in injuring the faith and credit of Chiang Kai-shek in America and in deceiving us concerning the minions of the Kremlin at Yenan. Chennault supplies us with other insights into Roosevelt's attitudes toward China at this time. During his visit to Washington in the spring of 1943, Chennault saw the President three times. It was evident that the President had a due appreciation of Chennault's gallant services in China, that he respected and liked him. On page 225 of his book, Chennault reports Roosevelt assuring him that:

> His policy was aimed at creating a strong pro-American China to emerge from the war as a great stabilizer among the oppressed peoples of the Orient. I have a deep conviction that had he lived and maintained the faculties which he had at his prime, the debacle of our postwar floundering in China and the incredible folly of the Marshall mission would never have occurred.

However that may be — and I sometimes feel that some have too indiscriminately charged Roosevelt with the blame for what has happened in China — Marshall remained at the President's elbow, a trusted adviser able to overshadow the loyal and foresighted counsel of Admiral Leahy; as we have seen, the tide of reports from the field, serving the great conspiracy, still flowed into Washington.

The impatience of Leahy with Stilwell and all he stood for breathes through a brief entry in his book, page 172, where he notes that "the problem [of the China command] was not to be solved for more than a year, however, when Stilwell was finally relieved of his command in October 1944."

And, on page 271, Leahy observes that even after Stilwell's insults had moved Chiang Kai-shek to demand Stilwell's head as the price of remaining in cooperative wartime relations with America, "Marshall made repeated efforts to induce the President to retain 'Vinegar Joe' regardless of Chiang's objections." Leahy observes drily that the President had to give "direct and positive orders" to Marshall before Stilwell was at long last called home.

How does that compare with Marshall's attitude toward the great proconsul of Japan? What accounts for the difference? Stilwell played with the Reds in China; MacArthur, on the other hand, made no secret of his wish to break their power over Asia. In whose cause was Marshall enlisted when he fought with such bitter obduracy to retain at Chungking the friend of the stooges of Moscow?

Before I leave the subject of Stilwell, I want to refer to a photostatic copy of a page from the New York *Daily Worker* of January 26, 1947. Represented on this page is a handwritten letter of the general's to a friend. The letter appears under the letterhead of the Commanding General, Headquarters Sixth Army. Stilwell was then commanding the Sixth United States Army. The letter was addressed to a friend whose identity the *Daily Worker* did not see fit to disclose. Stilwell wrote, and I quote:

> Isn't Manchuria a spectacle? But what did they expect? George Mar-

> shall can't walk on water. It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.

At that moment the forces of the Republic of China were successful in Manchuria. They had reached the peak of their efforts at pacification. This was, of course, displeasing to Stilwell.

What Stilwell is saying is that even Marshall, unable to perform miracles, had not yet been able to deliver Manchuria to Chu Teh. This passage will grow clearer as we proceed with this narrative. Stilwell wanted also to give his assistance to the man who had carried support of him almost to the point of defying President Roosevelt. Need I remind the reader that Chu Teh, the heir of Agnes Smedley, was then, and is now, the Commander in Chief of the Chinese Red Armies warring with us in Korea?

And so Stilwell finally came home to be succeeded by that great American soldier, Albert Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer has not enjoyed the friendship and patronage of the powerful Marshall since the day he brought home his wise and effective report on China in 1947 and since the further day when he refused, putting his career in peril, to sign a doctored version of his report which Marshall, by then Secretary of State, wished to issue in further delusion of the American people.

Wedemeyer does deserve the fullest confidence and esteem of the American people and I look forward to the day when, please God, this country may again have the full use of his talents, his judgment and his unalloyed devotion to his country and her interests. Wedemeyer redeemed our situation in China, he forged a fighting instrument out of Chinese conscripts, he reestablished good relations with our long-suffering and loyal ally, Chiang Kai-shek, and he conducted the affairs of America in the interests of America.

The war came to an end with the Russian armies firmly entrenched in Manchuria and the northern provinces of China, thanks to Marshall's endeavors at Yalta, but with Wedemeyer at Chungking still able, if left alone, to salvage something out of the situation.

The Chinese people might at last have hoped to be free from the great troubles which had torn and vexed their land since the last days of the old Empress Dowager. But no. The Reds at Yenan, determined as always on acquiring all China in the service of the Kremlin, launched into guerrilla warfare. By October the conflict had assumed the scope of a civil war. Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to deal with the situation. He had thirty-nine American-trained divisions, he had equipment, he had a high morale among his troops, although he lacked the air forces that had been promised him and withheld by the War Department. The stiuation was not too difficult. Back in March Pat Hurley and General Wedemeyer, with Commodore Miles, of the Navy, had assured the Joint Chiefs, in expectation of the trouble that would ensue upon the end of the war, that the "rebellion in China could be put down by a comparatively small assistance to Chiang's central government." I have quoted from Admiral Leahy's veracious record, on page 337.

The government at Chungking was our ally. We had come through a long, hard war together. It was we who had encouraged Chiang to resist, to treat with scorn the entreaties of the Japanese that China fall out of the war so that the combined forces of Asia could fall upon the Americans in the Pacific and the Far East. We owed much to Chiang.

Roosevelt was dead. Up to a point he had been swayed by Marshall. We now had Truman, who, in these matters, was to become the pliant tool and instrument of Marshall and Acheson. In explaining to the new President how the Russians had got into Manchuria, Leahy gave Truman his "jaundiced view" of the situation, adding, and I quote from page 385, that the Army, meaning Marshall, had won the argument, and the "decision had been ratified at Yalta." The exposition of the admiral fell upon uncomprehending ears. From that day forward Truman never wavered in support of the forces that were intent upon delivering China to the Kremlin.

## CHAPTER SIX
## *The Marshall Policy for China*

Who really created the China policy, the policy which has consistently been administered to run down the United States flag in the Far East and surrender China to the Kremlin? We have a new and most significant clue in a report of General Wedemeyer to Chiang Kai-shek made on the 10th of November 1945 upon his return from an official mission to Washington. I do not believe that this report has ever before seen the light of day. General Wedemeyer was the chief of staff to the Generalissimo and, in effect, the commander in chief of all the Chinese Government forces, as he was supreme commander of American forces in that theater. Wearing these two hats, he had the duty of mediating between the Generalissimo and the American authorities.

It was his duty also to report in detail upon the American official attitude toward the crisis in China. This he did, and I quote first the section of his report dealing with what he learned in what he described as his "consultations with the President." Wedemeyer wrote, and I quote in paraphrase: (a) The President wanted me to convey his greetings. (b) He was well satisfied with the accomplishments of this theater. (c) He emphasized the necessity of the early withdrawal of American Army, Navy, and Air Forces from China, stating the pressure on this point, the withdrawal of American personnel from China, is strong.

From whence did this pressure arise? Was it from the great peaceable masses of the American people, eager to have the war over and peacetime conditions reestablished, eager to have their sons, husbands, and brothers back home but in no wise eager to have our forces out of China? The answer came from the friends of the Soviet Empire in America.

The message of the President to the Generalissimo was not discouraging. It remained for the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which of course meant Marshall, to deliver the *coup de grâce* to Chiang Kai-shek's hopes for American support, moral, economic, and military, in putting down what Leahy had called the rebellion in China. It was evident from the Wedemeyer report on his talks with Secretary Byrnes that the China policy had already been set: no help to the Government of China in case it undertook to put down the Reds. The State Department made it clear to Wedemeyer

> that the United States would not permit herself to be involved in the conflict between Chinese forces, and that she would also not facilitate the activities of the central government vis-à-vis the rebellious forces within Chinese territory.

The Joint Chiefs — again meaning Marshall — were more explicit and disheartening. It remained for Marshall

to state the larger policy: not only would we view a suppression of the rebellion adversely, withdrawing our aid in case Chiang Kai-shek proceeded forcibly, but we would demand a government of unity in China. Chiang must bring the Communists into his government. Already we had the example of Poland and of Rumania before us. We were now embarking on that same disastrous road in China. But we were going further in opposition to the Republic of China. The Joint Chiefs, and I quote the Wedemeyer report,

> solemnly declared that American forces could not be involved in the civil war in China and that the United States would remain aloof in relations between the Chinese Government and Britain, France, the Soviet Union, or any other country.

Who was this, declaring diplomatic policy? The President, the Secretary of State? No. It was the Chief of Staff of the Army. I digress to explain the significance of that utterance. At the end of the war this Government had brought its overwhelming influence to bear to induce Chiang Kai-shek to yield to the betrayal at Yalta. Chiang had, therefore, a treaty with the Kremlin respecting the sovereignty of Manchuria, a treaty which the Russians had steadily violated from the day of the Japanese surrender, stripping Manchuria of what Edward Pauley, the Reparations Commissioner, estimated was at least $800,000,000 of movable assets under the specious claim that it was "war booty." "War booty" from a bloodless, six-day war!

The declaration I have quoted from the Wedemeyer report to the Generalissimo served notice in unmistakable language that the United States, having coerced China into accepting the sell-out at Yalta, was washing its hands of China's relations with Russia. We were abandoning the lamb to the lion. I doubt if the history of nations exhibits another such cynical declaration or one which made the intentions of its author clearer. And who was the author of it? Not the President or the Secretary of State, who constitutionally speak for the United States in such matters—but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a term which, it is abundantly clear, was merely a euphemism for George Catlett Marshall.

I continue with this incredible document:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly stated that American military aid to China would immediately terminate if the United States Government became convinced by facts that the Chinese forces benefiting from American aid were serving a government unacceptable to the United States, were engaged in civil war, or were employed for aggressive purposes. The degree of political security obtained under a unified government completely representative of the people would be regarded as a fundamental condition for the consideration of American economic, military, and other forms of aid to China. The United States Government would consider the above-mentioned condition, i.e., a unified government, as the criterion in determining whether or not to continue such aid.

There you have it spelled out in all its blunt and terrifying implications: the China policy, which ever since that date has operated to deliver China into the hands of the Kremlin, the China policy that inhibited Chiang at every turn from suppressing the Reds, setting his country in order, and proceeding with the great internal reforms to which he was committed and which he has always given every indication of pursuing in entire good faith. There it

is: the China policy that brought about the war in Korea and turned 450,000,000 friends of America into 450,000,000 foes.

And who was the author of it?

Had this directive to Wedemeyer been dictated by the master strategists of the Kremlin themselves, it could not more accurately have represented their will and wish. And where does this China policy leave the vital interests of the United States in the Far East, interests which we had just vindicated at the end of a four-year war fought in good faith with the aid of our Chinese allies and at the cost of many thousands of lives and uncountable treasure? What of the men who died in the air and over the waters and islands of the Pacific to sustain American honor and support American interest in Asia? Every mother's son of them was betrayed by this policy as surely as were our Chinese Allies.

I have established by means of the Wedemeyer report to Chiang Kai-shek that Marshall is an important author of our China policy. What bearing does this revelation have, you may ask, upon Marshall's testimony before the Armed Services Committee on September 19, 1950, when, by what I take to have been a deliberate equivocation, he contrived to give the impression that he had not participated in drafting the instructions he bore when he departed on his mission to China. He was being questioned by Senator Millard F. Tydings of Maryland, chairman of that committee at that time.

This is General Marshall replying to a question which had been asked in a very friendly fashion by the chairman:

> While I was in this room for a week undergoing the Pearl Harbor investigation, the policy of the United States was being drawn up in the State Department, and that was issued while I was on the ocean, going over there.

This was, mark you, in September 1950. The war which Marshall had helped to produce was being fought and he was under the scrutiny of the Armed Services Committee with reference to his nomination as Secretary of Defense. The China policy was not as popular as it had been. The people had been awakened by the events in Korea to a livelier interest in the factors that had brought on the war. Marshall was eager to get that job.

And so he indulged in that piece of barefaced, if indirect, prevarication. For a few days he was believed, for a time sufficient to have his nomination confirmed in what was one of the most monumental blunders ever committed by the Senate of the United States. This prevarication was even too strong for the stomach of the Washington *Post*, which has a strong stomach where the betrayal of American interest in the Far East is concerned, and it took the Secretary to task for it. I shall not dwell further upon this disgraceful episode. General Marshall's veracity, or lack of it, would be apropos; the incident would brand him as unworthy of high office under ordinary circumstances. However, the issues with which we are now dealing far transcend the question of his truthfulness.

The questions now before us concern his share in a series of events which go to the very heart of our existence as a free, self-governing people. Our survival is at stake in the Far East and what shall grow out of it, and upon the wisdom and the loyalty of the men at the head of our Government depend decisions of life and death. We are now concerned with reviewing the record of General Marshall with a view to ascertaining his trustworthiness in that larger sense.

There were, of course, other authors of the China policy. From the testimony taken by the Russell Committee, it is clear that Marshall, drafting the instructions that he took to China, had the assistance of Acheson and John Carter Vincent.

What do we know of the third man, John Carter Vincent? We know much. Suffice to say that he has been repeatedly named as one of those who are always found helping to do the planning where disaster struck America and success came to Soviet Russia. Vincent it was who, with Owen Lattimore, guided Wallace on his mission through China. At the conclusion of this trip, Wallace made a report to the State Department in which he recommended the torpedoing of Chiang Kai-shek.

In his book *Soviet Asia Mission* Wallace states—page 172—that while he, Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were traveling through China, Sergei Godlize, a high Soviet official—president of the executive committee of the Siberian territory, where they were—and an intimate friend of Stalin's, toasted Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent at a dinner as the men on whom rested the responsibility for the future of China.

There are other straws in the wind bearing us evidence upon the auspices and intent of the China policy. On the 2d of December, two weeks before Marshall departed for China, William Z. Foster, the chairman of the Communist Party in the United States, assured a meeting of the American Politburo in New York of what had been for long a truism of Communist world strategy. He put it in a new time frame, however, saying, "The civil war in China is the key to all problems on the international front." The problems of Europe, in other words, depended upon the issue in China. The next great expansive moves in the Kremlin's plan for world conquest waited upon victory in China. Those were the plain meanings of his words.

Two weeks earlier, on the 14th of November, Dean Acheson gave an explanation of why he and Marshall were determined that Russia must have China. I believe that he intended it as an official assurance to the Kremlin and its friends in America concerning our intentions in China. Acheson was speaking — he was Under Secretary of State — on the platform with the Red Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Hewlitt Johnson, with Corliss Lamont, the prospective quisling, with Paul Robeson and Joseph E. Davies, who assisted as much as any American in the corruption of the American mind regarding Russia and the nature of the Kremlin during World War II.

First Acheson indulged in some dishonest history, saying that American and Russian interests never had clashed anywhere in the globe; forgetting in his zeal for Mother Russia the fears of Russian designs on the west coast of North America that helped to occasion the Monroe Doctrine and forgetting also how this Government under Theodore Roosevelt gave aid and comfort to Japan in the war of 1904-1905 because the President thought Russian aggressions upon China were harmful to our interests in Asia.

At the moment the Red armies were giving every manifestation that they intended to treat Manchuria not as a part of China but as their own colony, which they have in truth done to this day, to the utter ruin of the Open Door Policy of John Hay. They were showing every sign of annexing Northern Korea to their Manchurian colony. They were violating spirit and text of the treaty we had extorted in their interest from Chiang Kai-shek.

Yet the Under Secretary of State, abasing himself before Russian imperial power, found no objective reason to suppose that we ever would have a clash of interest with what, with infinite hypocrisy, he called the Soviet peoples, identifying the subjected masses of Russia, the first victims of bolshevism, the faceless serfs of the Kremlin, with the tyrants themselves. We find that utterly fraudulent identification throughout the public utterances of Acheson. He added, while Dean Hewlitt Johnson, Corliss Lamont, Robeson, and Davies applauded, "We understand and agree with them—the Soviet peoples — that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of the world."

The peace of the world. That was the specious moral reason given by President Truman for insisting upon Chiang Kai-shek's capitulation to the Chinese Reds.

I think it is clear what Acheson was signaling to Moscow. He was saying, "You have seen that we delivered Manchuria and Northern Korea to you. That task is completed. You have set us another task, to see that you have a friendly government on your Manchurian and Mongolian borders. Never fear, rest assured, we will see to that, too. Only give us time and you will have a friendly Asia and then we can have world peace."

It could not have been spelled out more explicitly. And, as we shall see, Acheson and Marshall performed up to the very limit of their capacity, stinting nothing, withholding nothing of their country's interest, brooking no opposition to see that the Kremlin had a friendly government in China and we had a bloody and pointless war in Korea.

So Marshall's instructions were put into final shape by Marshall and Acheson and John Carter Vincent and, no doubt, by Alger Hiss, who was by then in the Far Eastern Division and who was then, as now, the trusted friend of Acheson. Marshall has recanted his false testimony of September 1950 wherein he sought to make it appear that he had no hand in the China policy and was a mere messenger of the President's. He has acknowledged the truth which was staring him in the face from the pages of James F. Byrnes's book *Speaking Frankly,* where Byrnes writes on page 226:

> The Sunday before I left for Moscow, Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and members of his staff met in my office. By the end of the morning's discussion, we had agreed upon the statement of policy that subsequently was approved by the President and released to the public on December 15.
>
> Thereafter, the President made no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General Marshall or with his approval.

We know, too, from Acheson's testimony before the Russell Committee (for what it is worth) that Marshall, upon being shown a State Department draft of his instructions, notified Byrnes that he would like to "try my hand at it," and he did.

In this connection it should be remembered that Millard Tydings wrote Marshall asking about the part that Lattimore had played in the formulation of the State Department's Far Eastern policy. Marshall answered that he had never met Lattimore. It developed, however, that Lattimore had attended a three-day round-table discussion called by the State Department on Far Eastern policy. Some of those who attended have since pointed out that Lattimore sat next to Marshall for three days and engaged in a rather

constant interchange of ideas with Marshall.

There is an interesting footnote to this situation, recounted in all innocence by Byrnes in his discussion of the ill-fated mission to Moscow which he was undertaking at the same time that Marshall went to China. On page 228 of *Speaking Frankly,* Byrnes draws aside the curtain upon a talk with Stalin at the Kremlin regarding the China matter. I quote Byrnes:

> He [Stalin] paid a compliment to General Marshall, saying that if anyone could settle the situation in China he [Marshall] could. As Stalin might have added with entire accuracy, settled it to my satisfaction.

This was a few days after the stormy scene at the White House described only sketchily in Jonathan Daniels's hero-worshiping biography of Truman *The Man of Independence.* Marshall had appeared to get Truman's approval of his policy, and Admiral Leahy, who was present, emphatically admonished him that his China policy was wholly at variance with President Roosevelt's attitude toward China and the Far East. The discussion became acrimonious and resulted in a permanent breach of the friendship between Leahy and Marshall.

Daniels quotes Leahy, page 317, saying:

> I was present when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang that he had to get on with the Communists or without help from us. He said the same thing when he got back.
>
> I thought he was wrong both times.

The admiral refers only obliquely in his own memoirs to this passage, which took place in the uncomprehending presence of the Chief Executive and which disposes of President Truman's claims to having administered Roosevelt's world policies as a faithful heir. Concerning this, Leahy wrote on page 104 of *I Was There:*

> In the postwar period, General Marshall and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign policy.

I pass over the moral aspects of the Marshall policy for China, a mere statement of which should bring the blush of shame to every conscientious American. I turn to the clear and easily understood question of our national interest. What was our interest in China in the fall of 1945? What was the stake as between the United States and the Russian empire? Which was to have sway and influence over China? That is the kernel of the situation which we describe as the China question.

It is not necessary to outline where we would stand if Russian controlled all the Pacific shores of Asia and the islands pertaining thereto—Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and the rest.

Our flank would be most grievously exposed. Not only would Hawaii be rendered extremely insecure and our Pacific coast brought into danger, but, most significant of all, the road to Alaska and northern Canada would be open to the air forces of the Russians, who have been for so long perfecting the arts of Arctic warfare. The Russians can reach Alaska over their own land mass. Given command of the western Pacific, they can supply and refresh their forces in Eastern Siberia by sea and ward off our attempts to interdict their supply. And from Alaska, as I have said, Pittsburgh—to say nothing of the West Coast, with its enormous war plants—is brought within range of Soviet long-range bombing and guided missiles.

The command of the coast of Asia

is part of the stake for which Russia was playing at Yalta and before. That may be called the oceanic aspect of the strategic problem. There is also the continental—and this bears upon Russia's defense from us in case of war. I do not profess to be expert on this subject and so I turn to one more proficient. I summon as a witness General Chennault, an airman, who, besides distinguishing himself in command of air forces during the war in China, has had long service in the leadership of civil aviation in Asia. I quote from General Chennault's book *Way of a Fighter,* in his foreword:

> China is the key to the Pacific * * *. The United States' attitude toward China should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.

And again:

> The Russians understand the role of China.

I again quote:

> I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure.

Chennault goes on to explain why this is so:

> From air bases built for America during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural mountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others in northern China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force.

Chennault published all this in 1949 before our China policy had finally borne its bitter fruit, but what he says remains true. I quote:

> If China remains friendly to the United States, the Russians will not dare move deeper into Europe, leaving their vitals exposed on their Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic flank is secure and American airpower is pushed out beyond critical range, then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.

I commend those observations regarding our strategical problem in the Far East and its relationship to the security of Europe to the baffled but arrogant statesmen of Westminster and the deluded gentlemen of this administration who say, whatever they may believe, that what happens in Korea is of no concern to the safety of Europe.

I had often wondered, until I read the Wedemeyer report, why General Marshall, a man of advancing years, undertook the ardors and discomforts of a sojourn in wintry, war-ravaged China at the behest of the President in December of 1945. His laurels were fresh and undimmed. As one of the leaders of the sweeping allied victory he had world-wide prestige. So far as the public knew, he deserved the respect of his countrymen and the honor due an old soldier who had apparently fulfilled one of the greatest duties ever entrusted to an American. To go to China, to enter into that vexed and complicated situation as a mere emissary of the President, would be a thankless task. Furthermore, it represented a come-down in status. It was a good bit like sending Churchill to govern India, if India had still remained subject to the Crown.

I think it is now transparently clear why Marshall went to China. Having, with the Acheson-Vincent crowd, framed the China policy, he was intent on executing it down to its last dreadful clause and syllable, and it is, I think, significant that he tarried in

China for thirteen arduous months, and when he left it was obvious to all beholders that China must fall to the Russian Empire. What was his mission?

First. To restrain the Government of China from subduing the Red forces which were sworn to bring all China within the orbit of Moscow.

Second. To deny the Chinese Government American assistance if it attempted to master the Communist minority by force.

Third. To insist at all times, in defiance of the lessons of Europe and the plain evidences of Russian imperial ambitions in Asia, that Chiang Kai-shek must accept the Communists into his government.

The surrender of Yalta had to be concluded and perfected.

But there was a final act to perform, an act calculated to put the quietus on the only sane, sensible formula for settling the civil war in China that came out of this whole deplorable period. General Wedemeyer had sent such a formula to the War Department, whence the plan was circulated through the Navy and State Departments. It was so simple and workable, so in conformity with American interest and all the ideals which had been uttered by the late President, that we can only conclude that it was an evil genius that thwarted and frustrated it.

What General Wedemeyer proposed was that the Government of China, with the backing of the United States forces under his command, offer the Chinese Communist leaders full political rights and full status as a national political party. The rights and security of their leaders and the status of their party were to be underwritten by the United States and its forces, providing only that the Communists disarm and surrender their arms. The Wedemeyer proposal included the promise of national elections to be supervised by the forces of the United States, to be held soon, with full electioneering rights to be guaranteed. Further, General Wedemeyer proposed that if the Communist leaders refused this offer, which rested on the good faith of the United States, the forces under his command would then forcibly disarm them and return their troops to civilian status. In that case, however, the full political rights of the Communist leaders and party would still be safeguarded as in the former case and their security guaranteed by the United States.

The Reds, we may be sure, would not have accepted the offer. They did not want peaceful collaboration but unrest, guerrilla warfare, and finally conquest backed by their neighbor in Manchuria and deviously abetted by the United States Government. And that was what they got.

What fairer solution could have been found? What better solution in the interest of the United States? We professed to want a unified China operating under democratic procedures. But did our Government want that? General Wedemeyer's plan died in the files of the executive agencies concerned.

And so General Marshall departed for China. His instructions, as we have seen, were written by himself and by other enemies of our friend and long-time ally, the Republic of China. I beg leave to express doubt that President Truman understood what the instructions were all about. He perhaps thought he was furthering a pious object. I beg leave to doubt that Secretary Byrnes, then departing on a fruitless errand of quasi-appeasement to Moscow, fathomed the purport of the China project.

Why was it so impossible for the

Marshall mission to reach any conclusion that served the interests of China and the United States? To begin with, we had served notice on Chiang Kai-shek, in Wedemeyer's report of November 10, that we would oppose and obstruct any attempt by him to come to realistic terms with the rebels who were in arms against him. We were, under all the verbiage, in the rebels' corner.

Nor must we lose sight of the overwhelming influence of the surrender to Russia at Yalta in the subsequent history of China. In his letter transmitting the White Paper on China to the President, Secretary Acheson perpetrates two astonishing untruths. The first is his denial that the refusal of ammunition to the Republic of China by the United States from August 1946 to August 1947 helped bring about the downfall of the Republic.

The second falsehood is less tangible. It deals with speculative matters. Dean Acheson is a master of the half truth. There is a sinuosity to Acheson's public utterances which makes it always advisable to place them under close analysis. He excused the demoralizing effects of Yalta on China's postwar circumstances by suggesting that, in any case, Russia could have moved into Manchuria and accomplished what she did in the way of turning that treasure house over to the Chinese Communists. Acheson repeated this barefaced fraud in his Russell Committee testimony. That is plainly not true. When the deal was made at Yalta, the Russians had something like thirty divisions in eastern Siberia, according to General Deane's report. For these they lacked equipment. They were not prepared for offensive operations. Under the terms of the bribe negotiated by Harriman and Deane at Moscow, we gave the Russians 800,000 tons of equipment for their Far Eastern forces. They moved a number of divisions from the west into Siberia, and when they opened their bloodless march across Manchuria, at our invitation, they were a well-equipped army.

Suppose, and this is a reasonable supposition, we had not implored Russia to enter the war in the Far East, had not equipped her army, had not given her the right to take Manchuria—where would the sudden collapse of Japan on the 10th of August, 1945, have found the Russians? Certainly not established in force throughout Manchuria and the northern provinces of China. Had we followed the advice of Admiral Leahy, instead of Marshall, the war with Japan would no doubt have come to its abrupt end with the Kremlin dickering with us for the bribe which they obtained with such miraculous ease at Yalta. The situation in the Far East—then and today—would have in that case looked something like this:

The surrender of the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria would have been made to the Americans and Chinese. The Americans would have held Manchuria—and all Korea for the Koreans—until the armies of the Republic of China would have been moved unimpeded there to take over. There were no Communists in Manchuria on VJ-Day except for secret agents. The Japanese had refused to allow such enemies within their lines. Given a peaceable transfer of Manchurian sovereignty from Japan to China, the great industrial plant of Manchuria would have remained intact instead of being looted and wrecked by the Russians; the surplus agricultural products of Manchuria could have been organized for relief of hunger in China proper, and the problems that aggrieved the Republic of China from 1945 to its fall

in 1949—military and economic—would have been well on their road to solution. With the Red army of Russia confined behind the Siberian-Manchurian border, the threat of Russian assistance to the Yenan Communists would have been negligible.

I ask this question of the reader:

Given the immense strength the United States dispersed in the Far East in August 1945, do you believe the Soviet Union would have ventured to fight its way into Manchuria once we and our Chinese allies had accepted the surrender of the Kwantung army? The answer is self-evident.

If we had wanted to keep Russia out of Manchuria in August 1945, all hell couldn't have blasted her in. We didn't want to keep Russia out. We invited her in, and recently Secretary Acheson had the nerve to insult the intelligence and the knowledge of two senior committees of the Senate of the United States by repeating that pernicious tissue of falsehoods regarding Yalta.

Given an uncontaminatedly American policy in Washington, we could have applied the same rule we were to apply to Greece—arming the government which we recognized, affording it military guidance to put down a Communist rebellion. Had we followed Leahy with respect to Yalta, and Wedemeyer in the immediate aftermath of VJ-Day, China would have become a progressive, hopeful, democratic society instead of a slave state in subjection to Moscow, and 140,000 young Americans would not have been called upon to expiate Yalta and the Marshall mission in Korea.

I have emphasized the overshadowing importance of Yalta in what is to follow because Manchuria was the rock upon which China broke in the postwar years. It was Chiang Kai-shek's effort to claim Manchuria against the will of the Russians and their Chinese stooges and against the restraints imposed by Marshall that first cracked the great military machine which he had on VJ-Day.

Chiang was also beset by the monetary and inflation difficulties which were partly the result of a lengthy war, but to at least some extent planned for him in the United States.

The campaigns in Manchuria, added to the harassing and vexatious necessity of fighting the guerrilla warfare of the Communist Chinese in North China, strained the logistics of the Republic unendurably, as General Wedemeyer had predicted they would when, in his November 10 report to the Generalissimo, he advised deferring the attempt to subdue Manchuria until North China had been pacified.

That advice, Chiang Kai-shek was unable to accept. The sentiment of his people reminded him that the eight-year war with Japan had been over Manchuria. Manchuria was his nominally by a treaty which he hoped, in spite of all examples to the contrary, Russia would honor. Furthermore, and this was a clinching fact, Manchuria, the workshop of Asia, contained until looted by Russia four times the industrial capacity of China proper, three times its power capacity, and four times its railroad mileage in proportion to area. The great plains of Manchuria, moreover, were and are the granary of the Far East.

What was the diplomatic situation when Marshall began his mission? The August treaty bound Russia "to render to China moral support and aid to be given entirely to the National Government as the Central Government of China." You will remember that this treaty pledged to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. Did Russia live up to this treaty? The question

answers itself. Did Bolshevik Russia ever live up to a commitment made with the world outside its hostile battlements? General Wedemeyer reported to the War Department as early as the 20th of November, 1945, and noted on page 131 of the White Paper, and I quote:

> Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communists', and possibly their own plans in North China and Manchuria. These activities are in violation of the recent Sino-Russian treaty and related agreements.

Wedemeyer added a warning with reference to the fatuous policy of attempting a Nationalist-Red coalition in China. He said:

> It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between the Chinese Communists and the National Government.

As Wedemeyer reported this in November of 1945, the State Department was daily receiving advice from its embassies and legations in Eastern Europe to the effect that collaboration with Communists in the succession governments of those States was an evil dream, impossible to maintain in good faith, conducive only to the conquest of those lands by Moscow.

But getting back to China, the White Paper further records, on page 136, that:

> The National Government is convinced that the U.S.S.R. had obstructed the efforts of the National Government to assume control over Manchuria in spite of the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945, and that the Chinese Communists were tools of the U.S.S.R.

And again, on page 147, allow me to submit this further evidence:

> The entry of Chinese Government forces [into Manchuria] had * * * been seriously impeded by Russian refusal to permit their use of Dairen as a port of entry * * * and by delay in Russian withdrawal. This delay also had the effect of giving the Chinese Communists time to build up their forces in Manchuria, which had apparently been reinforced by the movement of hastily organized or reinforced units from Chahar and Jehol provinces.

What had the Russians done to implement their treaty of friendship and alliance with China? A treaty, mind you, to which we were a part, for, and I am reading from page 116 of the White Paper:

> At the outset [of the T. V. Soong negotiations for the treaty in Moscow] the United States informed the participants that it expected to be consulted prior to the signing of any Sino-Soviet agreements in view of its role at Yalta.

Not only did we compel the Chinese to make this treaty; we declared, for that is what the diplomatic language means, that we were a party at interest in it.

What did the Russians do? First, they closed the principal port of Manchuria—Dairen—to the shipping of all nations, including the Chinese, whose sovereignty over it they had just sworn to uphold. Did we protest this flagrant violation of the treaty and our rights? The White Paper fails to record it if we did. Next they clamped a rigid control over the railroads, denying them as it pleased them to the forces of the Republic of China even though the ink was scarcely dry on their solemn word that the railroads were to be administered jointly by Russia and China.

The Russians welcomed the Chinese Communists to Manchuria. They had enormous stores of arms surren-

dered by the Japanese—their ammunition dumps, their reserve weapons, etc. Those they gave to the Chinese Communists. They supplied staff direction, training officers and camps for the conscript of the Chinese Reds. They stiffened them with Japanese from the Kwantung armies and finally they turned them loose in 1948—a disciplined army, well armed and well led—to defeat the war-weary, under-supplied forces of the Chinese Republic.

That is the story. It is an old story, familiar to all. Does anyone doubt it? On the 2d of November, 1945, Chinese Reds, who had already seized the port of Yingkow in Manchuria with Russian Red assistance, warned Vice Admiral Barbey, of the United States Navy, to withdraw his command from that port to avoid a collision. Barbey was also compelled to pull out of the Manchurian port of Hulutoo after Chinese Communist soldiers fired on his launch.

Did our State Department protest this unfriendly action? I remind you that at about the time the United States Navy was being humiliated in Manchurian waters, General Marshall was admonishing Chiang Kai-shek that he could expect no diplomatic assistance from us vis-à-vis Russia. Protect Chinese interests? We would not even protect our own.

What was the situation when General Marshall arrived? Economically, according to the White Paper, page 127:

> Despite the brutal and devastating effect of 8 years of war, [it was] surprisingly good and contained many elements of hope. In China proper, although there had been serious wartime disruptions in certain sectors of the economy, the productive potential of agriculture, mining and industry in most of the area taken from the Japanese was not substantially different from that of 1937. The expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria and Formosa promised to increase several-fold the national industrial plant and to contribute to the achievement of national self-sufficiency in food.

The Chinese Republic, as we have seen, never got Manchuria. China had unprecedentedly large gold and United States dollar exchange, estimated at $900,000,000, with half that much again in private hands. Politically, the prospect was equally promising, except for the rebellion. Civil rights had been restored, including the right to a free press, and Chiang Kai-shek was genuinely trying to implement the reforms which had been interrupted by the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937.

As always, he was committed to the Sun Yat-sen program, which all parties, including the Communists, embraced in principle; he thus was willing to go half way with the Reds on a new political regime which would end the one-party rule of the Kuomintang. He had shown his good faith—as he was to do again and again in the negotiations with the Yenan Reds—in the matter of the political consultative conference.

I notice a curious aspect of the White Paper. I find nowhere in its hundreds of pages any reflection upon the character and integrity of Chiang Kai-shek. His character was proof against the busy justifiers who compiled that record under the editorial oversight of Philip Jessup. It is my opinion that when the historians of the future come to enumerate the foremost men of the age in which we live, they will place Chiang Kai-shek high on that roster. I say this in spite of all the high-pitched screaming and squealing of the Lattimores, the Jessups, and the camp-fol-

lowing bleeding hearts of press and radio.

In a military sense, the Republic of China was in a position to meet any problem confronting it except the subversion of its will and the failure of supply from outside. Had China been Greece, had 1945 been 1947, there would have been no problem of pacification at all. I turn again to the White Paper, page 311, for the story of the military situation:

> The Government * * * possessed an estimated 5 to 1 superiority in combat troops and rifles [over the Reds], a practical monopoly of heavy equipment and transport, and an unopposed air arm.

General Wedemeyer had promptly ferried armies to Shanghai, Peiping, and Nanking by air from the west. He subsequently transported up to a half million troops to new positions. He finished equipping the thirty-nine divisions which had been trained by the United States forces and supplied large quantities of military supplies earmarked under wartime lendlease. This was the only material assistance given the Republic of China in any bulk after the war until the aid-to-China bill of 1948 began to operate—the operation of which was thoroughly sabotaged by the Commerce and State Departments. It should have been more. Over the hump in India, the United States military authorities were detonating large stores of ammunition and dumping 120,000 tons of war supplies in the Bay of Bengal—much of it undelivered to China but charged to her wartime lend-lease account.

CHAPTER SEVEN

## *The Marshall Mission*

The arrival of Marshall in Nanking was welcomed by all parties. Chiang Kai-shek hoped that Marshall would soon perceive, after a personal experience of the realities, where American interests lay. The Communists, as Miss Utley reports on page 10 of *The China Story*, "Welcomed General Marshall with open arms."

The Chinese Reds were fortunate, Miss Utley continues, in that their leading representative in Chungking was the handsome, intelligent, and charming Chou En-lai, now foreign minister of the Peiping government. Chou En-lai had for years shown a singular capacity for converting American journalists to the belief that the Chinese Communist Party was composed of liberal agrarian reformers, who should be backed against the despotic, reactionary government of Chiang Kai-shek. I again quote Miss Utley:

> Soon it became apparent to those of us who were in Chungking at the time and were frequently invited to General Marshall's residence, that Chou En-lai had succeeded in captivating him. Any doubts General Marshall may originally have had as to the truths of the State Department thesis about the "progressive" Communists and the "reactionary" Nationalists had obviously been dispelled. The fascinating Chou En-lai had evidently finally convinced General Marshall that the Chinese were not "real" Communists, or that they could be detached from their Russian affiliation provided only that they were helped by America to bring "democracy" to China. Marshall had long since come under the influence of his old friend, General Stilwell, who believed in the liberal professions of the Chinese Communists. Chou En-lai merely completed his conversion.

I call up another friendly witness to the happiness brought to the Communists by Marshall's arrival. This one is Robert Payne, the author of the seem-

ingly authorized and certainly idolatrous biography entitled *Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China*. Writes Mr. Payne on page 207:

> In the early days of 1946 there was a breathing spell for the Communists. Gen. George Marshall had been sent to replace General Hurley. He was a man of an entirely different caliber. He made a serious effort to understand the opposing camps. He visited Yenan and commented favorably upon the Communists' social policies, and he detested the servility [*sic*] of most of the Kuomintang officers he met. Urbane, polished, sensitive to social forces, he refused to accept the claims of either side in the quarrel, his preferences remaining with the liberal groups in the center, though for the most part these had long ago despaired of the reactionary policies of the Kuomintang.

I ask you to pause with me for a moment while we analyze the language of Payne. You will note the use of the term "reactionary" to describe the Kuomintang. That was standard operating procedure for the Yenan Reds, as it was, and still is, for all those in America who follow the Communist line on China. We shall meet with that epithet for the Kuomintang later in the language of the soldier-statesman who was sent to China presumably to work out a solution of the civil strife in that country, which would accord, first, with the international interests of the United States, and secondly, with the interests of the people of China.

The job of George Marshall in China scarcely called upon him to pass upon the relative social reform program of the contending parties. Both were reformers, both claimed to be the heirs of Sun Yat-sen. A commission of social workers or practicing sociologists could have weighed those matters far more expertly than this old soldier. He was called upon at a critical stage of world history, with Russia looming down from Manchuria and with that country already visibly embarked upon its scheme of world conquest and consolidation, to consider where the struggle in China fitted that larger picture, and to extract from it something that suited his own country's welfare and security.

The spectacle of General Marshall, ignoring the world interests involved in China and the menace of the Russia he had done more than any other man to seat in Manchuria, and solemnly inspecting the soup kitchens and nurseries of Yenan, would be laughable were it not so heavy with portent.

The point to dwell upon here is that Marshall showed throughout his stay in China that he accepted the party line for innocents, that the Communists are a party of social reform devoted to the well-being of the masses. In that light they had his sympathy. It is no wonder that the prevailing opinion of the Marshall mission has been that it was the venture of a gullible man not yet apprised of what was a truism to students of politics and the world in 1946, namely, that communism was a drive for power by a disciplined minority with welfare as its cloak, precisely as nazism was an enterprise of gutter intellectuals to gain the power of a great state and then of Europe in the guise to Germans of what its name meant: national socialism. That view of General Marshall does insufficient credit to his mentality and is far too pat. Reform was not, in my opinion, Marshall's prime consideration in China, although he sometimes made it appear so. Neither was peace. What it was we shall consider later when we have treated the evidence further.

It is unnecessary, I think, to follow the course of the endless, frustrating

negotiations Marshall conducted in China. He had commissioned himself to provide a political solution of the civil war "satisfactory to both sides." The specific solution was a new government which would include representation from the Communists and the minor parties, a government that could function with a parliament, courts and the rest, but a government with two armies. For that was what allowing the Communists to have a part of the national army, to be stationed in areas under Communist political control, meant. As finally worked out but never, of course, put into practice, the Republic of China was to have fifty divisions, the Peoples Republic of Yenan ten divisions. I have only to state the solution which Marshall was bent upon imposing to exhibit its absurdity. Such a proposal did not look to a permanent government in the western sense, it looked only to a truce in the struggle for all China. The Kuomintang wanted a stable government representing the consensus of all political opinion with a parliament affording a forum in which issues might be debated and resolved. The Communists wanted participation in a national government with a private army and regional ascendency on the side.

I have studied the White Paper on this subject and I am referring only to it concerning General Marshall's activities. Chapter Five of the White Paper deals with the Marshall Mission. It contains a footnote which says, "The bulk of the material for this chapter has been drawn from the files of General Marshall's mission."

The White Paper is obviously a highly prejudiced document. It is impossible to form a final opinion of China's sellout from it alone because so much has been left out. So much of it is phrased and tailored to convey a certain viewpoint toward Marshall and his policy.

For example, where the editors needed to balance the recalcitrance of the Communists on some point which is tangible, they resort to intangible reports of what some unidentified officials of the Republic of China were saying (not doing) so that they might blame them also for the failures. This is in line with Acheson's bringing forth, at the Russell hearings, an anonymous document from an anonymous chamber of commerce in an anonymous town signed by anonymous men, setting forth all of the Communist party-line arguments against the Republic of China, and it was a fantastic sight to see a few Senators during the reading of this anonymous document nodding their heads and smiling as though they were receiving valuable and trustworthy information.

Where it became necessary to recount some Communist outrages against United States Marines in July, the authors of the White Paper first meticulously related an attack upon a peace delegation that went from Shanghai to Nanking, an attack which the White Paper says was committed by "an organized group of Kuomintang secret police." This is on page 171. Turn the page and you come to a paragraph describing as "part of Communist activities during this period" the kidnaping of seven Marines in East Hopei and, this I quote:

> A deliberate Communist ambush of a United States Marine-escorted motor convoy bound from Tientsin to Peiping, during which 3 Americans were killed and 12 wounded.

That is surely a restrained treatment of that occurrence. Considerably greater emotion was displayed by the writers in describing the incident at Nanking.

One gathers that since the alleged assailants at Nanking were Kuomintang police, the victims were Communists. You can be sure none of the Marine victims of the Communists were Communists. This is taken, may I remind the reader, from an American Government document printed at the expense of Americans. I find similarly biased matters throughout the White Paper, but it is General Marshall's own record of his mission, hence I quote from it hereafter.

At the outset of his mission, Marshall arranged a ceasefire between the contending armies by compelling Chiang Kai-shek to give up the cities of Chihfeng and Dolun to the Communists. That truce was in effect when General Marshall returned to the United States on March 11. It was generally observed by the forces of the Republic. On the 15th of April, however, there was a resounding breach when the Yenan Reds laid siege to the important city of Changchun in Manchuria, which lies on the railway from Mukden to Harbin. Three days later the Reds had Changchun. That day General Marshall returned to Nanking.

Chiang, finding the truce broken to his disadvantage, ordered his forces to recapture Changchun. A month later the Nationalist forces defeated the Reds in a battle south of Changchun and, with the Reds in flight to the northward, the Nationalists easily retook Changchun on the 23d of May.

At this time the advantage lay with the forces of the Republic. This was before, mind you, the Yenan Reds had been able to train their conscripts with the new weapons handed them by the Russians. The Nationalists streamed north out of Changchun, headed for Harbin. It is possible, and the Nationalist generals so thought, that victory in Manchuria and the control of the railway lines as far as Harbin lay open to them.

General Marshall had other plans. He had been busy since his return, seeking to restore the truce. With the Nationalist victory he redoubled his efforts until, as described in the White Paper, they mounted to something like a frenzy. The Reds were clamoring at his heels, demanding that he call off the enemy. Chiang went to Mukden and the wires were kept hot between Marshall and him.

At length, Chiang yielded, and on June 6 a new truce was put into effect. Several times extended, it lasted until early in July, but in the meanwhile no political issues could be settled.

I want to be fair about this; I do not want to give you a hasty judgment, but throughout the Marshall mission the progression of events seems to have been this:

Marshall obtained concessions from Chiang to meet Red demands, whereupon, having gained a point, the Reds levied new demands. It was the familiar technique of Petrograd in 1916. Whenever the Kerensky government yielded a point to the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, the Soviet presented a new demand more exorbitant than the preceding one. I think it is evident from a reading of the White Paper on these negotiations that Yenan Reds never appeared in good faith. They did not want agreement but disagreement.

They were playing for time in which to avail themselves of their resources in Manchuria, meanwhile conducting a barrage of insulting propaganda against the United States in the free press of Kuomintang China aimed at enfeebling the already feeble will of the Truman administration to help the Republic of China.

The June 6 truce was being steadily whittled away during July. Aggressive

action was being taken, primarily by the Communists, and never for an instant did they cease the guerrilla activity, the destruction of the railway lines, the blowing up of dams and bridges, the damaging of mines and factories which were making a nightmare out of the efforts to reestablish the communications and the economy of China. By mid-July the forces of the Republic had gained control of many strategic points and the Reds increasingly were thrown back on hit-and-run activities.

It was during July that the outrages I have mentioned, along with others less grievous, took place against the 50,000 marines who were stationed at Tientsin and other points. It was during July that the shrill denunciations of the United States over the radio and in the Red press reached a crescendo. On July 7 the Yenan officials issued a manifesto denouncing the United States in bitter terms for giving assistance to the Chinese Republic. We were sending a military advisory staff to Nanking, the advisory service which, it will be recalled, the Joint Chiefs had advised General Wedemeyer they approved in November. The Government at Washington was negotiating with Nanking over the sale of surplus war materials left behind on the islands of the Pacific.

It was on the 21st of June that Chou En-lai suggested to Marshall that the United States undertake the training of Communist troops slated for the National army. Let me put this episode in the framework of the Marshall mission. The Reds were everywhere obdurate in the negotiations, they were violating the truce wherever it was profitable, they were attacking Americans and, apparently acting upon orders from Moscow, uttering the same billingsgate simultaneously in Shanghai, Nanking, Manchuria, and in the cities of America.

It was under those circumstances that on June 19, Marshall's faithful friend, the Under Secretary of State, Acheson, appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in behalf of that project. Already in China sixty-nine American officers had been earmarked for the training program and 400 tons of equipment set aside to start the project. The hearings were being held on a bill submitted by the State Department as an aid-to-China bill, but which contained the joker relating to training the Communist forces. We are indebted to Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers (R., Mass.) for bringing the crucial part of these hearings—which never were published—into the Congressional Record recently. "The Communist leaders have asked," Acheson testified, "and General Marshall has agreed that their integration with the other forces be preceded by a brief period of United States training and by the supply of minimum quantities of equipment."

Mrs. Rogers reported that she sought unavailingly to find out who had written the bill. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, who was also testifying for the bill, said that it came from the State Department. Acheson mentioned a State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, but Mrs. Rogers found, upon consulting her Congressional Directory for 1946, no listing for such a committee. She did find a State Department coordinating committee with Dean Acheson as chairman.

> Among its members [said Mrs. Rogers] were Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent. Mr. Hiss also is listed as Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. Mr. Vincent is listed as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Both

> positions, as you know, had an important bearing on the matter before the committee at that time. I think my question, which was never answered, was pertinent then and that it is pertinent today in the light of the tragedy we are undergoing now in Korea.

Is the matter clearer now?

There was a colloquy further in the hearings between Mrs. Rogers and Dean Acheson in which she pressed him as to what assurances we might have that the Chinese Communists would not use our arms against us. The Under Secretary referred to the United Nations as a guarantor of the peace, then he said:

> I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.

The chairman rescued Acheson from the questioning, but he concluded:

> I am sure we do not need to worry.

It was during this same period, with Marshall seeking to placate the Yenan Reds while at the same time using his great power to wring concessions out of Chiang Kai-shek in the interest of a unified Chinese government, that the State Department was taking quite another line in Europe. I turn to Sumner Welles's book *Seven Decisions That Shaped History*, page 217, where the author asserts that the late President would never have continued the Marshall policy in China. I quote again:

> He [Roosevelt] would never have permitted his representative in China to pave the way for a repetition of the same tactics in the Far East by trying to browbeat Chiang Kai-shek, as General Marshall did, into bringing representatives of the Chinese Communist Party into the Chinese Cabinet. It is, in fact, a strange anomaly that this Government in 1946 urged Prime Minister de Gasperi, of Italy, to oust the Communists who were then in the Italian Cabinet. De Gasperi's decision to take that step was in the highest degree salutary. It was probably the chief reason why a successful coup d'état in Italy that year was prevented. Yet in the autumn of that year General Marshall, as President Truman's special representative in China, was informing Chiang Kai-shek that all American assistance would be withdrawn unless he broadened his Government by appointing Communists as well as other liberal elements to the Cabinet.

What the former Under Secretary of State overlooked was that Marshall had provided at Yalta that Russia should have Manchuria and, furthermore, Acheson at Madison Square Garden heartily endorsed Russia's demand for friendly neighbors.

Marshall's entire mission was one of submission to Yenan. In July he gave his clearest manifestation of subserviency when he vetoed the appointment of General Wedemeyer as ambassador to China in obedience to the wishes of Chou En-lai. For this appalling circumstance I refer the reader to pages 6097-6100 of the Russell Committee transcript, and for detailed background to the column of Constantine Brown in the Washington *Star* and many other newspapers of June 13, 1951.

From those sources we learn that Marshall originally approved Wedemeyer's appointment but that in July, yielding to Chou En-lai, he called Acheson, saying Wedemeyer would not do. The appointment was on Truman's desk, Wedemeyer was awaiting his commission, when Acheson sent for him to say that his appointment had been voided. He read Wedemeyer part of Marshall's telegram,

saying, "the Communists are protesting violently." Upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, endorsed by Marshall, Dr. Leighton Stuart, a missionary educator, was then appointed. Chou En-lai was a one-time pupil of Stuart's.

It is the immemorial custom among civilized states to clear the appointment of an envoy with the government to which he is to be accredited. In this case, the appointment was cleared with the chief of the rebels in arms against that government. The American ambassador to the Republic of China was chosen by the Yenan Reds.

Marshall's first Chinese intervention gave the Communists two cities by a species of fraud perpetrated by the Reds. His second checked the victory of the Nationalists at Changchun, halting them in their tracks and giving the Reds a chance to regroup, retrain, and prepare for more decisive action later. His third intervention occurred in August. Its long-range effects were far more disastrous. It may not be wide of the mark to say that more than any other factor it made the victory of Russian imperialism in China inevitable.

I refer to the imposition by Marshall of an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms from the United States—an interdict promptly seconded by the British—to the Republic of China. By this act and a further minor restriction on the Nationalists' ability to obtain ammunition, Marshall declared the United States neutral in the struggle of China to remain free of Russian domination. Using Marshall's own boastful language:

> As Chief of Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions, now with a stroke of the pen I disarm them.

And, while he was arbitrarily shutting off the flow of arms to one of the great Chinese contestants, the flow of arms, of men, of training, and of moral support from Russia to the other continued unabated.

What occasioned this momentous decision?

I take you again to the White Paper, where, on page 181, Marshall's own files explain why he embargoed war supplies to China. I quote:

> With respect to United States military aid programs, General Marshall was being placed in the untenable position on the one hand between the two Chinese groups while on the other the United States Government was continuing to supply arms and ammunition to one of the two groups, namely, the National Government.

The situation was obviously not only untenable but to General Marshall intolerable. The Republic of China was winning its campaigns to subdue the rebellion. Something obviously had to be done to keep the Republic of China from winning the civil war which the Yenan Reds continued at all times to agitate by their aggressions. The Russians were providing for the Reds. That aspect of the situation was satisfactory. It was now necessary to pull the plug on the Republic of China. Otherwise Russia might not have a friendly neighbor and the United States and the West would have a progressive and prosperous China with a hopeful future as a powerful containing force against Russian imperialist aims in Asia. The prime author of the Yalta sellout could not stand idly by and see that happen.

I ask again, supposing that Marshall was acting in good faith—which I deny—did he regard himself as an impartial arbiter of China's destiny with no responsibilities to his native land which had honored him extravagantly and was, to put the matter on its lowest

terms, paying the bills for his venture into power politics?

I throw in also the reflection, which will strike home to those American liberals and leftists who eagerly besought sanctions in behalf of the Spanish Government in the 1930s: The ground upon which they based their argument was that the republican government at Madrid was the legal and recognized government and hence entitled to our assistance against the Franco rebels. Marshall's embargo in China was applauded by these same liberals and leftists. The shoe was on the other foot in China, but the liberal-leftists unblushingly forgot the arguments they had used in the Spanish civil war. Their inconsistency is only apparent, however, not real. What you must look for with the gentry of the left is the hard line of consistency that runs to Moscow. They never deviate from what serves the cause of Soviet imperialism.

I invite you to give ear to the insincere, devious language with which Marshall recounted his embargo in the White Paper. That is on page 181, and it reads:

> Action was therefore taken in August to suspend certain portions of these programs which might have a bearing on the continued prosecution of hostilities in China. Licenses were not granted for the export to China of combat-type items of military equipment and in late September shipments of combat items from the Pacific area to China were temporarily suspended.

The language thus quoted is the kind of language we have grown accustomed to from the State Department when they wished to conceal something. What Marshall did was to get from Truman an order forbidding export licenses in the sale of materials of war to China. He got also a similar order from the British Government. This left Nanking high and dry. There were no other markets into which they could enter. Does his language make that clear? I think not. This is the same sort of calculated deception that emanated from Marshall when he testified in the MacArthur hearings.

The embargo was put on in 1946 — it lasted for a year, sufficient time to enable the Reds to launch their massive operations in 1947 — and the White Paper came out in the summer of 1949. Times had changed. The people were uneasy over what had happened in China. They were coming to resent the fact that our ancient ally, China, was being overthrown by the Communists, with Russia standing by in Manchuria. They had begun to wonder if there was not something deeply sinister, perhaps treasonous, in what the American Government had been doing in China. And so the brief and ambiguous reference in the White Paper to what was the crown and seal of Marshalls' destructive mission, his embargo, was followed by weasel words of reassurance:

> This ban was imposed at a time when the National Government was gradually increasing the tempo of its military campaign and when its reserves of material were ample. The ban apparently had little effect, since it was not until November, when the National Government had reached the peak of its military holdings, that the National Government issued an order for the cessation of hostilities. By that time the government's forces had occupied most of the areas covered by its demands to the Chinese Communists in June and during the later negotiations and had reached what turned out to be the highest point of its military position after VJ-Day.

What Marshall and his editors here are saying is that the forces of the Republic of China were at a high tide of victory in August and the fall of 1946. That was true. It is possible that Marshall acted in the nick of time. Obviously the choking off of supplies to the Generalissimo's forces would not take effect at once.

The aim of the words about the state of Nationalist affairs is obvious. It is to assure the readers of the White Paper that the embargo did not hurt Chiang Kai-shek's cause and that it brought him to a cease-fire in November. That statement is false on two counts. The embargo stifled the cause of the Republic of China, and the cease-fire had no relationship whatever to it. We shall soon come to the ugly details and connotations of this cease-fire.

The enemies of the Republic of China have made much of the declining morale of its armies in late 1947 and 1948. The enemies of the Republic of China never ascribe the declining morale to the shortage of bullets, rifles, and machine guns. Much has been made of the capture by the Reds of Nationalist equipment. The legend has been spread that American supplies were sold by venal Chinese generals to the Reds. Some Nationalist generals did defect to the Reds as the war went along. A great deal of propaganda to-do has been made over the fact that, when the victorious Red armies, Russian-trained Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese entered Peiping in 1949, they paraded in American trucks, they wore American parkas, and they exhibited guns made in the United States. Where did those items, none of them battle-stained, come from? They were part of the 800,000 tons of equipment turned over to Russia as bribery for the Russian war in the Far East which did not eventuate.

The question of stopping the flow of combat items from reserve dumps in the Pacific, raised in my quotations from the White Paper, brings to light a telltale piece of behavior upon Marshall's part. He acted, of course, in both instances — the embargo and the one under question — under pressure from Chou En-lai. Marshall was under heavy abuse in Communist organs in China and America. His good faith and his integrity were being called into question. And so, in an attempt orally to appease Chou En-lai and to attest his fidelity to the impartiality of his course, Marshall prevaricated to his friend about the nature of the surplus stores. In this connection I quote from page 180:

> General Marshall had explained to General Chou En-lai the background of the negotiations [between Nanking and Washington] leading to the signing of this agreement * * * and had explained that the surplus property in question did *not* contain combat material but consisted of machinery, motor vehicles, communications equipment, rations, medical supplies, and various other items which would be of considerable value in the rehabilitation of the Chinese economy.

The prevarication in no way damaged the cause of Chou En-lai, because Marshall got an order from Truman barring the shipment to the Republic of China of any material other than what he had told Chou En-lai was in the stores. So, while on the face of it he lied to Chou En-lai and justified the pressures upon him by the Communist press, actually he was only anticipating what he could get Truman to do.

I have recently talked to one of the officers in charge of the "roll up" of American surplus materials for shipment to China. He stated that Ache-

son's story about the amount of military material we have shipped to China would defy the abilities of Ananias, even when Ananias was operating at the pinnacle of his ability. For example, he pointed out that the tanks which we dumped into China had their guns spiked and the breeches blown. He stated further that, when the President asked him about the value of the surplus material shipped to China about that time, he told the President that he could best compare it to a situation in which he was asked to redecorate the White House, and he had, say, $2,000,000 to do the task, and he spent all of that money for baby-grand pianos in which the wires were all cut and the keyboards destroyed, and then was to announce to the American people that the White House really was decorated because he had spent $2,000,000 doing the job.

At this precise moment Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung were ordering a general mobilization, which meant the conscription of the farmers' lads throughout the areas controlled by their forces, the kind of conscription which filled their ranks in Korea. Did Marshall seek to discipline the Reds for that as he had just disciplined the Generalissimo? Do not be absurd. He could not discipline the Reds, even had he wanted to, which I, of course, doubt. He had no leverage on the Reds. The only party to this quarrel which he could injure was the Chinese Republic. We have seen how he did so in his third major intervention.

We come to his fourth deadly blow at the friends of the United States in the Republican Government.

As the White Paper states, the forces of the Generalissimo were rapidly expanding their gains during September. The Reds were alarmed. The propaganda machines at Shanghai, New York, and Moscow were busy spewing out abuse of the Americans in China and our Government's supposed assistance to China. The great objective of the Yenan Reds at this moment, they having won their campaign to stop American aid to China, was a truce. The Generalissimo was pushing too hard. The objective of the propaganda campaign being waged with great intensity in the United States was to get the Americans' military mission, which was idling its time away in Nanking, and the Marines out of China.

We may treasure the force and nature of the get-out-of-China drive of the American Communists by examining one major rally with which they were seeking to bring pressure upon Marshall in China and upon the administration in Washington. This one took place in San Francisco, beginning its three-day sessions with a mass meeting on the 18th of October. Brigadier General Carlson, whom we have met before with Stilwell as a disciple of Agnes Smedley, presided. Paul Robeson was vice chairman. Among the celebrated participants in this rally were Harry Bridges, Bartley Crum, Joe Curran, Frederick Vanderbilt Field (the self-proclaimed Communist), Guenther Stein (the Soviet spy), Harrison Forman (the Soviet apologist), Congressman Marcantonio (the Soviet mouthpiece), and his colleagues, Hugh de Lacy and Ellis Patterson.

Likewise prominent on the platform were these leaders of the intellectual and political life of Hollywood: Edward G. Robinson, Paulette Goddard, and John Garfield. The rally passed resolutions denouncing Chiang Kai-shek as a reactionary and demanding that this Government at once withdraw our forces from China.

The Yenan Reds had been besieging

the city of Tatung in northern Shansi Province since August. Late in September the Generalissimo's forces began a retaliatory movement upon Kalgan. That city, which is described in the White Paper as "one of the political and military centers of the Communist Party," had great strategic importance, inasmuch as it commanded the Kalgan Pass through the mountains from China into Manchuria. The Reds had seized Kalgan with Marshall's blessing soon after VJ-Day, and it was through the Kalgan Pass that multiplied thousands of Red conscripts had marched into Manchuria, there to be outfitted and trained for the expected campaign from the north against the Republic of China. So valuable did Yenan consider Kalgan that Mao Tse-tung announced that he was lifting the siege of Tatung in the hope of deterring the Nationalist attack on Kalgan.

With the Generalissimo's forces pressing steadily north toward Kalgan, Chou En-lai began his supreme effort to bring about, through Marshall, a cease-fire. As a gesture of annoyance, Chou En-lai had quit Nanking for Shanghai in mid-September and Marshall had to communicate with him thereafter at long range, making, however, one visit to Shanghai to beseech the Red leader to yield on a point under discussion. At issue in these times was the whole impossible endeavor of Marshall to force an amalgamation of the party of the Republic and the Reds at Yenan into a parliamentary system, an endeavor likened by General MacArthur to the generally accepted impossibility of making oil and water mix. The discussions centered upon Communist agreement to enter in good faith into the various agencies and organs that had been proposed under the Political Consultative Conference's terms of the preceding January, a council of state divided among the Kuomintang on the one side and all other parties on the other; a national assembly and a new executive *yuan,* or cabinet.

The heart of the issue was this: Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Communists nominate their representatives to these bodies and get ready to make them work before he called off hostilities. The Reds demanded the cease-fire first. Having found through long and distracting experience that the Reds never lived up to any agreements whatsoever, the Generalissimo felt that there must be some *quid pro quo* as an earnest of good faith.

Chou En-lai steadily dinned into Marshall's ears his demand for a truce before the Nationalists took Kalgan. In support of his demands, Marshall astonishingly threatened the Generalissimo with the statement that, without the truce, the Reds "would be driven to seek outside support such as Russian aid." I quote that from page 187 of the White Paper. Chiang Kai-shek, in general, replied, and I quote from page 190:

> It was absolutely essential to the national welfare that the Government gain control of Kalgan and that the occupation of that city by the Government would do much to prevent further military action by the Communists.

Meanwhile, two weeks earlier, Chou En-lai, at Shanghai, had threatened that unless Marshall brought about a meeting of the Consultative committee against Chiang Kai-shek's objections, he would, and I quote from page 186 of the White Paper, "be compelled to make public all the important documents in the negotiations since the June truce period." What that touch of blackmail hinted at I do not know.

The White Paper omits any reference to what Chou En-lai had in his possession that might prove sufficiently damaging to spur Marshall on to greater efforts.

So matters stood at the beginning of October. The Generalissimo could see daylight ahead through his military operations. The Reds were panicked. On the 4th of October Marshall urged the Generalissimo in the strongest terms to leave Kalgan to the Reds. When Chiang Kai-shek still insisted on some evidence of good faith from Yenan, Marshall returned to his quarters resolved, as he put it in a message to Truman dated the next day, to play his ace. That consisted of his self-directed recall to America, a sign that the United States was not only abandoning its efforts to find a solution in China but severing its tenuous link to the Republic of China.

Marshall wrote the President, and this may be found on page 192 of the White Paper,

> that this is the only way to halt the military campaign and to dispel the evident belief of the Government generals that they can drag along the United States while carrying out their campaign of force.

In these controversial days he repeatedly lectured the President of China regarding what he called his campaign of force. There is no evidence in the White Paper that he ever sermonized Chou En-lai about the campaign of force which the Reds had been conducting wherever they could since the truce of June had been broken by them. The evidence of Marshall's partiality to the Reds infuses every page of the White Paper at this point.

In this connection let me read an incredible passage on page 205 of the White Paper:

> General Marshall stated that he wished General Chou to determine formally from the Communist leaders at Yenan whether specifically they wished him to continue in his mediation role and asked that the matter be viewed as a plain business proposition without regard to Chinese considerations of face since he was not interested in face. He explained that his sole interest was the question of whether he could render some service to China by way of mediation. General Chou stated that he sympathized with the request by General Marshall and that he would place the question before the appropriate Communist authorities at Yenan.

I believe that in this revelatory passage we have additional insight into Marshall's true relations with the Communists in China, and perhaps into those at a far higher level.

Marshall did not so conduct himself with humility and a desire to please before the great adversary of the Reds, the President of China. To Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall prided himself upon speaking with direct and forceful candor. He never, so far as the White Paper discloses, asked the President of China, "How am I doing?" If his attitude toward the Yenan Reds was that of a solicitous subordinate, toward Chiang Kai-shek, it was one of master, with only one reservation: He could not as a rule expressly order the President of China to do his bidding.

Even that became possible after he dictated to Truman the order for his recall, allowing Ambassador Leighton Stuart to show the text to Chiang Kai-shek. The scheme worked. The Generalissimo, who, through thick-and-thin, resisted Japanese threats and blandishments and rejected during this period advances from Moscow for a common front against the Americans, remained

as always steadfast in his friendship for the United States. I think it is not well understood that during this trying period the Russians had made and were to make further overtures to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his regime a full partnership in a great Sino-Russian state enterprise to exploit the riches of Manchuria and hinting that if he agreed he would have no further trouble with his domestic Reds. To join up with the Russians meant, however, trouble with America, because the proposed deal made permanent and legal hash of this country's desires for the open door in Manchuria. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek, who viewed the Russians with a cautious eye on good and sufficient grounds, also feared getting into their clutches.

In any case he surrendered to Marshall. The White Paper puts it this way, and I quote from page 192:

> When word reached the Generalissimo through Ambassador Stuart of General Marshall's action, the Generalissimo expressed his willingness to stop military advances against Kalgan for a period of 5 days, perhaps even longer if the American mediators insisted, on condition that the Communist Party would immediately participate in meetings of both the five-man committee and the committee of three (these were agencies by which they had been trying to reach political understandings) and that Kalgan would be the first issue negotiated. The Generalissimo also requested that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart discuss the matter with him the following morning.

Marshall's ultimatum, reflecting the get-out-of-China agitation, stirring the American leftists and liberals at that moment, had worked. Although the Communists, as could have been anticipated, rejected any and all proposals arising from the truce negotiations, Marshall now had the upper hand and nothing but an unconditional cease-fire by the Republic of China would satisfy him.

It was during these days that Marshall put the dignity of the United States in his pocket and went to Shanghai to implore Chou En-lai to make at least some face-saving gesture. Chou En-lai, as you might suppose, refused to take his friend off the hook. Agreement, peace, and the welfare of China were far from the thoughts of Chou En-lai.

On October 13 Marshall laid down the law to the Generalissimo, saying, according to page 197 of the White Paper:

> The important factor was the immediate cessation of hostilities and that even if the Communists were forced to submit to various agreements by the pressure of government military action, there could be no healthy results from political negotiations and the reorganization of the government as the bitterness engendered thereby would be too deep and the spirit of revenge and distrust too great.

In other words, you have the Reds on the run, they have refused at all times and on all occasions to act in good faith concerning the future of China, but do not press them. If you do, they may get mad and will not play.

Three days earlier Kalgan had fallen to the Nationalists, Chihfeng also on the same day. There was talk of a new offensive in Manchuria, and the Nationalists were marching on Communist-held towns in the province of Kiangsi. The situation grew urgent. In the last hours of his independence, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to issue a new basis for negotiations, an eight-point tender which, had the Reds ever been

willing to make terms, would have fetched them. Quite naturally, they flatly rejected it.

The military situation had by now grown so menacing to the Reds that party negotiators and agitators, who had been sheltered under Nationalist protection in Nanking, Shanghai, and Chungking, besought transportation from the United States authorities to Yenan and were flown there in army planes.

Marshall and Stuart handed the Generalissimo a draft of a statement to be issued by him on November 7. This statement, whether the Generalissimo knew it or not, was his last straw. In it the mediators, if such they may be called, put the Generalissimo on record for an unconditional cease-fire.

He protested, he made his last stand, saying, and I am quoting from page 205 of the White Paper,

> that he could not support an unconditional termination of hostilities before his military and political leaders, and that he stood practically alone in the belief (among his associates) that matters could be settled by peaceful negotiations.

Yet Marshall was adamant. When the Generalissimo asked him to reconsider his views with another draft in mind, Marshall replied, and this appears on page 205 also,

> that he would need an opportunity to consider with Dr. Stuart the points of view expressed by the Generalissimo as he was seriously concerned whether he should participate, as a representative of the United States Government, in the preparation of a paper in accordance with the points of view he had indicated, which were contrary to the views of General Marshall and those, he thought, of the United States Government.

He had scarcely bothered to glove the mailed fist. This was, of course, a threat. How different from Marshall's inquiry of Chou En-lai as to what the big boys at Yenan thought of his exertions.

Chiang Kai-shek yielded the next day, issuing an unconditional cease-fire order to all his forces.

Did this humiliating capitulation save him and his Republic? Did it lift the embargo? Did it bring cooperation from Yenan? It most certainly did not.

It did bring the Communist armies a much-needed respite, however — another breathing spell in the sense of the biographer of Mao Tse-tung. The legions he and the Russians were training in Manchuria with Japanese and American stores were not yet ready to march. That would come later. And what shall we say of the effect upon the morale of the fighting forces of the Republic? They had been stopped in their tracks after long, weary, bloody campaigns across the face of northern China and Manchuria with victory in sight. They could not but read in all this—coming on top of the embargo and the partiality of Marshall for the Yenan Reds—the desertion of China by its ally, America.

The cause of the Republic of China reached its highwater mark at the time of the enforced truce. The Generalissimo's armies would make some gains thereafter, but the balance had been tipped, and slowly, gradually, the advantage would come to lie with the armies of Yenan and Moscow.

The United States had thrown its weight on the side of Moscow in the struggle for command of the allegiance and resources of China. That was the plain meaning of Marshall's fourth and last intervention. That struggle, which might have been settled honestly by Chinamen in battle, would now have

to be settled in battle by Americans as well as Chinamen, but, as we shall see later, the interventions of Marshall were not at an end.

Marshall, his mission completed, was to stay in China until early in January 1947. Chiang Kai-shek, carrying out his promises of political reform, convened the first national assembly on the 15th of November. The Yenan Reds, of course, stayed away. They wanted no part of any democratic institutions unless they had full control and could subvert them to totalitarian purposes. Chou En-lai came to call on Marshall on the next day, the 16th, to ask for an American airplane ride to Yenan:

> He [Chou] expressed fear that the National Government would undertake offensive operations against Yenan and said that if this occurred it would mean the end of all hopes for a negotiated peace.

I have quoted from page 208 of the White Paper. I have heard of idle threats all my life. Chou's threat to end all prospects of a negotiated peace if Yenan were invaded strikes me as the choicest example I have ever heard of the idle threat.

General Marshall hastened to offer United States Army transportation for all Red personnel in Republic of China territory, adding, with a tender touch of solicitude, and I am quoting from the White Paper, that

> while he had no information of Government plans for an attack on Yenan, he would deplore such action and oppose it strongly. He also said that if such an attack occurred he would consider that it terminated his mission.

In summing up his impressions of the breach in negotiations represented by Chou's departure for Yenan, Marshall thought the Nationalists obdurate because, as I find on page 209 of the White Paper,

> they were thoroughly convinced that the Communists would not carry out any agreement reached * * * and that the Communists would merely disrupt any government in which they participated.

The experience of all Europe had by that time developed the hard and immitigable fact that you could not do business with Communists in your government. The Kuomintang was, as we will all agree, entirely correct in its appraisal of the situation. Marshall explained the refusal of the Yenan Reds to make a single concession toward accord and peace in very innocent terms:

> The Communist Party had defeated itself through its own suspicions.

This is on page 210 of the White Paper.

On the 1st of December, Marshall, in a talk with Chiang Kai-shek, firmly warned the Generalissimo that he could not expect to subdue the Yenan Reds because they were too strong and that, therefore, it was imperative — and his words are taken from page 212 of the White Paper — "that efforts be made to bring them into the Government." Three days later Marshall heard from Chou En-lai at Yenan. The Red leader, who is the Foreign Minister at Peking at this moment, imposed utterly impossible terms for reopening negotiations. He also snubbed Marshall's placatory request, noted above, for a judgment from Yenan on his endeavors. The White Paper so records it:

> General Chou En-lai's message made no reply to General Marshall's request for an indication by the Communist Party of its attitude

> toward his mediation effort and posed conditions which the National Government obviously could not be expected to accept. It appeared that the Communist Party had, in effect, rejected American mediation.

The terms called for the dissolution of the National Assembly, which was, at the moment, adopting what the White Paper was to call with some reservation "on its face a democratic document." They called also for the relocating of all Chinese troops to where they stood in the preceding January when the Reds had certain advantages.

We have heard much of the necessity of reform in China. Although a bit grudgingly, the White Paper paid tribute to Chiang Kai-shek's progressive accomplishments in the Assembly:

> He did exercise a determined personal leadership, assisted by almost all other groups and individuals in the Assembly, in opposing the extreme right-wing group. The Assembly adjourned on December 25 with the Generalissimo in full and confident control of the situation, having demonstrated his ability to override the Kuomintang reactionaries and having restored his prestige through his action in securing the adoption of a constitution of a democratic nature.

That was not good enough for Marshall. On page 215 of the White Paper we read:

> The passage of the constitution was only the beginning, and the only guaranty of an honest reorganization of the Government and a genuine enforcement of the constitution lay in the development of a truly liberal group in China.

In his farewell statement, made January 7, 1947, when Marshall departed for his reward in the Secretaryship of State, he spoke approvingly of the liberals in the Chinese Communist Party.

> It has appeared to me [page 687 of the White Paper] that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future.

The January 7 statement of General Marshall's must be read in one of two ways. It is, in my opinion, the most fantastic utterance ever to come from an American in an exalted position. If it is read as a propaganda document in behalf of Communist world objectives, it makes sense. It is in that case a highly intelligent, effective piece of work, calculated to confuse the American people concerning the situation in China but to fill them at the same time with reassurance that things are coming all right once the liberals in the Communist Party and the other liberals obtain control of affairs from the dominant reactionary group in the Government. How dominant they were we have just seen in the results of the National Assembly.

If, on the other hand, you try to understand the statement as the report of an American who was sent to China to advance his country's interests and the interests of the free world and to arrest the advance of Communist terror and Russian imperialism, you will be dumbfounded. You will then have to fall back upon the origin of this mission, the well-disclosed intentions of Marshall, the author of his own directives, and the climate in the Department of State with Acheson, Vincent, and Hiss managing Far Eastern policy.

I urge that you reread this statement in the White Paper.

There is nowhere in it a phrase suggesting that the United States has a stake in what happens to China. There is no indication of any special interest on the part of the country whose representative Marshall presumably was. There is, mark my words, no suggestion that the Chinese Communists were anything more than a political party, wholly Chinese in character, working toward a Communist regime in China, it is true, but first, and I quote, "advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type."

That is the subtlest, most disarming of all the adroit passages in the statement. The new constitution, he concedes, is "in all major respects in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January." He continues, "it is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution seems to include every major point that they wanted."

To the careless reader that would appear to make the Communist Party neglectful of its own true interests in refusing to sit in the Assembly.

Nowhere in this remarkable letter is there any hint that the Reds of Yenan belonged to a worldwide imperialistic system, that they were in league with and under command of the Kremlin; that in Manchuria, ceded at Yalta, Russia was supplying the strategic direction, the training, and the supplies so that these liberals could take over all China and thus add it as another vast and teeming province to the dominions of Moscow. Nowhere is there any reproach to Russia for having broken its good faith in Manchuria over and over, for having prevented the China with which it was bound in the treaty of August 1945 from exercising its sovereignty over Manchuria.

I repeat: if you read this letter as coming from an American emissary, loyal to his country and his institutions, you are first puzzled, then indignant, and you finally conclude that its author is the greatest incompetent ever sent abroad by this or any other country. If you read it as a propaganda document in behalf of other interests, another country and civilization, you will be struck by its persuasiveness and force, and the brilliance of its author.

The silence of Marshall's letter regarding the rampant Bolshevist conspiracy to rule the world is deafening. Had the letter been written in the early 1940s it might have been put down to innocence of Russia's lethal intentions. Coming in January of 1947, after Marshall had been cheek-by-jowl with Russian imperialism in Manchuria for thirteen months, after every other informed man in the non-Communist world had scanned the darkening skies and read therein the outline of Soviet expansion, the letter admits only the most damaging conclusions.

A sober epitaph was written on the Marshall mission by General Chennault, who observed, in the foreword to *Way of a Fighter:*

> The net result of Marshall's mission to China was much the same as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger central government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists.

## CHAPTER EIGHT
## *The Marshall Plan*

So Marshall, having created the China policy with Acheson and Vincent at his side, and having executed it in China, was returned to the State Department where he could administer it in line with his will and desires.

I have often wondered what prompted

President Truman to replace Byrnes, a man of politics, with a professional soldier—a soldier turned diplomat who had, moreover, just sold China out to the Communists—a fact which I suspect was, however, among the multitude of things that Truman did not know. He had much company in this. Our attention, among other things, was on Greece during the early weeks of 1947, and Marshall's prestige among the liberals who controlled the avenues of communication with the people was, largely because of his obedience to the Yenan Reds, towering by then.

Jonathan Daniels gives us a satisfactory clue in *The Man of Independence,* where, on page 316, he reflects:

> Truman had, when he appointed him and afterwards as well, more confidence in Marshall than in anybody in the Government and probably anybody in the world. Sometimes, indeed, he acted when some members of his staff thought that Marshall was being a little stuffy, as if Marshall were his walking equivalent of George Washington and Robert E. Lee.

I have some curiosity that goes deeper than the passage I have just quoted. Whence did that adoration spring? What hidden and undisclosed forces were at work around the President so to shape his emotions and his will that he would appoint Marshall Secretary of State?

Whatever dark forces lay behind Marshall's appointment to the head of our foreign relations, it did bring him into even closer contact with Dean Acheson. I have studied Acheson's public utterances sidewise, slantwise, hindwise, and frontwise; I have watched the demeanor of this glib, supercilious, and guilty man on the witness stand; I have reflected upon his career, and I come to only one conclusion: his primary loyalty in international affairs seems to run to the British Labor Government, his secondary allegiance to the Kremlin, with none left for the country of his birth. The only trouble Acheson ever encounters is where Socialist-British and Russian-Communist policy diverge, which, in Asia at least, has been seldom. Then he reluctantly follows the lead from Socialist London. That was so in the matter of the Greek and Turkish aid policy to which we shall soon come.

Where, you may ask, does President Truman fit into this picture? I do not believe that the President's staunchest advocate will claim that he understands these questions. They are beyond the capacity he has demonstrated to the country both as to scope and detail. We have noted his idolatry of Marshall. We have observed the extravagant estimates he has placed on Acheson's qualities, his stubborn refusal to dismiss him. I think it is clear that, in these great matters of life and death, President Truman is in the custody of Marshall and Acheson.

The question of China was never absent from the forefront of American concern during the two years Marshall passed as Secretary of State. The matter of supplying the Republic of China frequently recurred. We had brushes with Russia over the open door in Manchuria. Twice during 1947, we are informed by the White Paper, this Government protested Russia's appropriation of Dairen, a port whose freedom was guaranteed in the treaty of August 1945 between Moscow and China. Each time the State Department was rebuffed and let the matter drop. The Russian pretext was that the treaty allowed Russia to close the port in time of war with Japan. Were we at war with Japan? Technically, yes. No peace treaty had ended that war, and Russia was a party to that war because of Marshall's exertions before and at Yalta. As

you might suppose, the Secretary of State refused to get exercised over Russian effrontery and impudence in this matter.

There were a number of other situations affecting China which we shall consider in their proper place. Through his incumbency at the State Department, Marshall remained the sworn and implacable enemy of the Republic of China. Such enmity, of course, was in the interest of the Yenan Reds and their masters in Moscow.

Other major aspects of the struggle with Russia over the shape of the peacetime world intruded in the spring of 1947. Marshall had scarcely warmed his office chair before he went to Moscow for one of those fruitless, ill-natured conferences with the commissars through which we have expiated the original sin of recognizing the Bolshevik empire. This conference was to consider a peace treaty with Germany. Before he departed for Moscow on March 7, the Secretary of State ordered home the last of the United States Marines who had afforded some measure of stability to North China. This removed, as the American Communists had long been urging, the last visible assurance to the Chinese that American power was friendly to them. On April 2, in Moscow, Marshall was able to report to Molotov that the Marines were coming home "as rapidly as shipping becomes available." Did he tie this great concession to the Yenan Reds, to American leftist and liberal agitation and to Moscow, to anything we wanted from the Kremlin? Not that we know of.

The Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow was a perfunctory exhibition of Russian intransigeance. Nothing of any moment was accomplished. The plain-speaking Mark Clark was there on the problems of Austria, Lucius Clay on those of Germany. As Clark recalled the matter on page 486 of his book *Calculated Risk:*

> I felt that it must have taken a great deal of courage for Marshall to step into the job of Secretary of State and then leave almost immediately for Moscow to deal with many intricate problems before he had time to familiarize himself with the essential details.
>
> I was amazed, however, when we met in Berlin (on the way to Moscow) to discover that we didn't have a definite program of action. On the eve of the most importance conference since Potsdam everybody was still discussing what we should do in Moscow.

The atmosphere of Moscow should have been congenial to Marshall. On several occasions, as we have seen, Stalin had gone out of his way to make commendatory remarks about the American. At a dinner given by Molotov, Marshall wore his Order of Suvorov on his dinner jacket. He had a talk with Stalin. Usually, perhaps without exception, foreigners who have words with Stalin find some way to acquaint the public with the whole conversation between them and the Autocrat of all Russians. Not so with Marshall. He did say in a radio broadcast noting the conference's failure, that, in this conversation, Stalin had called the conference negotiations "only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaisance forces on this question." The question was the kind of self-government Germany should have. This broadcast took place on April 28 upon Marshall's return to Washington. The obstacle to agreement on this issue, he said, was that "the Soviet government insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government adapted to the seizure of absolute control." He concluded, "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."

It may be gathered that one subject

of Marshall's private talk with Stalin was the Russian demand, first heard when Hopkins was in Moscow in the preceding June, for a reinstatement of some of the items of the fourth lend-lease protocol which was cancelled at the end of hostilities in Europe.

A few days after Marshall's return to Washington he conferred with the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senator from New Hampshire, Styles Bridges, and with his opposite number from the other house, Mr. Taber.

Marshall came to see those gentlemen in behalf of a project which he very much desired, namely, the restoration of some forty million dollars' worth of lend-lease which the Russians claimed due them by some distortion of logic. The Secretary of State announced that he approached the gentlemen of the Congress as personal friends to plead in that capacity for this appropriation. "We must," he said, and I am relying upon the memory of my colleague, "in our relations with Soviet Russia be, like Caesar's wife, above reproach. We must give them no reason whatever to feel that we have not lived up to every commitment we have made." The Secretary was asked if he knew what the forty million dollars represented in the way of goods. He said that he did not, not having the schedules with him. Whereupon he was told that, among other things, the schedules in question called for two plants, earmarked for Siberia, for converting gasoline into high octane fuel for aviation purposes. Marshall failed to win his case.

The principal advantage to the United States of the Moscow Conference, as I see it, was that it took Marshall out of Washington while the policy of aid to Greece and Turkey was being formed. Given his militant aversion to supporting British interests in the Mediterranean, which we have seen, we can scarcely believe that he would have been a genuine advocate of the Forrestal plan in the eastern Mediterranean. I regard the assistance we voted to Greece and Turkey as the most statesmanlike approach made by the Truman administration to the whole postwar problem of the containment of Russia.

With the Truman Doctrine, Marshall had nothing to do. He was the author of the Marshall Plan. Between the two concepts and programs there is the difference of night and day, although they have become inseparably united in the public mind under the impact of administration propaganda. It is no doubt generally supposed that, as Jonathan Daniels puts it on page 321 of his book *The Man of Independence,* the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Pact "all were steps in one plan and parts of the policy of one man." He is referring to the man from Independence. Nothing could be more misleading.

We are all familiar with the rapid events which in March of 1947 brought our quick acceptance of the British burden of support for Greece and Turkey. Its chief supporter in the highest administration circles was the late James V. Forrestal, a complex, gifted statesman, who saw with as much clarity as any American the drift of events toward Russian expansion. Because of his strong services rendered in this cause, Forrestal was marked for destruction by the Soviet apparatus in this country.

The character assassination of Jim Forrestal was led by Drew Pearson, that master of snidery and venom. How much Forrestal's derangement and eventual tragic death came as the result of the campaign by Pearson and the other Communist camp followers to injure his faith and credit and reflect upon his gallantry and courage, I do not know. I can only say that their task was to destroy him.

In reporting that Marshall had no part whatever in the discussions of the Forrestal program for Greece and Turkey, I am relying upon the recollections of a man who was at the time high in the confidence of the White House.

The situation at the time seemed to those around the President most urgent. He therefore cut short a vacation to hurry home, and on March 12 asked Congress to support an aid program for those countries to preserve them from Communist aggressions, actual and feared. The President asked for $400,000,000 for Greece and $150,000,000 for Turkey. What were these sums for? Primarily, to strengthen the military forces of the countries, only secondarily to assist them economically, and emphasis was put on the rebuilding of harbor installations and railways in Greece for military purposes. This was a policy that made sense from the point of view of America's world politics. It served the interest of the United States and the West, but not the Kremlin. The Congress passed it by overwhelming majorities in both Houses.

The staunch Americans who, like Forrestal, believed that the steady encroachment of Soviet imperial purposes must be confronted by evidences of America's will to resist, were enormously encouraged. That they were momentarily in the ascendant at the White House was seen when the President went on to put the policy into a larger frame.

The enlargement of the Forrestal Greek-Turkish aid measure into the Truman Doctrine came on May 8. On that date Dean Acheson addressed an audience in Cleveland, Mississippi. Because Truman was staying close to the White House telephone for word from the sick room of his aged mother in Grandview, Missouri, he had seen fit not to deliver a speech prepared for him at Cleveland and had deputized Acheson to substitute for him. It was an important speech. So muddled has been the thinking on this subject that it is generally held to have been a prior enunciation of the Marshall Plan, which first saw the light in a speech by Secretary of State Marshall at Harvard University nearly a month later, on June 5.

Actually, the only similiarity between the Cleveland speech and the Cambridge speech is that they both envisaged enormous transfers of money from the pockets of the American taxpayers to those of other lands.

At Cleveland, Acheson said:

> Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we are going to have to concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

How would the United States Government determine where its assistance would be sent? I quote the answer given by Acheson at Cleveland:

> Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid. This is no more than frank recognition that, as President Truman said, "Totalitarian regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Keep in mind this was not Acheson speaking; this was Truman's speech. He had been given it to read—a speech drafted under Forrestal's thinking and not the thinking of Acheson and Mar-

shall. We may suppose this speech found little favor in the Kremlin. The prospect of the United States pouring out its limitless treasure to support the enemies of Soviet aggression, direct or indirect, could not be welcome to the masters of Russian policy. The means test, the test which signified that only countries prepared to resist Russian world policy could qualify, must have been especially irksome. It could easily have been clear to Stalin that such a policy, strengthening the political and military resources of lands in the path of Soviet ambition, and followed as a logical corollary by an effective military alliance among the free nations, would be infinitely troublesome to his plans.

So rested the matter when the President, on May 17, flew to Kansas City to be at the bedside of his dying mother. He was absent from Washington until after she died on June 26, transacting the Government's business in his penthouse suite atop the Hotel Muehlbach in Kansas City. In his absence, Secretary Marshall and his advisers—I wish we knew who all of them were—wrote the speech that launched the Marshall Plan. I wonder if the President, harassed as he was by grief, attending his mother several hours a day, ever passed upon that speech or whether it was represented to him as it has been steadily represented to the country ever since, as a complement to, a fulfillment of, the Truman Doctrine, and hence something he need not see and study.

What Marshall said at Cambridge after depicting the disorganization of European economies, the hunger and scarcities obtaining there, was this:

> It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Was there to be any discrimination in the assistance envisaged by the Secretary of State, any means test based on resistance to Soviet encroachments and machinations? No, indeed:

> Our policy is directed not against any country, or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop [a direct hit at the Greek-Turkish aid program]. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a palliative.

Who is to get the assistance?

> Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

Need I point out to you that the Marshall Plan made mincemeat of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine? The last sentences were, of course, window dressing, a restatement of the Truman-Forrestal doctrine in innocuous words with no point whatsoever. Their insincerity was plainly shown when the benefits of the Marshall Plan were promptly offered to Russia and her satellites. Need I elaborate the point that, whereas the Truman-Forrestal doctrine offered our wealth to like-minded countries, striving to combat

communism, externally and internally, the Marshall Plan eradicates that purpose? Need I say that the one bade fair to forge the free world into a great and vital instrument with which to confront Soviet imperialism, the other reduced the whole splendid concept of Acheson speaking Forrestal's mind at Cleveland into a mere charity enterprise, without political content, and without political value to the United States? What Marshall did, to borrow the facetious language of some opponents of his plan, was to put Europe on the WPA.

The Forrestal plan would have strengthened us in the conflict with Russia. The result of using the Marshall Plan instead of the Forrestal plan in Europe has been to make us the patsy of the modern world, to arouse the contempt and suspicion of Europe and to leave us in the summer of 1951, heavily engaged in Asia, and with no willing, reliable allies in all Europe among the beneficiaries of our bounty except Greece and Turkey and, a country that had no seat at the table at all, Spain, plus Western Germany, whose resources we cannot use in the struggle against international communism because her 48,000,000 people, according to the State Department, are not peace loving.

The Truman-Forrestal doctrine's means test would have included Spain. The Marshall Plan excluded Spain, although it included Russia in its intent.

I do not think this monstrous perversion of sound and understandable national policy was accidental. I think it was an evil hoax on the generosity, good will and carelessness of the American people. I think it was the product of a will and intention hostile to this free society.

The Marshall Plan was received with a clamorous acclaim from the leftist, liberal intellectuals. Those who spoke against it, who sought to point out the dire discrepancy between it and the Truman Doctrine, were howled down as ungenerous reactionaries. I voted for the Marshall Plan. As I said at the time, I voted for the Marshall Plan because it had some good aspects, for example, the feeding of the starving people of Europe. I strongly maintained then that the food and clothing which we were giving should be on the basis of need of the people themselves rather than a gift to the governments involved, which sold it to starving people on the basis of ability to pay. Another point which I maintained at that time was that the money for the rehabilitation of industry should have been loaned directly to the industry in question, taking back what security that industry had to offer regardless of how valueless the security might be, instead of funneling the money through tottering, corrupt, and socialistic governments as the Marshall Plan proposed to do.

Nevertheless, in the end I voted for it because it was a case of Marshall Plan aid for Europe or nothing. I am not too sure today that nothing might not have been better.

Of all Marshall's significant endeavors since the early months of World War II, the derricking of the Forrestal plan ranks next, I should judge, to the Marshall policy for China in its massive helpfulness to the world ambitions of the Kremlin. That judgment is in no way impaired by the fact that Russia declined and forbade its satellites to share in the Marshall Plan's bounty.

There were good and sufficient reasons for that attitude from the Russian viewpoint. Two will immediately occur to anyone who thinks of it. To accept it meant to disparage in the eyes of the world the industrial magnitude, the might and prestige of the great rival of the United States, Russia. The acceptance of this assistance would like-

wise have meant the intrusion of United States representatives in the affairs of the satellites—although, given the political nature of so many of the men and women who have represented this country abroad under UNRRA and ECA, that could not have been the major disability that it no doubt seemed to the Kremlin—and a certain interference with their economies. The Kremlin could not, it is patent to me, have allowed to arise among the millions of its unwilling vassals sentiments of gratitude for this free country.

I have often wondered whence came the inspiration for the Marshall Plan in the mind of its author. Why should he conceive that we needed another plan when we already had the Truman-Forrestal plan? What called for his intervention in this matter? The country, except for those who serve Soviet interest, was content with the Truman Doctrine. There were no objections from abroad save from the Kremlin alone. Who prompted Marshall?

I have found one clue that offers some promise. I have here a book by Earl Browder entitled *Teheran—Our Path in War and Peace*. It is a highly informative book that deserves a wider reading among those who would like to make sense and order out of our national policies in recent years. In his book, Browder gives us the true significance of Teheran from the viewpoint of Russia, finding great cause for rejoicing in the solidarity of American and Russian interest at that conference. There is more to the book than that. I find in it almost textually exact the blueprint for unlimited, indiscriminate benevolence abroad comprehended in the Marshall Plan. In fact, in 1945 Browder in his book gave almost a complete blueprint of the Marshall Plan and of the administration's Point 4 program.

Let us again briefly compare at this time the Forrestal plan—erroneously named the Truman plan—for Greece and Turkey with the Acheson-Marshall plan for Europe.

The Forrestal plan—which Truman fortunately adopted for Greece and Turkey—provided for all the necessary military aid to people who themselves were willing to fight communism—enough military aid to make them strong enough to withstand international communism. While sufficient economic aid was given to make the military aid effective and workable, the emphasis at all times was to be on military aid. The Forrestal plan proved very successful.

The Marshall Plan was directly opposite to the Forrestal plan for Greece and Turkey. It consisted of giving the maximum economic aid with no thought whatsoever of any military defense of Western Europe. In fact, the overall purpose was to build up the area economically and keep it defenseless from a military standpoint. The Marshall Plan fitted perfectly with Communist Russia's desire for a power vacuum in all of Western Europe.

The recommendations of Washington in the summer of 1947 were something like this:

Hundreds of millions for Greece and Turkey to help preserve them from being engulfed by the tide of Soviet imperialism, billions in economic aid for Europe—not one cent for the Republic of China.

The Secretary of State, having opened the Treasury gates for his massive and unrewarding boondoggle throughout Europe, made no mention whatsoever of aid to China. It was only after the Eightieth Congress indicated that they would look with disfavor on aid to Europe unless aid to China were included in the plan that the State Department proposed a similar nonmilitary grant to China. It called

for $570,000,000 over a fifteen-month period. Marshall stipulated in the bill he sent to Congress that the money should go alike to his friends, the Yenan Reds, and our friends, the Republic of China.

I deal now with the extraordinary campaign of deception practiced upon this Congress regarding aid to China. Acheson's testimony before the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees in June of 1951 was a piece of organized fabrication on so vast a scale as to have excited the envy of Ananias.

Acheson repeated the assertion that this Government between VJ-Day and 1949 gave China $2,000,000,000 in grants and credit. He scraped the bottom of the barrel to arrive at that figure. It includes lendlease left over from the war to the tune of several hundred millions. It includes nearly a half million estimated to be the United States share of UNRRA for China — our friends and the Yenan Reds alike sharing in this. It includes about $600,000,000 for "services," the principal part of which was the cost of transporting the Republic of China's armies into northern and eastern China and Manchuria to accept the surrender of the Japanese —as much our job as theirs. It includes perhaps a hundred million in loan for internal reconstruction. If we were to believe Acheson, half of the two billions was "military aid." That is the most preposterous aspect of his great deception. Anyone who studies the record will find, as I have found, that the only military aid given the Republic of China, either as grants or credits, from VJ-Day to 1949 consisted of this:

1. The balance of lend-lease with which Wedemeyer finished equipping and munitioning the Nationalist forces in the fall of 1945; 2. The $125,000,000 voted by the Congress in the spring of 1948, an appropriation which was maliciously sabotaged by the State Department and Commerce Department; 3. A tiny residue found in the surplus war materials sold the Republic of China in 1946 before Marshall, in deference to his friend, Chou En-lai, procured a Presidential order forbidding any combat items to be included.

Why did Marshall and Acheson seek to deceive the people about this? The record is open. We failed to assist the Republic of China in its war with world communism, represented by the Yenan Reds. In fact, it was the declared and consistent policy of this administration to refuse to assist our friends.

I refer to Truman's statement of policy of December 18, 1946, where, after all the evidence of Russian intentions to dominate all governments in which they were allowed to enter had been thoroughly disseminated through the western world, he demands in stern tones that Chiang Kai-shek accept the recalcitrant Yenan Reds on pain of incurring his displeasure. I want particularly to stress Truman's apologetic reference to the surplus stores, and I quote the President's words:

> China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases * * * especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people * * *. Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. [This was done at Marshall's insistence upon the urging of the Yenan Reds when the Nationalists were winning the civil war.] Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

When Acheson said in the foreword

to the White Paper that "the second objective of assisting the National Government * * * we pursued vigorously from 1945 to 1949," he is deliberately attempting to deceive. Not only did we not assist them affirmatively, but Marshall shut off what they had coming to them by his embargo and in the surplus stores. I shall offer one final proof of Acheson's moral turpitude in this matter.

First I quote from testimony of Acheson before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House on March 20, 1947, when he opposed military advice and supplies to China, saying:

> The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

Next I quote from the White Paper letter of transmittal where Acheson said that the action which he was against in 1947, because it was unnecessary then, was too late to do any good in 1949:

> The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.

I hope that I never have to face an angry God with a lie of that enormity on my conscience. The plain fact is that we not only did not assist the Republic of China to avoid "the ominous result of the civil war in China" but we did everything we could, short of arming and leading the Yenan Reds, to give the decision to them. For this result two men are more responsible than any other Americans, and their names are George Catlett Marshall and Dean Gooderham Acheson.

And so we come to another attempt to hide, to prevaricate, to deceive. This concerns the Wedemeyer mission to China. Already in 1947 the public was stirring in curiosity over the deplorable and dangerous trend of events in China. Already the friends of China were asking why, if we could so munificently assume the British burden, we could not take care of our important interest in China? So Wedemeyer was sent to China in the summer of 1947.

He returned in September and rendered to the President his report, a report which I cannot commend too highly for objectivity, for candor and, above all, for its sound realization that Russia was on the march in China to our potential disaster. The Republic of China still had the upper hand militarily when Wedemeyer was there, although the problem of supply was growing more acute day by day and he recommended measures to relieve it.

The Wedemeyer report utterly displeased General Marshall for reasons we shall come to later. At first, Marshall thought it might be modified so that it would suit his long-range purpose. A crew of State Department officials was put to the task of rewriting the report. I would like to know if it included Hiss and Vincent. Wedemeyer declined to sign a distorted report. And so Marshall pocketed the whole thing, keeping it suppressed for nearly two years until it was inserted among the annexes of the White Paper.

Why did Marshall bottle up the Wedemeyer report? The true answer is found in the nature and language of that report, which is a plain repudiation of the intent of his policy and mission. Two pretexts were put forward by Marshall. One, which was

given to satisfy a request for publication by the late Senator from Michigan, Arthur Vandenburg, who was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was *in toto* false. The second answer was ambiguous but indicative of the goal and purpose of Marshall's China policy.

I have photostatic copies of two letters addressed by Senator Vandenberg to Alfred Kohlberg, a staunch American, without whose indefatigable efforts to expose the truth we might already have been totally lost in Asia. The first Vandenberg letter, dated November 24, 1947, said:

> It is my opinion that there is nothing to be gained for China by its [the Wedemeyer report's] publication—and I think I speak as a proven friend of China. I give you one example — confidentially. The report is replete with quotations of many prominent people (both Chinese and Americans) whose opinions were obtained under. the seal of confidence. I am advised on what I consider to be unimpeachable authority that this is the fact.

Kohlberg replied, expressing his fears that "a conspiratorial group in the State Department, and possibly in the administrative office of the President, and possibly in the Bureau of the Budget, have objectives in the Far East that conflict with our proclaimed open-door policy," and further stated that he was under the impression that "the so-called bi-partisan foreign policy is being used as a shield to cover objectives which are hidden from the Republicans, like yourself, concerned with that policy."

On December 31, 1947, Senator Vandenberg again wrote Kohlberg in reassurance concerning the Wedemeyer report, referring to his previous letter and saying:

> My statement to you in my letter of November 24 regarding the Wedemeyer report was based upon a direct and specific statement to me by Secretary of State Marshall.

The Wedemeyer report finally saw the light of day despite Marshall's opposition. Are there in it any confidential statements ascribed to any Chinese or Americans such as the first Vandenberg letter relates? Certainly not. What can we make of this clear and explicit accusation from beyond the grave? Only this, that Marshall manufactured this excuse out of whole cloth. That, in short, he lied; as he lied on the witness stand in September 1950 about the authorship of the China policy; as he lied about his whereabouts on the morning of Pearl Harbor Day, saying first that he was horseback riding, then that he was at home at Fort Myer, when, in Arthur Upham Pope's book on Litvinoff, Marshall's name appears as one of those Americans who met the Russian Ambassador when he arrived by plane in Washington on that morning. This latter incident I have already placed in the Congressional Record.

What can we make of this succession of untruths? What of the character of their author? There was a time when the word of an officer of the United States Army or Navy was as good as his bond. Veracity was bred in the bone and fiber of our officers corps, at their academies and throughout their careers. We honored them for it and took pride in their honor. General Marshall was at the head of our armed services. Quite apart from the destructive nature of his public acts since the beginning of World War II, I ask in all gravity, whether a man so frequently taken in falsehood, who has recourse to the lie whenever it suits his convenience, was fit to hold a place where he must be a model to the officers and enlisted men and women of our armed services?

The second and public reason given for suppressing the Wedemeyer report was that in it Wedemeyer recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria. It is true that Wedemeyer did so recommend. The inference drawn in this excuse was that its publication would have been offensive to the Republic of China. The disingenuousness of that excuse is at once apparent if we refer to China's position in 1947, with its continued possession of Manchuria touch and go, and to the brusque and contemptuous treatment which had been meted to Chiang Kai-shek by Truman and Marshall since December of 1945. Since when were we considering the feelings of the Republic of China? You need not seek far to find the real reason lurking behind this avowed one. Whom would such a proposal really offend? Not China, but Russia—the Russia which had, as a result of the Yalta deal, a hammerlock on Manchuria which it proposed not to relax, sharing it, if at all, and nominally only, with its creatures of Yenan.

So we see that the excuse based upon the trusteeship proposal was a species of deceit also. The genuine reason fits perfectly into the whole pattern of the China policy, being part and parcel of the scheme hatched in the fall of 1945, with Marshall as its chief exponent, to deliver China, and with it all Asia, to the Soviet empire.

We come to the bona-fide reason for the suppression of the Wedemeyer report in the fall of 1947, when, I bid the reader note, China still had a chance to fight off the Red imperialists with our assistance. By 1949, when the report found its way into public attention, that hope had vanished and the Marshall plan for China was, to all intents and purposes, crowned with success. The overwhelming reason for the suppression was that the Wedemeyer report in almost every line, directly and indirectly, repudiated the Marshall policy.

Wedemeyer did point out the need for reform in the Chinese Government. One wonders whether reform was needed more in China than within our own Government, as evidenced by the odorous 5-percenter investigation, the deep freezes, the mink coats, the fixes in criminal cases and in RFC loans, the combine of gamblers and Government officials. No one in this Nation has urged, as Marshall did in China, that because this Government is corrupt, we should turn it over to the Communists. Incidentally, Acheson, before the Russell Committee, dealt almost exclusively with the small section of the Wedemeyer report dealing with corruption in China.

Why was the Wedemeyer report really suppressed?

Marshall wholly ignored the question of Russia, omitting any reference to it in his valedictory.

The whole of Wedemeyer's general statement to the President was instinct with the urgency of that question. I shall quote passages illustrating this point, resisting the temptation to quote all of the Wedemeyer report:

> The goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in Europe and Asia during the 10 years leading to World War II. The pattern is familiar — employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement to disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the imposition of totalitarian ideologies. This pattern is present in the Far East,

particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia.

In other words, Manchuria.

Why did Wedemeyer propose a trusteeship for Manchuria? Was it against the interest of China? I quote further from his report:

> The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area becoming a Soviet satellite. * * * This would create a difficult situation for China, the United States, and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.

What can be done in general to meet the threat to the peace contained in Soviet imperialism?

> Events of the past 2 years demonstrate the futility of appeasement based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive expansion through ruthless secret police methods and through an increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of nazism in its ambitious scope and dangerous implications.
>
> Therefore in attempting a solution to the problem presented in the Far East * * * every possible opportunity must be used to seize the initiative in order to create bulwarks of freedom.

How did our difficulties arise in the Far East?

> Indirectly the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian reentry into Manchuria and later by withholding aid from the Nationalist Government.

Wedemeyer proposed that the whole problem be referred to the United Nations; that the United Nations set up a trusteeship over Manchuria; that China give continuing evidence of a will to reform her governmental structure; and that the United States supply official advisers, military and civilian, to assist China in those reforms.

What evidence does General Wedemeyer's report offer on whether or not we supplied China? In his testimony of June 4, before the Russell Committee, Dean Acheson said:

> Although his [Wedemeyer's] actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in.

Although in September 1947 the forces of the Republic of China had invaded and captured Yenan, the situation in Manchuria had reached a point where, said Wedemeyer on page 808 of the White Paper, "prompt action is necessary to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite." Elsewhere the Nationalist forces faced severe stringencies and suffered from poor strategical leadership. Said Wedemeyer:

> It is doubtful if Gen. Chen Cheng [the new Nationalist commander in Manchuria] can weld a strong unified force in view of the continued serious shortages of both supplies and capable subordinates.

The Yenan Reds had no shortages of supplies and trained captains, both being furnished by Russia.

What did Wedemeyer think of the importance of China to the American position in the Far East? I quote from page 809 of the White Paper:

> Any further spread of Soviet influence and power would be inimical to United States strategic

interests. In the time of war the existence of an unfriendly China would result in denying us important air bases for use as staging areas for bombing attacks as well as important naval bases along the Chinese coast. Its control by the Soviet Union or a regime friendly to the Soviet Union would make available for hostile use a number of warm-water ports and air bases. Our own air and naval bases in Japan, [the] Ryukyus and the Philippines would be subject to relatively short-range neutralizing air attacks. Furthermore, industrial and military developments of Siberia east of Lake Baikal would probably make the Manchurian area more or less self-sufficient.

On the other hand, a unified China friendly or allied to the United States would not only provide important air and naval bases, but also from the standpoint of its size and manpower, be an important ally to the United States.

These strategic lessons are elementary to any consideration of the relationship of the United States to the Far East. Recognizing them, Wedemeyer's advice, explicit and implicit, is that we hold and preserve China as an ally. If General Wedemeyer understood matters in this sense, were they not understandable also to General Marshall? He, like Wedemeyer, is a professional soldier, trained to the understanding of strategy.

What did Wedemeyer recommend that we do in detail to bolster China in its civil war on the Yenan Reds? He had a six-point program.

First, China had 16,000 motor vehicles which it could not use, chiefly trucks, because of the lack of spare parts which we had agreed to supply but hadn't.

The United States [said Wedemeyer] is morally obligated to complete this program.

Secondly, the United States should enable the Chinese to buy military equipment. He said, and I quote from page 811.

Since completion of the 39-division program nearly 2 years ago very little has been supplied. Thus there are many shortages in military equipment which react to the disadvantage of Nationalist military efforts. Credits should be established for China to purchase the necessary military equipment needed to effect a supervised revitalization of her ground and air forces. Without such aid American equipment purchased during and subsequent to the war is, or soon will be, valueless since maintenance parts will not be available to keep the equipment in use.

What does that do to Acheson's billion dollars in military aid furnished China between VJ-Day and 1949? What a monstrous deception that has been. The Secretary of State has repeatedly declared that the Republic of China lost no battles because of a lack of equipment and ammunition. What did Wedemeyer say bearing upon the future of the civil war in September 1947?

In July the Navy abandoned 335 tons of ammunition in Tsingtao, which was recovered by Nationalists. However, Nationalist armies continue to complain of shortages of ammunition of all types and calibers. There will be severe shortages in the near future unless replenishment from foreign sources is accomplished.

There is an implied moral obligation to assist the Chinese Government to obtain ammunition.

In conclusion, Wedemeyer recommended and I quote from page 814:

That the United States provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to China in

> order to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite, to bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and to contribute to the gradual development of stability in China.

Could you ask for a more forthrightly American program? Can you wonder that Marshall, bent on other aims, suppressed this report?

Six months later, on March 10, 1948, months during which the situation in China had gone, from the American viewpoint, from bad to worse, Marshall was asked at a press conference whether the directive of December 1945, demanding a unified government of China, was still our policy. He said that it was, an answer which threw the State Department into a dither. No one but Marshall was openly supporting that policy by the spring of 1948. So the Department sought to extricate him, issuing a statement the next day which made it appear that Marshall had been confused. They said that he had thought the question had to do with the President's statement of December 15, 1945, which, of course, it did. Others in the Department of State then edited what the Secretary had said to make it appear that what he really said was that, the Communists being in open rebellion in China, the matter of their inclusion in the Government was for the Chinese, not the American Government, to decide.

The President, too, was utterly confused at this point. On March 11, at a White House press conference, he was asked the same question, "Do you still insist upon Communists in the Chinese Government?" The statement of December 15, 1945, "still stood," replied Truman. He confounded his American interviewers by adding the contradictory explanation that, however, "we did not want Communists in the Government of China or anywhere else if we could help it."

The questions of March 10 and 11 had been prompted by public discussion of aid to China. Such demands were rising. We then had the Eightieth Congress. The friends of China had friends in this court. And so the Congress, rejecting Marshall's nonmilitary $780,000,000 bill, appropriated $275,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for arms to help Chiang Kai-shek at that late hour stand against Soviet imperialism. This sum, inadequate though it was, might have been effective had it been immediately translated into the ammunition for lack of which the armies of the Republic of China were being beaten, were defecting, or fading away.

What ensued is one of the most shocking subversions of the will of the Congress that our history will show. If proof were needed that the State Department, under Marshall and Acheson, and sheltered by a wholly uncomprehending and pliant President, were intent upon delivering China to Russia, that proof was afforded by their administration of the China-aid bill of 1948.

Nothing was done for two months. The Chinese Ambassador had been pleading in vain for implementation. On June 2 the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges, having sent a strong note to the White House concerning this delay, the President wrote the State and Treasury Departments, in effect authorizing them to move. But the President, relying upon his State Department advisers, had gummed up the works. I am sure this was intentional on their part. He had authorized the executive agencies to buy military supplies only from commercial suppliers. No supplies were available from those sources. Not until July 28, four months after the act was passed, was the Defense Department empowered to issue matériel from its own stocks.

Not until November 9, more than

seven months after Congress spoke, did the first shipment clear from Seattle for China. China was finally lost during those months. This is not the end of this wretched story. Not only was the will of Congress frustrated for more than half a year, but China got only half as much in the way of military supplies as Congress had supposed she would. The prices fixed upon the supplies by the Army were exorbitant. Congress had expected China to be treated as had all other countries which drew from our stores, that is, that she would be charged the cheap, surplus price charged the others. Instead of that, and I am taking the figures from Miss Utley's book *The China Story*, China paid for bazookas $162 apiece, the surplus price being $3.65; for .30-caliber rifles she paid $51 each, the surplus price being $5.10; for a thousand rounds of rifle ammunition $85, the surplus price being $4.55; and for machine-gun ammunition per thousand rounds, $95, the surplus price, being $4.58. Those figures appear in Miss Utley's book. I have not myself checked them; therefore, I ask the Department of the Army to submit to the appropriate committee of the Senate the price lists that it charged the Chinese.

I shall not further elaborate this appalling chapter in the betrayal of China. As it demonstrates, Marshall was still implacably against the Republic of China. And he never relented. Only a few weeks before he resigned as Secretary of State, Marshall was attending the Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. There he was approached by Dr. T. S. Tsiang, the Chinese delegate, who, and I find this on page 887 of the White Paper, implored Marshall for assistance. Tsiang asked that the United States recognize the need for expert military leadership by sending United States officers to actual command of the Republican armies and that the United States expedite the supply of munitions; and he asked Marshall's advice about laying China's plight before the United Nations, as Wedemeyer had proposed.

In his report on the incident to Under Secretary Lovett at Washington, Marshall said:

> I did not offer encouragement beyond present efforts.

Respecting Tsiang's United Nations inquiry, Marshall reported:

> I said I would have to consult my colleagues of the United States delegation to develop various possibilities; that offhand I thought it an inadvisable procedure and discussed possible Soviet moves to take advantage rather than to counter such a move.

The sense of the foregoing is difficult to arrive at. What can be easily gathered is that Marshall was, as usual, sensitive to Russia's plans, aims, and prospects.

The final, definitive word was given on the Marshall China policy in January of 1949. By then the friends of the Yenan Reds, who are, of course, by definition, the enemies of America and the West, were jubilant. Marshall's policy was a success. There remained the task of explaining to the faithful how it had been accomplished. There remained a bit of crowing to do over the corpse of China and the decline of America's position in the Far East. This task was assumed by, or delegated to, Owen Lattimore. There has been a controversy over whether Owen Lattimore is a conscious agent of Soviet imperialism. I know that he is and I know that in the fullness of time that fact will be established.

On the editorial page of the Sunday *Compass* of New York, July 17, 1949, is an article by Owen Lattimore, with

the exultant heading, "South Korea—another China." Lattimore is discussing the proposals, then before Congress, for a grant to South Korea of $150,000,000. Dean Acheson had made what Lattimore called a "strong appeal" for that appropriation before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Lattimore went on to point out that at this same time we were withdrawing our troops from South Korea. The conjunction of these events was to Lattimore, and he was so explaining them to the faithful who read the *Compass,* a demonstration of the Communist-planned duplicity of American policy, a policy which he said "is now conducted under rules of protocol which have become as rigid as tribal taboos." If we may paraphrase Lattimore's words, the United States was then pursuing one policy with two contradictory horns. Upon the one horn, we were appearing to be standing in friendly sponsorship of South Korea; on the other we were preparing to let her fall into the maw of Russian imperialism. George Marshall's part in this conspiracy is stated in Lattimore's words thus:

> There is logic to the course of action advocated by Secretary Acheson. It is, moreover, a perfectly convincing logic. * * *
>
> For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China. The truth is that Gen. George C. Marshall, on his mission to China in 1946 * * * became convinced of several unpleasant things which, because of the state of political opinion in America, could not be stated out loud.

Note that Lattimore is interpreting the secret mind of George Marshall as one having authority. I continue:

> First, he was convinced that the Kuomintang would not be able to triumph over the Chinese Communists unless it took American advice. Second, he was convinced that politically and militarily America could not handle the situation in China by taking the Kuomintang by the scruff of the neck and the seat of the pants and making it behave. Yet he could not, as a statesman, advise what seemed sensible to him as a General—that the United States simply pull out and abandon an untenable position.

I come to the operative part of this astounding recital of the problem of China:

> As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem—

and here we have reached the inner chamber, the arcanum, of the Marshall plan for China—

> was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely [that is, it cannot be wholly concealed] and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

There you have the complete, sinister, treacherous, traitorous picture—here is the modus operandi written to instruct the Communists and Communist sympathizers which, alone, read the *Compass.* This is a secret communication, in effect, letting the faithful in on the secret of how the Marshall policy worked.

Can anyone doubt, after the lengthy documentation which I have presented from the pens of the principal actors of this period and from other records,

including the White Paper, that Lattimore was speaking the truth?

So, he went on, it was to be with Korea:

> The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence, the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000.

## CHAPTER NINE
## *The Marshall-Acheson Strategy for the Future*

The next appearance of Marshall in a position of supreme influence over our affairs came only in September of 1950. It was a black day for America when this Senate voted to set aside a law it had passed to guard against lesser calamities to allow Marshall to become Secretary of Defense. We were not on guard, we were not vigilant. We fell short on that day and I repentantly accept my share of the blame. I was recorded against the bill but opposition was hopeless because Marshall was still wearing the halo placed upon his head by the alchemy of liberal-leftist propaganda.

I wondered then why this venerable soldier, who had received the world's honors, who had served as the first man in the President's Cabinet, should be willing to return to the wars. I no longer wonder.

What is our strategy now?

It is to abandon American interest in the Far East, surrendering Formosa to the grasp of a United Nations strewn with our enemies and wanting nothing so much, under the leadership of the Socialist Government of Britain and the racist, totalitarian Government of India, as to thrust the United States out of the Far East.

It is because he differed with that policy that General MacArthur was recalled from the Far East. He stood as a barrier to the final fulfillment of the Marshall policy for China. That is why, when Marshall took office, Eisenhower was rushed to Europe and the great debate over the extent of our participation in the defense of Europe was provoked. That was the diversionary trick of a carnival prestidigitator. What had changed in Europe during last summer and early fall? What new sign was there that we faced attack from Russia in that quarter? The whole procedure was without meaning in any objective sense, yet it had meaning in the mind of the man referred to by the Democrats at Denver as "a master of global strategy."

Let us examine Marshall's strategy in Europe. Some feel that the problem of defending Europe can be settled merely by the decision whether we shall send an additional six or eight or ten American divisions to Western Europe. Would that it were that simple. The group which is doing the planning for Western Europe is the identical group which has been doing the disastrous planning for Asia; the same group that did the planning for the sellout of Poland and China.

When General Eisenhower appeared before the joint session of the Congress, he said he was unable to discuss the use of German manpower until the politics of the situation were cleared up by the diplomats. And for five years those diplomats have done nothing to clear up the situation. Periodically, our State Department has talked of rearming Western Germany to counter the powerful "peoples" army built up by the Russians in East Germany. We have had nothing but talk, apparently planned to lull the American people into a sense of security that we are going to do something in West Germany to counter the threat of Russia in East Germany.

When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the defense of Western Europe, he was not even allowed to visit the greatest potential source of manpower for a Western European army — a country that has long been dedicated to fighting communism—Spain. I shall not argue that Spain has or has not the kind of government of which we approve. I am not going to argue that we should or should not love the 48,000,000 people of Western Germany. But it takes no argument, it follows as the night follows the day, that there is no way to defend the industrial heart of Europe unless we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany and Spain.

Why have we apparently adopted the suicidal strategy of opposing American and Allied flesh to the Russian on the undefended plains of central Europe? Are we inviting defeat there as well as in Asia? Why has our strategy, under Marshall, ignored the Mediterranean theater, as he scorned it in World War II; an area where we alone have potential bastions that can be held and from which we can launch counterattacks by air and land against Russia? Why have we slighted the two nations in Europe — one with an organized and effective army that is on our side; the other with a vast potential army. Spain has an organized army. The warlike quality of the Spanish is not challenged.

They have thirty-five divisions which they would throw into the pool. France has a half dozen at most, and who could rely completely on French conscripts in a war against the Communist motherland? The British have no more. Why have we slighted heroic Greece and the Turks, whose valor in Korea has won our respect and forged ties of gratitude which should last as long as this Republic itself?

We have embraced Yugoslavia. Dean Acheson has served notice upon the Kremlin that an attack upon Communist Yugoslavia will mean war with us. At whose bidding and by whose authority did Acheson speak — Acheson so meek in the Far East, so willing to surrender Formosa, to make peace on the thirty-eighth parallel and admit Communist China into the United Nations? Whose bidding was he following? Was it the British Socialist Government which, pursuing what Winston Churchill has called a sectarian and isolationist policy, has sought to strengthen all left-wing governments this side of the Iron Curtain and weaken all others? Was it the British Labor Party's desire for a socialized Europe that prompted Acheson to give his guaranty to Tito?

The policy of the United States with reference to the global pressures of Russia was ambiguous enough even before Marshall reentered the picture in September 1950. With Marshall again at Acheson's side, their captive President between them, there has been little doubt that we were treading the old path of appeasement of Russia.

Marshall's friends, the liberals of Yenan, shouldered their way into the war in Korea in December 1950. In January this Government agreed to the most abject poltroonery, the cease-fire offer to Peking, which, had it been accepted, would have resulted in our departure from Korea, the seating of the Chinese Reds in the United Nations, and placing the disposition of Formosa at the hazard of a commission weighted three to one against us. What saved us then I do not know.

Our escape was, however, only temporary.

After Marshall resumed his place as mayor of the palace in September 1950, with Acheson as captain of the palace guard and that weak, fitful, bad-

tempered and usable Merovingian in their custody, the outlines of the defeat they meditated grew even plainer. The weakness of the United States in relation to the growing power of Soviet imperialism became clearer. And our weakness has become plain to the simplest citizen, the farthest removed from the seat of Government in Washington, and would have been evident even without the shameless doubts of the President that we could win a war with Russia and the self-satisfied revelations of our poor estate as a world power by Marshall and his palace men before the Russell Committee.

The feeling of America's weakness is in the very air we breathe in Washington. It derives not only from the moral debility of the highest echelons of the administration, from the flabbiness and lack of resolve upon the part of the palace guard and their minions. It comes from the objective facts of the situation.

During the summer of 1945 America stood at what Churchill described as the "highest pinnacle of her power and fame." The President and the man who was to be his Secretary of Defense commanded the greatest military instrumentality on land, sea and in the air that the world had ever seen. Our forces had fought victoriously on every continent except the American—in Africa, in Europe, in Asia, and above, on and over the seven seas. The Soviet empire, which would have fallen before the Nazis but for our assistance, was nursing its wounds, but glowering, self-confident and on the march from its own weakness. Britain had declined into the incompetent, self-righteous and doctrinaire hands of its Labor Party. Britain was economically prostrated, its empire was dwindling and was to dwindle further.

Only the United States among the great powers found its economic strength undiminished, its Territories uninvaded and unswept by war, its full powers still unflexed. Everywhere America had friends, everywhere its power suggested friendship to others. In terms of the division of the world into spheres of interest, the United States, at the head of the coalition of the West, exercised friendly influence over nearly all the masses of the earth. The Soviet Union's own people and the few millions in the bordering satellites upon which it was already laying its hands constituted a small minority of the earth's peoples.

What do we find in the winter of 1951? The writs of Moscow run to lands which, with its own, number upward of 900 millions of people — a good forty per cent of all men living. The fear of Russia or the subservience that power inspires inclines many hundreds of other millions, as in India, toward Moscow. The fear of Russia, plus other reasons, the chief of which is the supine and treacherous folly of our own policies, places other hundreds of millions in a twilight zone between the great poles of Moscow and Washington.

The United States stands today virtually alone as it faces its greatest trials. Where have we loyal allies? In Britain? I would not stake a shilling on the reliability of a Government which, while enjoying billions in American munificence, rushed to the recognition of the Chinese Red regime, traded exorbitantly with the enemy through Hong Kong and has sought to frustrate American interest in the Far East at every turn. Let us not blame our longtime friends, the British people. They have their Attlee and Morrison directing their foreign policy. We have our Marshall. We have our Acheson. Or perhaps I should say their Acheson.

What of Western Europe generally? Have we a constant friend in that

quarter? The Marshall Plan has mystified and alienated while it enriched them; the Marshall strategy, which threatens to turn Western Europe into another devastated Korea, has rightfully terrified them and encouraged among them a neutralism which sees the coming world struggle as one between two reeling giants, Russia and the United States, in which they seek to avoid a part.

In Europe we have snubbed our friends, the heroic Greeks and Turks and the thoroughly indoctrinated anti-Communists of Spain; and because of our servility toward Russia in Eastern Europe we have discouraged the gallant souls behind the Iron Curtain who might have waited upon our deliverance of them, as the peoples oppressed by the Nazis did, only to find themselves betrayed to an equal tyranny by our appeasement. What do we find in Asia? We reject the friendship of the Chinese of Formosa and the millions on the mainland struggling to be free of the monstrous usurpation that overwhelms them. The new Japan may be our friend but the governments of India, of Pakistan, of Burma, of Indonesia—all of which rose from and owe their existence to our defeat of the Japanese empire—belong to the league of those who want to deprive us of our strategical interests in the western Pacific.

The will to resist Russia here at home is vitiated. Gone is the zeal with which we marched forth in 1941 to crush the dictatorships. The leftist-liberals who preached a holy war against Hitler and Tojo are today seeking accommodation with the senior totalitarianism of Moscow. Is this because we are today arrayed against, to recall the phrase of General Bradley, "the wrong enemy" in the "wrong war"? We were on Russia's side in the last war—our strategy after the first Quebec conference might as well have been dictated in the Kremlin and teletyped to the Pentagon —and is that why the Marshall who prosecuted World War II with bloodthirsty zeal, eager to storm fortified shores, sat this one out?

The administration preached a gospel of fear and Acheson and Marshall expounded a foreign policy in the Far East of craven appeasement. The President threatens the American people with Russian-made atomic bombs. What is the purpose of such actions and utterances? Is it to condition us to defeat in the Far East, to soften us up so that we shall accept a peace upon the Soviet empire's terms in Korea; a peace which would put the enemy one step nearer to Alaska? And how did Russia acquire the technical secrets, the blueprints, the know-how to make the bombs with which the administration seeks to terrify us? I have yet to hear a single administration spokesman raise his voice against the policy of suppression, deceit, and false witness with which this administration has protected the Soviet agents who have abstracted those secrets from us.

The people, I am convinced, recognize the weakness with which the administration has replaced what was so recently our great strength. They are troubled by it. And they do not think it accidental. They do not believe that the decline in our strength from 1945 to 1951 just happened. They are coming to believe that it was brought about, step by step, by will and intention. They are beginning to believe that the surrender of China to Russia, the administration's indecently hasty desire to turn Formosa over to the enemy and arrive at a cease-fire in Korea instead of following the manly, American course prescribed by MacArthur, point to something more than ineptitude and folly. They witness the conviction of Hiss, which would not

have happened had he not brought a private suit for damages against Whittaker Chambers; they follow the revelations in the Remington case, the Marzani case, and the others which have disclosed at the heart of Government active Soviet agents influencing policy and pilfering secrets; they note the policy of retreat before Soviet assertion from Yalta to this day, and they say: this is not because these men are incompetents, there is a deeper reason.

How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this Government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man.

Who constitutes the highest circles of this conspiracy? About that we cannot be sure. We are convinced that Dean Acheson, who steadfastly serves the interests of nations other than his own, who supported Alger Hiss in his hour of retribution, who contributed to his defense fund, must be high on the roster. The President? He is their captive. I have wondered, as have you, why he did not dispense with so great a liability as Acheson to his own and his party's interests. It is now clear to me. In the relationship of master and man, did you ever hear of a man firing master? President Truman is a satisfactory front. He is only dimly aware of what is going on.

It is when we return to an examination of General Marshall's record since the spring of 1942 that we approach an explanation of the carefully planned retreat from victory. Let us again review the Marshall record, as I have disclosed it from the sources available. This grim and solitary man it was who, early in World War II, determined to put his impress upon our global strategy, political and military.

It was Marshall who, amid the din for a "second front now" from every voice of Soviet inspiration, sought to compel the British to invade across the Channel in the fall of 1942 upon the penalty of our quitting the war in Europe.

It was Marshall who, after North Africa had been secured, took the strategic direction of the war out of Roosevelt's hands and who fought the British desire, shared by Mark Clark, to advance from Italy into the eastern plains of Europe ahead of the Russians.

It was a Marshall-sponsored memorandum, advising appeasement of Russia in Europe and the enticement of Russia into the Far Eastern war, circulated at Quebec, which foreshadowed our whole course at Teheran, at Yalta, and until now in the Far East.

It was Marshall who, at Teheran, made common cause with Stalin on the strategy of the war in Europe and marched side by side with him thereafter.

It was Marshall who enjoined his chief of military mission in Moscow under no circumstances to "irritate" the Russians by asking them questions about their forces, their weapons, and their plans, while at the same time opening our training schools, factories, and gradually our secrets to them.

It was Marshall who, as Hanson Baldwin asserts, himself referring only to the "military authorities," prevented us having a corridor to Berlin. So it was with the capture and occupation of Berlin and Prague ahead of the Russians.

It was Marshall who sent Deane to Moscow to collaborate with Harriman in drafting the terms of the wholly unnecessary bribe paid to Stalin at Yalta. It was Marshall who ignored the contrary advice of his senior, Admiral Leahy, of MacArthur and Nimitz; manipulated intelligence re-

ports, brushed aside the potentials of the A-bomb, and finally induced Roosevelt to reinstate Russia in its pre-1904 imperialistic position in Manchuria; an act which, in effect, signed the death warrant of the Republic of China.

It was Marshall, with Acheson and Vincent assisting, who created the China policy which, destroying China, robbed us of a great and friendly ally, a buffer against the Soviet imperialism with which we are at war.

It was Marshall who went to China to execute the criminal folly of the disastrous Marshall mission.

It was Marshall who, upon returning from a diplomatic defeat for the United States at Moscow, besought the reinstatement of forty millions in lend-lease for Russia.

It was Marshall who for two years suppressed General Wedemeyer's report, which is a direct and comprehensive repudiation of the Marshall Policy.

It was Marshall who, disregarding Wedemeyer's advices on the urgent need for military supplies, the likelihood of China's defeat without ammunition and equipment, and our "moral obligation" to furnish them, proposed instead a relief bill bare of military support.

It was the State Department under Marshall, with the wholehearted support of Michael Lee and Remington in the Commerce Department, that sabotaged the $125,000,000 military-aid bill to China in 1948.

It was Marshall who fixed the dividing line for Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel, a line historically chosen by Russia to mark its sphere of interest in Korea.

It was Marshall's strategy for Korea which turned that war into a pointless slaughter, reversing the dictum of Von Clausewitz and every military theorist after him that the object of war is not merely to kill but to impose your will on the enemy.

It is Marshall-Acheson strategy for Europe to build the defense of Europe around the Atlantic Pact nations, excluding the two great wells of anti-Communist manpower in Western Germany and Spain and spurning the organized armies of Greece and Turkey — another case of following the Lattimore advice of "let them fall but don't let it appear that we pushed them."

It was Marshall who, advocating timidity as a policy so as not to annoy the forces of Soviet imperialism in Asia, admittedly put a brake on the preparations to fight, rationalizing his reluctance on the ground that the people are fickle and, if war does not come, will hold him to account for excessive zeal.

If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would have dictated that at least some of his decisions would have served this country's interest. Even if Marshall had been innocent of guilty intention, how could he have been trusted to guide the defense of this country further? We have declined so precipitously in relation to the Soviet Union in the last six years, how much swifter may be our fall into disaster with Marshall's policies continuing to guide us? Where will all this stop? This is not a rhetorical question; ours is not a rhetorical danger. Where next will Marshall's policies, continued by Acheson, carry us?

What is the objective of the conspiracy? I think it is clear from what has occurred and is now occurring: to diminish the United States in world affairs, to weaken us militarily, to confuse our spirit with talk of surrender in the Far East and to impair our will to resist evil. To what end? To the end that we shall be contained and frustrated and finally fall victim to

Soviet intrigue from within and Russian military might from without. Is that far-fetched? There have been many examples in history of rich and powerful states which have been corrupted from within, enfeebled and deceived until they were unable to resist aggression.

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## APPENDIX A

## SOURCE MATERIAL


Winston Churchill — **The Hinge of Fate**

Admiral William Leahy — **I Was There**

Cordell Hull — **Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II**

Henry L. Stimson — **On Active Service**

James F. Byrnes — **Speaking Frankly**

Sumner Welles — **Seven Decisions That Shaped History**

Edward Stettinius, Jr. — **Roosevelt and the Russians**

Robert Sherwood — **Roosevelt and Hopkins**

Hanson Baldwin — **Great Mistakes of the War**

General H. H. Arnold — **Global Mission**

General Claire Chennault — **Way of a Fighter**

General Lucius Clay — **Decision in Germany**

General Mark Clark — **Calculated Risk**

General John R. Deane — **Strange Alliance**

General Omar Bradley "The War America Fought," **Life** magazine, April 30, 1951

George Morgenstern — **Pearl Harbor**

Edward Ansel Mowrer — **The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy**

Jonathan Daniels — **The Man of Independence**

Freda Utley — **The China Story**

Henry Wallace — **Soviet Asia Mission**

Robert Payne — **Mao Tse-tung—Ruler of Red China**

Arthur Upton Pope — **Litvinoff**

**U. S. Relations with China** (State Department White Paper)

Hearings before Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking and Currency, June 17, 1947.

Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tydings Committee), April 27, 1950.

William C. Bullitt, General Patrick Hurley, and others, as quoted in above books.

APPENDIX B

## PRESS REACTION TO THE SPEECH

Generally speaking, the press reaction was extremely bad during the first few weeks after the Marshall speech was made.

Columnist George Sokolsky recognized this when he wrote:

> The immediate newspaper reports were based not upon the Senator's 60,000-word speech, but on a supposition of what he might have said.
>
> In current journalism, this is called "high-lighting" and is generally inaccurate and distorted.
>
> So I waited until I could get a full copy of the speech; read the whole of 60,000 words and realized that the Senator had done a decent job of research and analysis.
>
> * * * [His] bibliography is important because it shows not a single enemy—personal or political—of General Marshall, unless it be Winston Churchill, with whom Marshall did not see eye-to-eye during phases of the war.
>
> The point of this piece is to suggest that the speech ought to be read; ought to be taken seriously; and should be discussed.
>
> It is apparent throughout that Senator McCarthy, while not approving of General Marshall, devotes most of his long speech not to his own views but to quotations from others.

The bad press which the speech received fell roughly into three groups:

(1) The papers which honestly felt that Marshall was a "great hero" and that it was very wrong and un-American to give any part of his history which would tend to discredit him.

(2) A much more sizeable group of papers, the editorial reaction of which was based not upon the content of the speech but upon very abbreviated wire service reports thereon.

The best example of this group is a large eastern paper which editorialized vigorously against the Marshall speech, basing the editorial on misquotes from the speech. While the editor of this paper had differed energetically with me before, he had always based his editorials on the facts as they were. After reading his Marshall editorial, I sent him a copy of the speech, asking him to read it and point out where I had thrown any "mud" or done any of the "character assassination" he wrote of in his editorial.

The following excerpt from his letter answering me demonstrates the honesty of the typical American newspaperman:

> We are very grateful to you for pointing out to us the errors in our editorial of June 18th.
>
> Believe me, our errors were unintentional. We went off half-cocked on the basis of a wire service story without checking your speech for ourselves.

(3) The third group, and of course the loudest, was made up of the official Communist papers such as the *Daily Worker,* which bitterly condemned McCarthy in a stream of editorials and colorfully lauded General Marshall as a "great hero." A few days after the Marshall speech the *Daily Worker* denounced General MacArthur and myself as the "two most vociferous architects of fascist propaganda."

"An integral part of the technique," wrote the Communist *Daily Worker* in referring to the "fascism" of General MacArthur and myself, "is the gutter insult hurled at individuals such as Truman, Acheson and Marshall, whose high positions, irrespective of their character, would in ordinary times pro-

tect them from personal attacks of this sort."

Papers like the *Compass,* New York *Post,* Washington *Post,* St. Louis *Post-Dispatch,* Milwaukee *Journal* and Madison *Capital-Times* editorialized in almost the same words as the *Daily Worker* and with equal viciousness against the Marshall history.

There was no attempt to discuss the important documented facts in the speech taken from the memoirs and writings of more than 20 authors either actively engaged in or closely associated with the events of the war and postwar period. Instead they released a torrent of adjectives. In fact, one such newspaper editor wrote me following the Marshall speech and announced that he did not and would not read the "garbage" which I "dumped into the Congressional Record on June 14th," but that he would take care of me and discuss the speech in his editorial columns.

Following are some typical examples of the camp-following press's answer to this 60,000 word documented history of Marshall:

Milwaukee *Journal:* "Garbage . . . Beserk eruption. . . . New outburst of . . . misstatements, misquotations, and vilification."

Madison *Capital-Times:* "Smear marathon. . . . Sickening show of demagogic smear attacks."

Chicago *Sun:* "Innuendoes, half-truths and deliberate misrepresentations. . . . Scurrilous type of attack."

*Compass:* "Cowardly smears and lies. . . . Wisconsin's rabble-rouser."

Washington *Post:* "Pipsqueak. . . . Foulness. . . . Barker's hoopla. . . . Same old hokum."

St. Louis *Post-Dispatch:* "Outrageous performance. . . . Character assassination."

Columnist Stewart Alsop: "Evil-smelling effort."

Columnist Marquis Childs: "Nasty political mud. . . . Mudslinging."

Here is how one national magazine reported the Marshall speech:

> . . . an attack on Secretary of Defense George Marshall by Wisconsin's poison-tipped Joe McCarthy. Despite McCarthy's loud advance promise to expose "a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man," only a dozen Senators were on hand when he began. In familiar fashion, McCarthy twisted quotes, drew unwarranted conclusions from the facts he did get right. . . .

It meant nothing to them, of course, that they could not find a single quotation that was twisted. Nor were they concerned about misquoting the record —a record which showed that I never even remotely promised to expose "a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history as man," but had merely promised to give a cold, documented history of one of the most powerful figures in American history.

In order to better understand the attitude of such magazines, it is important to review some of the adjectives used by them during my anti-Communist fight:

"Loud-mouthed . . . irresponsible . . . wretched burlesque . . . completely without evidence . . . hashed-over charges . . . scarehead publicity . . . tired old loyalty cases . . . desperate gambler . . . conspiratorial secrecy . . . mad man . . . weasel worded statements . . . senatorial immunity . . . noisily charging . . . vituperative smear . . . wild charges."

When one analyzes the camp-following, left-wing "news" coverage and comment on a carefully and thoroughly documented speech such as the Marshall speech, the question that arises is:

Why the deliberate distortion and suppression?

A part of the answer lies perhaps in the facts recently disclosed by Congressman Hill of Colorado and Willard Edwards, long-time Washington newspaperman. After weeks of work these men uncovered a large number of secret contracts made by the State Department, which revealed that the department used a $27 million slush fund last year to subsidize a number of radio commentators, cartoonists, writers and publishers. For example, the State Department paid over $2,000 for a book of Herbert Block's cartoons entitled *Herblock Looks at Communism*. Herbert Block is the political cartoonist for the Washington *Post*. He cartooned violently against my Marshall speech and has cartooned violently against every attempt to dig out unexposed Communists, including my anti-Communist fight.

The magazine which referred to misquotations in the Marshall speech — misquotations no one has yet been able to find in the speech—also received a heavy subsidy from the State Department this year, and in addition, according to a speech of Senator Harry Cain of Washington (April 10, 1950), was subsidized, as of December 31, 1949, in the amount of $343,800 by the government.

The twisted reporting by a combination of Communist camp-following elements of press and radio and the heavily subsidized elements of the same, together with their suppression of the speech, have made it necessary to publish this history of Marshall in book form so that it can be made available to the people of this nation.

The personal attacks and uncomplimentary adjectives leveled at me by the Communist and left-wing elements of the press were a matter of no consequence whatever. I do not relish the abuse of my detractors, nor do I quail before it. I cite these cases only to raise the question: Why the unwholesome hysteria? Why the slander? Why the suppression? Why did not one member of this segment of the press cite one misquotation that they spoke of, or one twisted fact that they screamed about? Why did not one answer any of the profound questions raised in that speech?

There were strong voices raised in the press over the fact that the documented facts on Marshall's history were overlooked or ignored by some parts of the press during the first few weeks after the speech was made.

The Washington *Times-Herald* wrote:

> Senator Joe McCarthy made a 60,000-word speech about General Marshall on June 14. The kept columnists and newspaper errand boys of the Pendergast mobsters have been screeching the house down ever since.
>
> They have suggested the Senator is a skunk, traitor, mud-slinger, faker of facts and all around candidate for horse-whipping. Are they right?
>
> We don't see how anybody can possibly say unless and until after examining the evidence. And right here and now, we will place a small bet . . . that not one of those who have been calling Joe McCarthy names since June 14th has actually done the basic homework job of reading the speech itself. . . .
>
> The writer of this editorial has read McCarthy's speech and finds it a challenge that will have to be met and dealt with, sooner or later.

John O'Donnell, columnist for the New York *News*, also raised this question:

> Without reading the text, all of Marshall's pinko, pseudo-liberal friends in press and radio, started

out on another smear-McCarthy campaign. This time the press and courtesans were in trouble — and so is General Marshall. For the McCarthy speech was a coldly-documented, carefully-edited and restrained indictment in which damning evidence marched steadily on the heels of accusation, where lie and reputation came face to face.

Perhaps the overall picture of the genuine, honest newspaperman's coverage of the speech is best illustrated by the following excerpts from the editorials of two typical mid-west papers:

We listened and read with growing alarm the comments of the daily press and radio. We heard McCarthy charged with crimes ranging from blasphemy to mere political dishonesty. Yet we were impressed, as we have been impressed on previous occasions, with the studied refusal of the McCarthy critics to discuss his basic charges. Nowhere did we read or hear direct references to McCarthy's text, or direct quotations from it. The critics simply told us that McCarthy had engaged in a wholesale slander of General Marshall. We began to suspect that there might be a vast difference between what McCarthy said, and what the critics who disagree with him would have us believe he said.

So we did the logical thing—the thing the critics didn't do. We read the full text of McCarthy's speech on "America's Retreat—The Story of George Catlett Marshall." We read all 48 pages of it (not printed at government expense) direct from the Congressional Record.

(Polk County *Ledger,* Balsam Lake, Wis. Editor: Mason H. Bobson)

Many, ourselves included, were at first inclined to dismiss the Marshall speech as a McCarthy grandstand play for attention.

It has been brought to our attention that critics were out condemning McCarthy without knowing what his 60,000-word Senate speech contained. None of McCarthy's critics had challenged the documented charges against General George C. Marshall in that speech. They just criticized him for tearing down an American hero. We too have always regarded General Marshall as a great hero, and it is a shock to see an opposite viewpoint proved by Senator McCarthy.

Few people have read Senator McCarthy's speech, because of its length and the fact that it was not reproduced generally.

We decided to read the 60,000 word treatise on General Marshall. Several aspirins later we had gone through a copy taken from the Congressional Record.

Senator Joe McCarthy's discourse, which admittedly took 30 days' preparation by himself and several staff members, is, if true, a horrible indictment of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.

No one has answered the basic points made therein, not by McCarthy so much, but by quotations from the books of Winston Churchill, Admiral Leahy and a formidable array of General Marshall's close friends.

This document should be studied by more thinking people so they can judge for themselves what has gone on.

(Pierce County *Herald,* Ellsworth, Wis. Editor: H. F. Doolittle)

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